Committee Size. A review committee of five (5) persons appointed by the Police Chief shall establish selection criteria, screen, rank, and recommend qualified candidates for the position of Senior Community Service Officer.
Committee Size. The Employer and Union shall be limited to no more than three (3) members each at any bargaining session, with the understanding that each side may be represented by counsel or may call persons to appear for the purpose of giving pertinent testimony. It is understood, however, that no more than one (1) member of the Union shall be on duty at any bargaining session.
Committee Size. · The fraction h > 2 of weighted honest users in Algorand must translate into a “sufficiently honest” committee for BA⋆. BA⋆ has two parameters at its disposal: τ , which con- trols the expected committee size, and T , which controls the number of votes needed to reach consensus (T τ ). We would like T to be as small as possible for liveness, but the smaller T is, the larger τ needs to be, to ensure that an adversary does not obtain enough votes by chance. Since a larger com- mittee translates into a higher bandwidth cost, we choose two different parameter sets: Xxxxxx and τfinal for the final step, which ensures an overwhelming probability of safety regardless of strong synchrony, and Tstep and τstep for all other steps, which achieve a reasonable trade-off between liveness, safety, and performance. To make the constraints on τstep and Tstep precise, let us denote the number of honest committee members by д and the malicious ones by b; in expectation, b +д = τstep, but b +д can vary since it is chosen by sortition. To ensure liveness, as · we prove in Appendix C.2, BA⋆ requires 1 д +b ≤ Tstep · τstep bits are also random. The common coin is used only when CountVotes() times out, giving sufficient time for all votes to propagate through the network. If the committee member and д > Tstep τstep. Due to the probabilistic nature of how committee members are chosen, there is always some small chance that the b and × д for some step fail to satisfy the above constraints, and BA⋆’s goal is to make this probability negligible. Figure 3 plots the expected committee size τstep that is needed to satisfy both constraints, as a function of h, for a probability of violation of 5 10−9; Appendix B describes this computation in more detail. The figure shows a trade-off: the weaker the assumption on the fraction of money held by honest users (h), the larger the committee size needs to be. The results show that, as h approaches 2 , the committee size grows − × quickly. However, at h = 80%, τstep = 2, 000 can ensure that these constraints hold with probability 1 5 10−9 (using Tstep = 0.685). The constraints on τfinal and Tfinal are dictated by the proof of safety under weak synchrony; Appendix C.1 shows that τfinal = 10, 000 suffices with Tfinal = 0.74. With these parameters, BA⋆ ensures safety even if the lowest-priority block proposer is malicious (proposes dif- ferent blocks). Appendix C provides proofs of BA⋆’s safety under weak synchrony (§C.1), liveness under strong syn...
