Communication Overhead Sample Clauses
Communication Overhead. In this part, we compare the communication over- head of the proposed scheme with several existing schemes. We assume that the sizes of the elements in G1 and G are 128 bytes and 40 bytes, respectively. In addition, let the output of a hash function and the size of the time stamp are 20 bytes and 4 bytes, respectively. Moreover, we assume that the origin messages are included in the finite field Z∗ and have a size of 20 bytes. whether T ′ − Tvi ≤ ∆t holds. We focus on the analysis of the communication
5) Modification attack An adversary may modify a message and rebroad- cast it. However, we use keyed hash function H to au- thenticate messages. Without the group key kug, it’s difficult to generate a valid Hash. Any modification of message {PIDi, M, Tvi , MV } will cause MV ƒ= Hkug(PIDi, M, Tv ). The message can’t be authenti- overhead in the following three processes: authentica- tion message generation, authentication message verifi- cation, and group-key generation. The communication overhead of several schemes is listed in Table 5. In the scheme proposed by He et al. [4] the au- thentication message is {Mi, AIDi, Ti, Ri, σi}, where AIDi = {AID1, AID2}, {AID1, AID2, Ri} ∈ G, σi ∈ q cated and accepted. Therefore, our scheme can resist modification attack. Z∗, Ti is the timestamp, so the size of the authentica- tion message is 40 × 3 + 20 × 2 + 4 = 164 bytes. Table 2 Notations Notations Descriptions . Σ Tbp the execution time of one bilinear pairing operation eˆ Uˆ, Vˆ , where U, V ∈ G1 Tea the execution time of one point addition operation on ECC Tep the execution time of one exponentiation operation on point Th the execution time of one hash function operation using SHA-1 Tch the execution time of chebyshev’ encryption THkey the execution time of one keyed hash function operation using chaos map THkey 0.061ms In the scheme proposed by ▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [1] vehi- cles send messages as (M|| sig|| Yk|| Certk), where Certk = {Yk||Ei||DIDui ||γu||γv||c||λ||σ1||σ2}, {sig, Yk, Ei, DIDu , γu, γv} ∈ G1, {M, λ, σ1, σ2} ∈ Z∗, by adopting pseudonym changing at social spot strat- egy. Declarations Conflicts of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest. Data Availability All data generated or analysed during this study are included in this published article. References
1. ▇▇▇▇▇, M., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, P., ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇.▇.: Eaap: c is a hash operation result. Therefore, the communi- cation overhead is 7 × 128 + 5 × 20 = 996 bytes. The authentication message ...
Communication Overhead. The communication overhead is measured by the number of the messages. That is to say the overall communication overhead of the scheme is the summation of messages exchanged in cluster and messages exchanged among clusters. In order to compare these protocol conveniently, we assume the size of group is n, and the size of the each cluster is k. In IKA phase, members in cluster perform BD protocol and the message overhead is C1 b =n k [2k+k(k−1)] = n+nk. Among clusters the members perform TGDH protocol. According to Table 2. we know that the message overhead which the leaf nodes need to send is k ∑n/k i=1 hi , where hi is the height of leaf node i. So the message overhead in performing TGDH is t C1 : K ∑ i=1 n/k hi <K ∙ n/k ∙ log n/k = n ∙ log n/k . Therefore, we can compute the overall communication overhead in IKA phase as C1=C1 + C1 =n + nk + n · log n/k. In AKA (we only discuss single member joining in for short), a new member join in a certain cluster, all the members in this cluster must choose the random value again, so the overhead of
Communication Overhead. Since LKE and iLKE are two in-situ key establishment schemes, messages are transmitted for keying information distribution as well as pairwise key establishment. Compared to the existent key predistribution schemes, the additional traffic may appear to be a deathful weakness for the two schemes. However, polynomial shares are only transmitted
Communication Overhead. The proposed scheme communication overhead as compared with other existing schemes [8], [12], [23] and the computed values are shown in Tables 3, 4 and 5 and then design graph according to these computed values which are shown in Fig. 5. Communication overhead of our proposed scheme with schemes [8], [12], [23] is represented in Fig. 5 where our scheme shows 84.2% as compared to scheme [8], 85.7% efficiency than scheme [12] and 78.57% than [23]. TABLE III. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON WITH ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ET AL. Scheme Communication Overhead Communication Overhead Reduction in Percent ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [8] (1024+192)bits % = 84.2 % Proposed (128+16+48) bits TABLE IV. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON WITH ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇ ET AL. Scheme Communication Overhead Communication Overhead Reduction in Percent ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [12] (1024+320)bits % = 85.7 % Proposed (128+16+48) bits TABLE V. COMMUNICATION OVERHEAD COMPARISON WITH ▇▇▇ ET AL. Scheme Communication Overhead Communication Overhead Reduction in Percent ▇▇▇ et al. [23] 2(160+160+128)bits % = 78.57 % Proposed (128+16+48) bits ( ) Proposed Scheme
Communication Overhead. To measure the overhead of the communication, we use the size of the package exchange between the source node and the destination node as the criterion. If the source node needs to transit too large a package, it will consume the frequency bandwidth excessively. Therefore, the efficiency of the bandwidth allocation would not be very high. And the power cost of message exchanges would also reduce the life expectancy of the network. In Du et al.’s scheme, the node only needs to compare the indices of the pre- distributed secrets. With these indices, the node can check whether there is any overlap secret in the other node. If a node is pre-distributed into s secret, the size of these indices is s log2 n and the communication overhead of the Liu et al. is the same.
Communication Overhead. As the establishment of direct keys between a pair of nodes does not require handshakes between them, the major com- munication overhead lies with the establishment of indirect keys. Just like most existing security schemes that require handshakes between end nodes to negotiate a shared key, this overhead is inevitable. However, few analytical results about server to facilitate key agreement between any two nodes. The trusted server can be a potential failure point. Distributed methods are more secure. A simple method is the full pairwise key distribution, in which each pair of nodes in a network of N nodes is preloaded with a distinct symmetric key. Each node, however, must keep N 1 symmetric keys. Another two basic distributed methods are proposed by ▇▇▇▇ [2] and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [3], which feature the same amount of memory cost as the full pairwise key approach. Those distributed methods lack scalability and thus only suitable in small networks. Probabilistic schemes [4]–[22] can provide a certain level of scalability with the tradeoff that they can not guarantee that every pair of nodes establish a shared key. The memory cost of those schemes increases linearly with respect to the total number of nodes if they need to achieve a certain level of security or communication efficiency [23]. Moreover, those schemes are targeted at the key establishment between neighboring nodes, while our scheme can achieve the end-to- end key agreement. Combinatorial design techniques are proposed in [24], [25]. They can ensure key sharing between any pair of nodes. In their schemes, however, each key is reused by many sensor nodes. This leads to poor resilience to node compromise in that one compromised node can expose keys belongs to other noncompromised nodes. In addition, the memory cost of their schemes is roughly ( N) where N is the total number of nodes, while the memory cost of our scheme can be ( k N ), which is more scalable. Then, Shamir’s (s+1,T ) threshold secret sharing scheme [31] can be applied. Specifically, T shares can be calculated as g(1), g(2),... , g(T ) , (33) where T s + 1. Next, node u transmits the T shares to node v through multiple secure paths by following the method proposed in [30]. Suppose u and v have j mismatches in their IDs, which means there are j disjoint secure paths between them. Then node u may transmit T/j shares along each secure path to node v. Once node v gets s + 1 out of T shares, it can recover the polynomial g(x) and get the k...