Relying Party Obligations. Before placing any reliance on a Time-Stamp, the Relying Party shall verify that the TST has been correctly signed and that the private key used to sign the TST has not been revoked. If this verification takes place after the end of the validity period of the certificate, the Relying Party should follow the guidance denoted in Annex D of ETSI EN 319 421. The Relying Party should take into account any limitations on usage of the time-stamp indicated by this Subscriber Agreement, the QV-TSP/PS, the TSA Disclosure Statement and any other precautions documented by QuoVadis.
Relying Party Obligations. As a Relying Party, you agree that:
Relying Party Obligations. The Relying Party shall:
Relying Party Obligations. When relying on a time-stamp token, the Relying Party shall verify that the time-stamp token was correctly signed and that the private key used to sign the time-stamp has not been revoked. During the validity period of the TSU's certificate, the validity of the signing key can be verified on the SwissSign CRL. If the verification takes place after expiry of the certificate's validity period, the relying party shall check whether the employed hash function, algorithms, and cryptographic key lengths can still be deemed secure. For further terms and conditions applicable to Relying Parties, refer to the TSA Disclosure Statement in the SwissSign TSA Policy and to other agreements between the parties.
Relying Party Obligations. Relying Parties shall rely on a certificate that has been issued by the PMA if (and only if): • the certificate has been used for the purpose for which it has been issued, as described in the Certificate Policies; • the Relying Party has verified the validity of the digital certificate, using procedures described in the X.509 standard and this section 5; • the Relying Party has established trust in the certificate by verifying the certificate path to a trust point, in accordance with the guidelines set by the X.509 standard; Relying parties must check revocation status of any certificates on which they wish to rely, by accessing the relevant CRLs and ARLs from the published source at the time of certificate validation. Relying parties must check the authenticity and integrity of the certificate status information by: • verifying that the CRL, ARL has been digitally signed using the Private Key corresponding with the digital certificate purported to have been used; • verifying the validity of the digital certificate, using procedures described in the X.509 standard; and • establishing trust in the CA who issued a certificate by verifying the certificate path in accordance with the guidelines set by the X.509 standard. If necessary, and if practical, the Relying Party shall check the subsequent CRL, ARL or certificate status message issued after the digital signature has been created to verify the on-going validity of the certificate that has been used. If a CRL, ARL or certificate status service is temporarily not available, a certificate has no status or value until the CRL, ARL or certificate status service becomes available once more. The Relying Party can make an informed decision as to whether to reject the certificate, or whether to accept the increased risk, responsibility and consequences of accepting the certificate.
Relying Party Obligations. 1. Before relying on a Certificate or a Digital Signature, Relying Parties must:
Relying Party Obligations. As a Relying Party, you are obligated to ensure the reasonableness of your reliance on any Information by:
