Negotiations Leading up to The Kyoto Protocol Sample Clauses

Negotiations Leading up to The Kyoto Protocol. Right from the start of negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol presented a more complex political problem than that experienced during the Montreal negotiations. However, it wasn’t until the U.S. made public its intention not to become a party to the agreement that the real problems associated with the negotiations started to surface.104 In 2001, after several years of negotiations between the U.S. and the other parties to the Kyoto Protocol, President Xxxxxx X. Xxxx withdrew the U.S. from the Kyoto Protocol, invoking great dissatisfaction from the rest of the world.105 The U.S. maintained that it would not sign the Kyoto Protocol (1) unless developing countries were included, and (2) as long as the U.S. considered it to be harmful to its economic interests.106 The U.S. Senate concluded that any “exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is environmentally flawed” and strongly believed that proposals leading up the Kyoto Protocol “could result in serious harm to the 100. See, e.g., Xxxxxxx, supra note 11, at 371-74. 101. See generally Sunstein, supra note 1, at 4-7; Xxxxx X. Xxxxxxxxxx, Common, But Differentiated Commitments in the Future Climate Regime: Amending the Kyoto Protocol to Include Annex C and the Annex C Mitigation Fund, 18 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 247, 248-51 (2007). 102. See, e.g., Xxxxxxx, supra note 11, at 377-80. 103. See Bohringer & Finus, supra note 17, at 279, 284, 294 (highlighting that more realistic and effective punishments can provide incentives for compliance, and that strategic links among countries can counter trade leakage). Recall discussion, supra text section III(B)(1). 104. See generally Oh no, Kyoto, THE ECONOMIST, April 7, 2001. (discussing the reactions after the U.S. withdrawal from Kyoto, and the difficulties that soon became apparent after the withdrawal). 105. Xxxxxxx, supra note 11, at 371; see also Sunstein supra note 1, at 28 (suggesting that leading up to the creation of the final draft of the treaty, it was common knowledge that the U.S. could never join the treaty as drafted). 106. S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. ¶ 1 (1998), available at xxxx://xxxxxx.xxx.xxx/cgi- bin/query/D?c105:1:./temp/~c105F6Lwz2::. It should be noted that, despite the frequent accusations of partisan political approaches, the U.S.’s involvement was virtually doomed from the start, even before Xxxxxxxxx Xxxx came into office. In fact, even during the Clinton Administration the ...