Anticompetitive. Practices - Compaq will not tolerate anticompetitive practices by its suppliers, including efforts to allocate markets or customers among their competitors or to fix bids.
Anticompetitive practices Each Party shall, in accordance with its laws and regulations, take measures which it considers appropriate against anticompetitive practices, in order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement.
Anticompetitive. Business Practices The Namibian Competition Act aims to remove or reduce the distorting effects resulting from: • Collusive practices; • Abuse of dominant position; and • Mergers.
Anticompetitive. Activities
Anticompetitive. Effects Xxxxxxx and Foseco are two of only three firms that manufacture and sell the vast majority of ladle shrouds and stopper rods to U.S. customers. Xxxxxxx and Xxxxxx have competed with one another on price, service, and innovation in the markets for stopper rods and ladle shrouds. The markets for ladle shrouds and stopper rods would become substantially more concentrated if Xxxxxxx acquires Foseco. For example, Xxxxxxx and Foseco would have a combined share of approximately 75 percent. Using a measure of market concentration called the Xxxxxxxxxx- Xxxxxxxxx Index (‘‘HHI’’) (defined and explained in Appendix A), the proposed transaction will increase the HHI in both markets by approximately 700 points to a post-transaction level in excess of 6000. Customers request bids from ladle shroud and stopper rod suppliers and consider price, quality, service, and innovation when selecting the winning bidder. The proposed acquisition will eliminate Foseco as an independent bidder. This reduction in the number of active bidders from three to two will reduce competition and likely will result in higher prices and/or reductions in service and innovation for a significant number of customers in the markets for ladle shrouds and stopper rods. The likely anticompetitive effects are heightened due to customers’ preferences to maintain supply relationships with two independent suppliers simultaneously. In light of such preferences, the proposed acquisition will eliminate competition to be a customer’s second supplier. Moreover, manufacturers outside of North America likely will not have the incentive or ability to defeat an anticompetitive increase in price or reduction in service or innovation because of their high delivered costs, need to acquire capital equipment and manufacturing facilities in North America; assemble or develop manufacturing, technical, and personnel expertise; conduct extensive customer trials; and establish a reputation for quality and reliability among U.S. customers. An entrant undertaking these steps would need to undertake these steps would be unable to enter in less than two years. There are foreign firms with a share of the U.S. market for more complex CBCs. Because of the expertise and reputation they have developed in these markets, theoretically they are capable of entering the domestic market for ladle shrouds and stopper rods. None of these firms, however, is likely to open North American manufacturing facilities within the next several...
Anticompetitive. Effects of the Merger The Complaint alleges that the proposed merger likely will substantially reduce competition to supply newsprint in the United States. Abitibi and Bowater are the two largest North American newsprint producers, and they directly compete against one another to produce and sell newsprint. Abitibi and Xxxxxxx currently own approximately 25 percent and 16 percent of North American newsprint capacity, respectively, which will result in a post-merger share of over 40 percent.5 North American newsprint demand has declined over the last several years at a rate of approximately 5 to 10 percent per year because of a significant decline in demand for newspapers. As a result, North American newsprint producers have closed or idled capacity and converted some of their newsprint machines to produce other grades of paper. This decline in demand for newsprint is projected to continue, and the resulting excess newsprint capacity likely will lead Defendants and their competitors to close, idle, or convert more newsprint xxxxx. But for the merger, neither Defendant acting alone would be of sufficient size to profitably increase the price of newsprint by reducing its own output through strategically closing, idling, or converting its capacity. The combination enhances Defendants’ incentives to exercise market power because the merged firm will control a greater base of capacity over which the merged firm would benefit from an increase in newsprint prices after strategically closing, idling, or converting some of its capacity. Without Snowflake’s capacity, the merged firm would not be of sufficient size to be able to recoup the losses from such strategic closures through increases in prices on its remaining newsprint production. The divestiture of Snowflake would adequately address the likelihood that the proposed merger substantially would reduce competition for newsprint in the United States.
Anticompetitive practices may include abuse of dominant position, and all practices and conducts, individual or concerted, that have the effect of restricting, limiting, preventing or distorting competition in the telecommunications market.
Anticompetitive. Practices Refers to concerted practices, agreements, express or tacit anticompetitive practices or coalitions, including through the intermediary, whether directly or indirectly, of a company within a group located in any country within the meaning of Article 420-1 of the French Commercial Code (Code de commerce), in particular where said practices have or may have the effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition within a market, especially where they may entail: limiting access to a market or hindering the exercise of free competition by other companies; hindering the setting of prices by market forces by artificially promoting higher or lower prices; limiting or controlling production, market opportunities, investments or technical progress; sharing markets or sources of supply.
Anticompetitive procedures—(1) Fil- ing requirements. In order to facilitate Commission review of the anticompeti- tive effects of applications for CWIP pursuant to § 35.26(c)(3), a public utility applying for rates based upon inclusion of such CWIP in rate base must include the following information in its filing:
