Transmission Capacity for Reserve Sharing. Each Party shall make transmission capacity available for reserve sharing by either redispatching its flowgates or holding TRM for generation outages in the other Party’s system. The Party responsible for making transmission capacity available for the reserve sharing obligation shall bear the costs of the redispatch to the extent the costs may be recovered under such Party’s OATT.
Transmission Capacity for Reserve Sharing. Each Party shall make transmission capacity available within the transmission system under its responsibility for generation reserve sharing. The Parties shall reserve the required TRM, or its equivalent, for those MAPP members that are part of the XXXX generation reserve sharing pool. The Party responsible for making transmission capacity available for the reserve sharing obligation shall bear the costs of any redispatch required to make the transmission capacity available. In those instances in which XXXX generation reserve sharing pool participants that are not members of the Midwest ISO seek emergency reserve deployment pursuant to the Restated Agreement reserve sharing provisions from units within the Market to delivery points on the XXXX-Midwest ISO seam, the pool participants that are not members of the Midwest ISO shall be subject only to charges associated with Schedules 1, 2, 7 or 8, and 10 under the Midwest ISO tariff. The Midwest ISO members of XXXX shall be subject to the charges under XXXX Schedule F, Schedules 1 and 5, and applicable member tariffs’ Schedules 1 and 2.
Transmission Capacity for Reserve Sharing. Each Party shall make transmission capacity available for reserve sharing by either redispatching its flowgates or holding TRM for generation outages in the other Party’s system. The Party responsible for making transmission capacity available for the reserve sharing obligation shall bear the costs of the redispatch to the extent the costs may be recovered under such Party’s OATT. Stakeholder comment: While not addressed specifically, effectively, the SPP criteria require the distribution of reserves throughout the region. It seems that MISO could allow its market to operate in such a way that the reserves are distributed in a manner that disproportionately impacts the shared flow gates. It seems like this section should address that the mechanism used for the distribution of the reserves in the regions should be similar or the differences and their impact on ATC should be taken into consideration.
