Compromise Verdicts Sample Clauses

Compromise Verdicts. ‌ In the preceding model, Xxxxxxxx (2016) shows that in response to sentencing dis- cretion, both the optimal sentence and burden of proof go down. The exact arguments are not repeated here, but the intuition is that from Claim 1, the optimal sentence is less than the target. Next, the burden of proof goes down because the lighter sentence lowers the potential cost of a wrongful conviction. A sufficient condition for the result to hold is: c1(t)/c1(l∗) > u(t; t)/u(l∗; t). If, in going from the smaller sentence l∗ to the larger sentence t, the growth in the cost of a wrongful conviction outweighs the growth in the utility from punishing the guilty, then a trier-of-fact with sentencing discretion will engage in what looks to be a compromise verdict. Compared to a determinant sentence scheming, both the sentence and the burden of proof will be lower under a discretionary regime.

Compromise Verdicts. The idea of a compromise verdict requires a joint test. Do judges both convict more often and impose lower sentences in periods of greater judicial discretion? Con- sider how changes in review standards over the last decade have effectively varied the freedom of judges to choose a sentence outside of the guideline range. For various rea- sons, judges are averse to having their decisions overturned on appeal. A reverse and remand creates more work for a judge, incurs an obvious disutility, and might affect promotion opportunities if reversals become frequent (Xxxxxxx et al. 2013). Thus, when review standards are lax, judges have more discretion in sentencing. Xxxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxxxxxx (2011) and Xxxxxxxx and Xxxxxxxx (2010) provide evidence that judges are in fact constrained by the prospect of appellate review. One way to test for compromise verdicts is then to check whether conviction probabilities go up while sentences go down in periods of relatively lax review standards. Figure 1 shows the monthly rates of conviction and departures from the guidelines for judges in bench trials, along with the timing of the important laws and Supreme Court decisions outlined in Section III.1. These policy changes create the variation in judicial sentencing discretion exploited in the empirical test of compromise verdicts. The first period is one of relative discretion, with lax review standards (Xxxx x. US ), while the second is one of low discretion and strict review standards (PROTECT Act). In January 2005, the Xxxxxx decision created more discretion by rendering the guidelines advisory, and departure rates notably rise. In 2007, the Court ruled that a sentence within the guidelines could be held presumptively reasonable (Xxxx x. US ), but later that year, the Court simultaneously decided Gall and Xxxxxxxxx, stating (1) an out-of-range sentence could not be held presumptively unreasonable, and (2) judges were free to ignore the Congressional mandate of treating crack and powder cocaine in a 100-to-1 disparity. The period between Xxxx and Gall/Xxxxxxxxx can be construed as a period of less discretion since the guidelines provided a safe harbor for a judge averse to review. The period after Gall/Xxxxxxxxx is one of unequivocal discretion. Figure 4.1: Monthly Rates of Conviction and Guideline Departures in Bench Trials (deferential)

Compromise Verdicts. ‌ In each equation, the sign of the coefficient on the discretion regime dummy matches the prediction. Judges convict more frequently when given more discre- tion and impose more lenient sentences. However, the latter effect is not statistically significant. Likewise, a chi-square test of joint significance across the two stages fails to reject the null, with a p-value of 0.126.