Verification Results Clause Samples

Verification Results. The results of the automated verification for the above formalized scheme are shown in Figure 4. Goals G1-G11 relate to the establishment of the session keys and check for the secrecy of the key components and their possessions by the legitimate corresponding users, while goals G12-G14 relate to the authenti- cation of the users. As presented in Figure 5, all security goals are successfully verified. This provides confidence in the correctness and effectiveness of the proposed protocol. In this section we discuss the computational complexity of our scheme and compare it with [20]. As mentioned before, [20] is the only other symmetric key based proxy re-encryption scheme in literature which does not assume that the sender and receiver possess in advance a prior secret key. From the sender side, both ALPKA 1 and ALPKA 2 require 8 hash opera- tions and 1 encryption. From the receiver side, 1 encryption and 5 hashes are required in ALPKA 1, while 1 encryption and 4 hashes in ALPKA 2. Taking into account that Key Derivation Functions (KDF) and Message Authentica- tion Codes (MAC) have similar complexity as a hash operation, therefore [20], requires 2 encryptions and 5 hashes at sender side and 2 encryptions and 4 hashes at receiver side. In order to get a better understanding of the impact of these numbers, we consider measurements performed on a smartphone with Android OS (Android 4.4 KitKat) consisting of a 2260 MHz ARM device. The timings for both AES128 as encryption algorithm and SHA2 as hash operation, correspond with 0.1 ms [32]. Consequently, both schemes have comparable and negligible computational complexity.
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Verification Results. ‌ Table 2 summarizes the properties and verification results. For ease of pre- sentation, when properties include statements, we replace statements with the augmented-transition numbers that we have added to Figures 9, 11, and 12 in Appendices F.1 and G.2. The number of states represents the reachable state space as evaluated by nuXmv. Blind Auction We analyzed both the initial and augmented models of the Blind Auction contract. On the initial model, we checked four safety properties (see Properties (i)–(iv) in Table 2). On the augmented model, which allows for more fine-grained analysis, we checked two additional safety properties. All properties were verified to hold. The models were found to be deadlock-free and their state space was evaluated to 54 and 161 states, respectively. The augmented model and generated code can be found in Appendix F. The DAO Attack We modeled a simplified version of the DAO contract. ▇▇▇▇▇ et al. [2] discuss two different vulnerabilities exploited on DAO and present different attack scenarios. Our verified safety property (Table 2) excludes the possibility of both attacks. The augmented model can be found in Appendix G.1.
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Verification Results. For each test, a similarity score is calculated as given in Equation 1 and Equation 2. The minimum score, the maximum score and the average score of the system are calculated for each subject. These scores are used as acceptance thresholds of the system one by one. For each different threshold, the corresponding False Accept Rate (FAR) and False Reject Rate (FRR) values of the system are calculated. FAR is the percentage of the impostor subjects who are accepted as genuine users; whereas FRR is the percentage of the genuine subjects who are rejected. As a result of these operations, the best Equal Error Rate (EER; the point where FAR = FRR) percentages are obtained when the maximum scores of the system is picked as the acceptance threshold. It is inevitable that an impostor subject cannot reach the maximum similarity score of a genuine subject. Figure 3 shows the FAR and FRR percentages when the maximum of the similarity scores, which are calculated using Equation 1, is picked as the acceptance threshold. As can be seen in this figure, our protocol achieves 0.57% EER when the optimum acceptance threshold is 5.99. This threshold value is the point where FAR and FRR curves intersect with each other. In order to minimize both FAR and FRR at the same time, their intersection point is considered. If the acceptance threshold is selected as the average score of the system, the EER lies at 5% with 2.15 acceptance threshold, as can be seen in Figure 4. On the other hand, if the acceptance threshold is selected as the minimum score of the system as in Figure 5, the EER is 10% and the acceptance threshold is 0.76. In Table II, all of these EER values that are calculated according to two different predefined similarity score equations are given. The explained results are summarized in this table as well. Equation Strategy EER (%) Equation 1 min 10 max 0.57 avg 5 Equation 2 min 10 max 0.57 avg 6.66
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Related to Verification Results

  • Verification Bank may, from time to time, verify directly with the respective Account Debtors the validity, amount and other matters relating to the Accounts, either in the name of Borrower or Bank or such other name as Bank may choose.

  • Verifications If Partner acquires Red Hat Products and/or Services directly from Red Hat, during the Term and for at least two (2) years thereafter, Partner will keep and maintain commercially reasonable written records regarding Partner’s use and distribution of the Red Hat Products and Services and business activities related to the Program(s) ("Records"). Red Hat may, at its own expense, verify the Records to determine Partner’s compliance with this Agreement. This verification may take the form of requests for information, documents or records (to which Partner will respond promptly), on-site visits (for which Partner shall grant Red Hat the requisite access), or both. The Parties will act reasonably and cooperate with each other in respect of such verifications. Any on-site visit will occur during regular business hours and will not interfere unreasonably with Partner’s business. For an on-site visit, Red Hat will give Partner at least thirty (30) day’s prior written notice.

  • E-VERIFICATION The Vendor represents and warrants that it will ensure its compliance with the Mississippi Employment Protection Act of 2008, and will register and participate in the status verification system for all newly hired employees. Mississippi Code Annotated §§71-11-1 et seq. The term “employee” as used herein means any person that is hired to perform work within the State of Mississippi. As used herein, “status verification system” means the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 that is operated by the United States Department of Homeland Security, also known as the E-Verify Program, or any other successor electronic verification system replacing the E-Verify Program. Vendor agrees to maintain records of such compliance. Upon request of the State and after approval of the Social Security Administration or Department of Homeland Security when required, Vendor agrees to provide a copy of each such verification. Vendor further represents and warrants that any person assigned to perform services hereafter meets the employment eligibility requirements of all immigration laws. The breach of this agreement may subject Vendor to the following: termination of this contract for goods or services and ineligibility for any state or public contract in Mississippi for up to three (3) years with notice of such cancellation/termination being made public; the loss of any license, permit, certification, or other document granted to Vendor by an agency, department or governmental entity for the right to do business in Mississippi for up to one (1) year; or,

  • Third Party Verification 4.8.1 The SPD shall be further required to provide entry to the site of the Power Project (from which power under this Agreement is being made available) free of all encumbrances at all times during the Term of the Agreement to SECI and a third Party nominated by any Indian Governmental Instrumentality for inspection and verification of the works being carried out by the SPD at the site of the Power Project. The SPD shall provide full support to SECI and/or the third party in this regard. 4.8.2 The third party may verify the construction works/operation of the Project being carried out by the SPD and if it is found that the construction works/operation of the Power Project is not as per the Prudent Utility Practices, it may seek clarifications from SPD or require the works to be stopped or to comply with the instructions of such third party.

  • Identity Verification In the case that the Subscriber provides telecommunication services to any Subscriber’s Customers pursuant to Section 8.1, the Subscriber is responsible for performing and shall perform personal identification of Subscriber’s Customer. SORACOM shall not bear any responsibility in relation to dealing with such matters.