Game Sample Clauses

Game. An inter-collegiate game played by the Team at the Stadium.

Game. 7.1. The Game allows the User to access the sports game simulator, enabling the User, among others, to create and develop User’s own virtual player (footballer) and virtual football team together with other Users. 7.2. In order for you to use the Game, we grant you with a personal, limited, revocable, non-exclusive, non-transferable and non-assignable license to display, view, play and use the Game on the Website. 7.3. This license is for your personal use only (therefore you cannot give away, sell, lend, gift, assign, sub-license or otherwise transfer your Account, items or any other Game features to someone else, unless expressly provided otherwise) and it does not give you any ownership rights to the Game. The above also applies to the paid functions of the Game. 7.4. The detailed information on how to use the Game and all of its features can be found in the information presented on the Website.

Game. A game is a baseball game which shall be considered played when one pitch is thrown in the first inning.

Game. Any exhibition, regular season game, preseason game, or postseason game (i.e., a game that occurs as a result of the Team making the playoffs in its league) between the Team and any opposing team at the Stadium.

Game. Any Home Game or Home Playoff Game.

Game. It simulates the probability of adversary’s winning without sending a ℎ query. For this, the adversary needs to forge (, , <1 >) and (, , < 2 >). Based on the difference lemma in consecutive games, the difference between 3 and 4 is insignificant. Thus, |Pr[ ()] − Pr[ ()]| ≤

Game. It simulates a situation in which the adversary issues a () query. This requires a successful implementation of (). The oracle flips the coin . If = 1, it returns the session key. Using ℎ query at most probability ℎ and query at most probability , the difference between this game and the previous one is |Pr[ ()] − Pr[ ()]| ≤ 2 +

Game. 5′ and 6′. In Game 5′, we abort if the adversary queries the KDF oracle with second component dh2, equal to the test session’s dh2 component (derived from EKu and IKv). Once again, B will simulate Game 4′. After receiving an HCDH instance triple (EA, π, EB), B will replace the ephemeral key of the test session with EA, and IKv with EB. B will then also replace the test session FO-proof with πT := π ⊕ H2(SIDH(EA, SK )) ⊕ H2(SIDH(IKu, EB)). Recall from the definition of the HCDH problem, that π already includes the component H2(SIDH(EA, EB)), as required, so πT has the correct form. There are two cases in which B will not be able to compute valid session keys for non-tested sessions. The first is for a session where any user initiates with EKE EKu, and v is the responder. This is because SIDH(XXX, XX) is unknown when the secret key of EKE is unknown. The second case is a special case of the first, when EKu is reused in an exchange with v as the responder. As above, at least one secret key is known in all other situations, so these are the only two SIDH exchanges unable to be computed by B. In the first case, B will look up all pairs (h, h′) in the polynomial-length output table of queries A has made to H2. Suppose IKw is the identity key of the initiator, and πE is the FO-proof sent along with the ephemeral key EKE. B will check whether H1(πE ⊕ h ⊕ h′ ⊕ H2(SIDH(IKw, EB))) is the secret key of EKE. As above, SIDH(IKw, EB) is known to B since the secret key of IKw is. Also as above, the only way for the adversary to have generated a valid proof πE is if they had made queries H2(dh2) and H2(dh3)—otherwise, even if the adversary guessed the outputs of H2 correctly (with negligible probability), they would not be able to verify that the πE they created was actually correct without making the required queries to H2 anyway. Hence, the only case the proof πE is accepted is when a valid pair (h, h′) exists in the query list of H2, and if such a pair is found, we can use the secret key to compute the needed j-invariant SIDH(XXX, XX). can now use this j-invariant in a query to KDF to compute a consistent session key. If no pair is found, the receiver would reject the FO-proof and fail the exchange.

Game. This game is over when the adversary obtains the original ID of oracle by issuing a () query. needs to calculate = ℎ( ∥ ), = , and = ℎ()⨁ . Assuming the nonce , the difference between this game and the previous one is |Pr[ ()] − Pr[ ()]| ≤ 2 +

Game. (1) Nitro-family personal computer (“PC”) game (2) Nitro-family online game