High Court. 16.1.1 Any dispute arising out of or in connection with this Master Agreement and/or any Confirmation Notice (including any dispute in relation to the existence, validity or termination of any agreement, and including any non-contractual obligations arising out of or in relation to the Master Agreement or a Confirmation Notice) shall be submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court in London.]
High Court. [58] In the High Court, PwC apparently argued its case on a broader basis than it does now. Its arguments based on traditional grounds of abuse of process were rejected by Xxxxx X.34 As they were not pursued in the Court of Appeal or this Court, we need say no more about them. In relation to the argument pursued by PwC before us, Xxxxx J found that there was no impermissible assignment of the cause of action in the assignment of the Allied GSA from Allied to SPF.35 He rejected an argument that the assignment was impermissible because SPF had no antecedent commercial interest in Allied or the Allied GSA. He considered SPF’s commercial interest was inherent in the assignment of the Allied GSA.36 Brown J also discussed PwC’s contention that the combination of the Funding Agreement and the Allied GSA gave SPF an excessive profit share. He did not accept that the whole was greater than the sum of its parts.37 31 At [56], declining to apply Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Ltd v Fostif Pty Ltd [2006] HCA 41, (2006) 229 CLR 386. 32 At [57]. The Court did not comment on situations where assignments of personal causes of action may be permissible: at [62]. 33 At [57] and [76](e). 34 HC judgment, above n 4, at [62]. 35 At [80]–[90]. 36 At [82]. 37 At [90]. Court of Appeal [59] The Court of Appeal said the key issue before it was whether the SPF Documents were in substance a bare assignment of a claim in tort or personal claim, noting that such assignment remains unlawful after this Court’s decision in Waterhouse.38 [60] The Court accepted the SPF Documents had to be considered together;39 that SPF had no antecedent commercial interest in PVL;40 and that the Allied Assignment would not have been agreed to but for the Funding Agreement.41 But it did not accept the SPF Documents amounted to an assignment of a bare cause of action. Its reasons were:42
High Court. In connection with the aforesaid arbitration proceeding, only the High Court at Calcutta and its subordinate Courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try all actions and proceedings.
High Court. The HC dismissed the said application by holding that an arbitrator cannot be appointed as the appellant did not prove the existence of an arbitration agreement. The HC relied upon the judgement of the SC in M.R. Engineers and Contractors (p) Ltd-V- Som Datt Builders Ltd, (2009) 7 SCC 696, to hold that there is no special reference to the arbitration clause in the standard terms and conditions, so the arbitration clause cannot be said to have been incorporated in to the purchase order.
High Court. [14] On 13 July 1997, Xxxxxxxx being dissatisfied with the decision of the Tribunal appealed on a question of law to the High Court under section 39 of the Act by Notice of Originating Motion in compliance with Order 56 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1982 (RSC). There is no explanation for the fact that the case was not heard until 6 March 2000. Xx. Xxxxxx for the appellant made the same submissions to the High Court that he made to this Court, which we discuss in greater detail below. In essence he submitted that “the appellant had been constructively dismissed within the meaning of the Act by having been laid off by the respondent for an unreasonably long time”. He did not agree that the appellant was laid off and was not relying on the lay-off provisions. Xxxx Xxxxxxx relied on the reasons of the Tribunal in that the appellant did not comply with the lay-off provisions in section 6(3)(a) of the Act by giving notice of the termination of his employment. On 2 October 2003, Xxxxxxxxx X gave his decision. He (like the Tribunal) did not take into account the fact that no evidence was given on behalf of Rayside in opposition to Xxxxxxxx’x application for a severance payment. He rejected the appellant’s submissions and held that on the facts the appellant could not have been deemed to be dismissed by reason of redundancy; he agreed with the respondent’s submissions that the appellant was laid off and that although he gave notice of his intention to claim a severance payment he did not also give notice to terminate his employment as required by section 6(3)(a)
