CRR’s Eligibility for Recovery of Intervenor Costs. RSA 365:38-a authorizes the Commission to allow recovery of costs associated with utility proceedings before the Commission if such recovery is just and reasonable as well as in the public interest. The subject utility is the source of such recovery. The statute limits such recovery to utilities and “other parties,” the latter specifically defined as “retail customers that are subject to the rates of the utility and who demonstrate financial hardship,” with municipalities specifically excluded from the definition. Further, according to the statute, recovery by “other parties” is in the public interest “when, in any commission proceeding, the other party substantially contributed to the adoption by the commission, in whole or in part, of a position advocated by the other party in that proceeding, or in a judicial review of that proceeding.” Recovery is limited to $10,000. The first issue we must decide is whether CRR is eligible to obtain intervenor compensation under the statute. For CRR to be eligible, it must meet the “retail customers” and “financial hardship” requirements of the statute. We conclude that it does. CRR includes among its members customers of PSNH who are subject to the retail rates of PSNH. In these circumstances, we are unable to agree with PSNH that CRR is ineligible for RSA 365:38-a cost recovery because the organization is itself not a customer of the subject utility. In construing RSA 365:38-a, we are obliged to ascribe to the statute the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used, in a manner that effects the overall purpose of the statute and avoids absurd or unjust results. Xxxxxxx-Xxxxxx Properties, LLC v. Town of Xxxxxx, 148 N.H. 769, 771 (2002). It would be plainly at variance with the purpose of RSA 365:38-a to deny a group of utility customers cost recovery under the statute solely because (1) they created an organization for the purpose of conducting ratepayer advocacy rather than intervening individually, and (2) maintained an office for that purpose outside of the service territory of the utility in question. We reach that view based on the plain meaning of the words in the statute. However, even if we found the statute to be ambiguous on this score, thus justifying recourse to the relevant legislative history, see In re Xxx Xxxxx Builder, Inc., 150 N.H. , , 837 A.2d 335, 337 (2003), our conclusion would be the same. On May 29, 1999, the chief sponsor of the bill that led to RSA 365:38-a, Representative Xxxxxxx, address...
