The Basic Model. Consider a world consisting of two economies, North and South, denoted N and S.9 North is richer than South in the sense that it has a higher initial endowment of capital. Both economies have the same constant population size. A representative agent in each economy seeks to maximize the following utility function: i −ρt ( ) −ρt ci (t)1−θ (1) U = ∫ e ⋅ u c(t) dt = ∫ e ⋅ 1 − θ 8While Alesina and Dollar (2000) argue that political rather than economic considerations underlie the aid given by developed countries in some cases, other studies, such as Xxxxxx (1985) claim that economic considerations typically motivate foreign aid. 9 These economies may be either two countries or two blocks of countries, as in the case of WTO negotiations. Without any loss of generality, we do not distinguish here between the two options. where ci (t) is per-capita consumption at economy i at time t, i ∈ {N, S}, ρ and θ are constants satisfying 0<ρ<1 and 0<θ<1. The agent has one unit of labor which is supplied inelastically, owns the capital in the economy and continuously rents it to firms. The lifetime budget constraint of the representative agent in each economy i is given by:
The Basic Model. The LA will organise and centrally store all necessary documentation relating to the registration of the NQTs in school. Quality assurance of registration forms, assessment reports and the NQT process in schools to support compliance of statutory regulations. The LA will liaise and communicate with the school’s NQT induction coordinator providing information upon request and advising on current procedures, changes in regulation and statutory guidance, and advising on any issues which may arise. The LA will sign-off the NQT at the completion of the induction year, complete all necessary documentation and formally submit to the Teaching Agency of the DfE as the statutory body. The LA will liaise and communicate with the Teaching Agency (the successor to the Teaching Development Agency and General Teaching Council of England) on request and where applicable. A ‘welcome’ session for all NQTs and Induction Mentors in the Autumn term Maintain standards through a rigorous quality assurance procedure; including sampling of practice across the boroughs. Provide an NQT induction update and professional development session for Induction Coordinators/Induction Mentors, for all new Mentors, or those requiring refresher training (expected every 3 years). £500 per NQT for Academies, Free Schools and Independent Schools. Additional in-school support will be charged as follows: Consultant visits/support per day - £650 Register NQTs with the local authority, as the Appropriate Body and have registration approved, before Induction officially commences. Develop an in-school NQT induction programme which will complement any outside CPD provision. Provide internal support and mentoring for the NQT, including arrangement of release time. Ensure that the NQT has an action plan relating to their targets for development against the required Teaching Standards and their continuing professional development. Provide or source constructive assessment of teaching to support the NQT Where appropriate liaise with the LA NQT coordinator, giving early warning if the NQT is causing concern, and failing to make the expected progress. Provide the local authority, on request, with such information as is deemed necessary, by the LA, to allow the fulfilment of statutory duties. Keep all records relating to individual NQTs’ Induction for a period of six years The LA will: Provide the basic model as above. Promote Hammersmith and Fulham and the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea at NQT recruit...
The Basic Model. All schools with NQTs in a suitable post, where contracted for one term or longer are expected to buy into this model, as a minimum, to ensure statutory obligations are met. Schools that choose not to buy in will be charged the rates shown in the Tri borough SLA for adviser support/advice.
The Basic Model. An individual plans to evaluate a continuous stream of evidence over a finite period with exogenous stopping time. After her evaluation, she decides which of two alternatives to adopt, C or A. The state of the world s ∈ {G, I} is unknown, and the individual wants to choose the alternative that corresponds to the true state—C in state G and A in state I. Following the convention in the committee voting literature, the notation reflects the running example of a criminal trial, where the defendant is either guilty (G) or innocent (I), and the juror decides whether to convict (C) or acquit (A), but the model applies to any choice of whether to adopt a status quo. The juror has preferences u(A; I) = u(C; G) = 0, u(C; I) = −p¯, and u(A; G) = −(1 − p¯) for p¯ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter p¯ captures the cost of a wrongful conviction relative to the cost of a false acquittal. It also defines a threshold of proof. As an expected utility maximizer, the juror prefers conviction if and only if she believes the defendant to be guilty with probability higher than p¯. The sum of incoming evidence is normalized to unity. At any moment in time a
(a) i(t) g(t)
(b) i(t) g(t) Information Information
1 1 0 m = 1 ... t = 1 0 t = 1 portion g(t) will support state G, and the rest, i(t), will support state I. Any extra- neous information is filtered out. As pictured in panel (b) of Figure 5.2, information need not arrive at a constant rate, but the primary focus will be the case where it does, as in panel (a). Aside from being a natural benchmark, a constant rate of information arrival can be motivated as a Xxxx equilibrium where opposing debaters choose when to present their evidence in order to convince a Bayesian audience of their position; see Section VII.
