Proposition 3 definition

Proposition 3. In the bargaining equilibrium, for any given k N , c N is decreasing in k S .

Proposition 3. With banks’ effort, when μe2 , Δ ( ) > ,that is, banks’ profits increase, where, (κ +θ )4 φ > κ 4 . E Rb 0 φ = − > 0 ⎣ ⎦ 2λ ⎡(κ +θ )2 + λρσ 2 ⎤ 2λ ⎡⎣κ 2 + λρσ 2 ⎤⎦ The difference of the incentive coefficients in two cases is as follows: ⎡ ΔE (R ) = E* (R ) − E* (R ) = ⎢ (κ + θ )4 − κ 4 ⎤ μe2 ⎥ −

Proposition 3. With quantity competition and uncertain cost or demand specific intercept, welfare is greater when both firms share if and only if B < δ2(20 − 3δ2)/(20 + δ2). Inspection of proposition 3 shows that there does not exist δ such that when the union has all of the pricing power (B=1), welfare increases with information sharing: for δ∈(-1,1), δ2(20 − 3δ2)/(20 + δ2) is increasing in δ, and at δ=1, δ2(20 − 3δ2)/(20 + δ2) = 17/21. The intuition is that the information leads the union to induce output changes that are in the opposite direction of what would increase welfare. A lower cost firm receives a higher wage and so produces less, while a higher cost firm receives a lower wage inducing it to produce more. On the other hand, when the union has relatively little pricing power, welfare increases from information sharing because of the interaction between the firms. Thus, as δ decreases (so that the interaction between the firms decreases) information sharing is less likely to raise welfare. That welfare decreases with information sharing when the union has the pricing power is the opposite of what is found in Li (2002), pointing to the effect of differential wages. Worse, comparing proposition 2 and 3 shows that the critical threshold in pricing power for producer surplus to increase is always greater than that for welfare. Thus, Corollary: With quantity competition and uncertain cost or demand specific intercept, for all δ∈(0,1), there exists a pricing power B such that the union can profitably induce the firms to share, but welfare decreases.

Examples of Proposition 3 in a sentence

• Since the strategy profile is subgame-perfect, it follows from Proposition 3 that s > p, implying that αs > πs.

• Note that every member can compute the group key (see Proposition 3) since: – All existing members only need the new member’s blinded session random.

• While showing this we also obtained interesting side results, such as Proposition 3, which provides a novel characterization of weak pullback preservation.

• Whether the agents only determine the most specific diagnoses depends on the type of diagnosis they use; i.e. consistency based or abductive based: Proposition 3 Pure abductive diagnosis may not produces less specific diagnoses.

• Proposition 3 shows how wSNI bridges the gap between vanilla and general sandboxing.

• For the second part of Proposition 3, first remark that, since b1(e1)−b1(e1−w1∗) is decreasing with e1 ∈ [e1, e¯1] for every w1∗ ∈ (0, ei), b1(e1) − b1(e1 − w1∗) ≥ b1(e1) − b1(e1 − w1∗) for every e1 ∈ [e1, e¯1] with a strict inequality for e1 > e1.

• C Proof of Proposition 3 The proof of the first part of Proposition 3 is similar than the proof of Proposition 2.

• Our initial scope of services included bidding and construction of one single project for Proposition 4 and one project for Proposition 3.

• By Proposition 3, we have that NC1 (uπ(|U|)) = NG(uπ(|U|)) = NC2 (uπ(|U|)).

• S succeeds with probability ((n − n1)2m)−1 Pr(E.2.1.1), and contradicts Proposition 3, unless Pr(E.2.1.1) is negligible.

More Definitions of Proposition 3

Proposition 3. An increase in the size of the northern region reduces the stability of the market sharing agreement.

Proposition 3. Shall Section 2 of Article II of the Charter be amended to clarify that the City’s authority to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public shall be consistent with the laws and constitution of the United States as well as the State of Texas? □ For □ Against In the event that Proposition 3 is approved by the voters on November 4, 2014, Section 2 of Article II of the Pampa Charter shall thereafter read as follows:

Proposition 3. For any given k N , the smaller kS the higher c N . Proof: See Appendix C ■ In summary, this section shows that North gains more from aid tied to trade, than from free trade, and that North's share of the surplus created by cooperative solution is higher the poorer is the other country.

Proposition 3. If the sentence is harsh (l > t), then ∂p(l, t) > 0. If the sentence is ∂l S lenient (l > t), then ∂p(l, t) 0. ∂l In both Claim 1 and Proposition 3, either the actual or the target sentence is held constant. However, the general version of the conviction paradox would allow for both the actual sentence and the burden of proof to vary simultaneously.