December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The 1974 verifi- cation protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol. Treaty and protocol texts: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993)
December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any individual underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons or any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1500 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The 1976 verifi- cation protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol. Treaty text: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993) The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to destroy all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500–5500 kilo- metre (intermediate-range, 1000–5500 km; and shorter-range, 500–1000 km) and their launchers by 1 June 1991. A total of 2692 missiles were eliminated by May 1991. In 1994 treaty membership was expanded to include Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. For 10 years after 1 June 1991 on-site inspections were conducted to verify compliance. The use of surveillance satellites for data collection has continued after the end of on-site inspections on 31 May 2001. Treaty text: US Department of State, <xxxx://xxx.xxxxx.xxx/x/xxx/xxxx/000000.xxx> The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to make phased reductions in their offensive strategic nuclear forces over a seven-year period. It set numerical limits on deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs)—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched bal- listic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers—and the nuclear warheads they carry. In the Protocol to Facilitate the Implementation of START (1992 Lisbon Protocol), which entered into force on 5 December 1994, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also assumed the obligations of the former USSR under the treaty. A follow-on treaty, New START, entered into force on 5 February 2011. Treaty and protocol texts: US Department of State, <xxxx://xxx.xxxxx.xxx/x/xxx/xxxx/000000. htm> The treaty obligated the parties to eliminate their MIRVed ICBMs and reduce the number of their deployed strategic nuclear warheads to no more than 3000–3500 each (of which no more than 1750 may be deployed on SLBMs) by 1 January 2003. On 26 September 1997 the two parties signed a Protocol to the treaty providing for the extension until the end of 2007 of the period of imple- mentation of the treaty. Treaty and protocol texts: US Department of State, ...
December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The 1974 verification protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol. Either party may withdraw from the treaty, having given the other 12 months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extra- ordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter. Treaty and protocol texts: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993), <xxxxx://xxxxxxxx. xx.xxx/xxx/Xxxxxxxxxxx/XXXX/Xxxxxx 1714/v1714.pdf>, pp. 217–301 The treaty cannot be terminated while the TTBT is in force. If the TTBT is terminated, then either party may withdraw from this treaty at any time. Treaty and protocol texts: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993), <xxxxx://xxxxxxxx. xx.xxx/xxx/Xxxxxxxxxxx/XXXX/Xxxxxx 1714/v1714.pdf>, pp. 432–72 The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to destroy all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500–5500 kilometres (intermediate-range, 1000–5500 km; and shorter-range, 500–1000 km) and their launchers by 1 June 1991. The treaty established a special verification commission (SVC) to promote its objectives and implementation. A total of 2692 missiles were eliminated by May 1991. For 10 years after 1 June 1991 on-site inspections were conducted to verify compliance. The use of sur- veillance satellites for data collection continued after the end of on-site inspec- tions on 31 May 2001. In 1994 treaty membership was expanded to include Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. A party may withdraw from the treaty, having given six months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter. Treaty text: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1657 (1991), <xxxxx://xxxxxxxx.xx.xxx/xxx/ Publication/UNTS/Volume 1657/v1657.pdf>, pp. 4–167 The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to make phased reductions in their offensive strategic nuclear forces over a seven-year period. It set numerical limits on deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs)—intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers—and the nuclear warheads they carry. In the Protocol to Facilitate the Implementation of START (1992 Lisbon Protocol), which entered into force on 5 December 1994, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine also assumed t...
December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The 1974 verification protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol. Either party may withdraw from the treaty, having given the other 12 months’ notice, if it decides that its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter. Treaty and protocol texts: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993), <xxxxx://xxxxxxxx. xx.xxx/xxx/Xxxxxxxxxxx/XXXX/Xxxxxx 1714/v1714.pdf>, pp. 217–301 The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any individual underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons or any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1500 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The treaty established a joint consultative commission to promote its objectives and implementation. The 1976 verification protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol. The treaty cannot be terminated while the TTBT is in force. If the TTBT is terminated, then either party may withdraw from this treaty at any time. Treaty and protocol texts: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993), <xxxxx://xxxxxxxx. xx.xxx/xxx/Xxxxxxxxxxx/XXXX/Xxxxxx 1714/v1714.pdf>, pp. 432–72 The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to destroy all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500–5500 kilometres (intermediate-range, 1000–5500 km; and shorter-range, 500–1000 km) and their launchers by 1 June 1991. The treaty established a special verification commission (SVC) to promote its objectives and implementation. A total of 2692 missiles were eliminated by May 1991. For 10 years after 1 June 1991 on-site inspections were conducted to verify compliance. The use of surveillance satellites for data collection continued after the end of on-site inspections on 31 May 2001. In 1994 treaty membership was expanded to include Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. On 2 February 2019 the USA notified the other parties that it would withdraw from the treaty in six months, citing the alleged deployment by Russia of a missile in breach of the treaty’s limits. The USA and then Russia also suspended their obligations under the treaty. The withdrawal came...
December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons. The 1974 verification protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol.
December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any individual under- ground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilo- tons or any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1500 kilo- tons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The convention prohibits military or any other hostile use of environmental modifi- cation techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to states party to the convention. The term ‘environ- mental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space. The understandings reached during the negotiations, but not written into the convention, define the terms ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’.
December 1990. AK, 28 November 1991
December 1990. Memorandum of Understanding to provide a framework for cooperative activities necessary to develop, implement, maintain, and enhance a Watchable Wildlife Program on Federal and State lands, and to assist private landowners. (The signatories were the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, Defense and several non-governmental organizations.)
December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any individual underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceed- ing 150 kilotons or any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1500 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The 1976 verification protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol. Treaty and protocol texts: United Nations Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993), <xxxxx://xxxxxxxx. xx.xxx/xxx/Xxxxxxxxxxx/XXXX/Xxxxxx 1714/v1714.pdf> The treaty obligated the original parties—the USA and the USSR—to destroy all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500–5500 kilometres (intermediate-range, 1000–5500 km; and shorter-range, 500–1000 km) and their launchers by 1 June 1991. A total of 2692 missiles were eliminated by May 1991. For 10 years after 1 June 1991 on-site inspections were conducted to verify compliance. The use of surveillance satellites for data collec- tion continued after the end of on-site inspections on 31 May 2001. In 1994 treaty membership was expanded to include Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.
December 1990. The parties—Russia and the USA—undertake not to carry out any individual underground nuclear explosion for peaceful purposes having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons or any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 150 kilotons; and not to carry out any group explosion having an aggregate yield exceeding 1500 kilotons unless the individual explosions in the group could be identified and measured by agreed verification procedures. The 1976 verifi- cation protocol was replaced in 1990 with a new protocol. Treaty text: United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1714 (1993) The convention prohibits military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury to states party to the convention. The term ‘environmental modification techniques’ refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the earth, including its biota, litho- sphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer space. The understandings reached during the negotiations, but not written into the convention, define the terms ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’.
