November 2009. The ATAF Inaugural Conference was officially launched by His Excellency Xxxxxx Kaguta Xxxxxxxx, President of The Republic of Uganda, at a Gala Dinner hosted by the Ugandan Government on 18 November 2009. In his address, the Ugandan President stressed the importance of establishing the Continental Body in the development of capacity of African Tax Administrations; fostering accountability and state building; developing a common understanding and approach to Africa’s transformation; and reducing of Africa’s reliance on foreign aid. President Xxxxxxxx urged all African Countries to join ATAF as it is an important milestone for the development of the Continent. The Uganda President’s address was followed by a traditional African dance showcasing the coming together of Africa; a short video presentation entitled “The Road to Kampala” (the inaugural launch) and the introduction and unveiling of the ATAF publication with the same name which was signed by the Ugandan President. Other speakers include the Chairperson of the ATAF Steering Group, Mr Xxxx Xxxxxxxxx, and Ugandan Minister of Finance, Hon Xxx Xxxxx Xxxxxx (UGA).
November 2009. The ATAF Inaugural Conference was officially opened by Xxx Xxxxx Kagina (Commissioner General of the Ugandan Revenue Authority) Mr Xxxx Xxxxxxxxx (Chairperson of the ATAF Steering Group and Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service) and Mr Fed Omach (Ugandan Minister of State) on 19 November 2009. In his opening remarks, Mr Magashula welcomed all delegates to the first ATAF meeting and stressed the importance of ATAF to Africa, the road to Kampala, the global financial challenge Africa is facing and its impact on donor aid and the challenges ATAF will be facing on the road beyond Kampala. The Chair’s opening remarks were followed by a pre- recorded message by Xx Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx, the Minister of Finance of South Africa. The Minister expressed his sincere good wishes and wholehearted support to ATAF on its formal launch. Mr Magashula also read out a letter from the OECD’s FTA Chair and IRS Commissioner, Xx Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxxx, expressing continued support to the mission of the ATAF and hope that the FTA’s experience in capturing emerging good practice in tax administration and in adopting common approaches to important issues will be useful to ATAF in its work to meet the needs of tax administrations in an African environment.
November 2009. The ATAF Inaugural Conference was closed with comments from Xx Xxxx xx Geus (OECD), Xxx Xxxxx Kagina (UGA) and the newly elected ATAF Chairperson, Mr. Xxxx Xxxxxxxxx (SARS), who provided overviews of the work to be done on the road beyond Kampala.
November 2009. Not published in print in accordance with article 12(2) of the General Assembly regulations to give effect to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, as amended.
November 2009. It is not disputed that the soft launch of the Defendant’s trading platform took place in December 2009 and its official launch in March 2010.8 It is also not disputed that after paying the first instalment of US$112,500 of the first S&M payment on 9 July 2010, the Defendant began withholding payment of the subsequent S&M amounts, claiming that it was experiencing multiple problems with the software system provided by the Plaintiff.
November 2009. The Convertible Loan
November 2009. Salary Scale for Mental Health Inpatient Nurses
November 2009. In such a situation it is very hard for both sides to relax their positions to an extent that makes it possible to reach and implement agreements. The problems of legitimacy and weakness of the Palestinian government also hinder concluding any agreement. The permanent agreement demands a compromise on the most sensitive issues, including refugees, Jerusalem, and territory. The Palestinian leaders, on the one hand, are concerned that any concession in talks will be exploited by their bitter political rivals, Hamas, to attack and undermine them. At the same time, they also suspect they will not receive the necessary backing from their divided party, and thus they are unable to display the necessary ftexibility precisely because of their weakness. The second factor is the domestic political situation in Israel. After long years of the intifada and two wars, in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 and in the Gaza Strip in late 2008 and early 2009, the Israeli public has lost faith in the ability to reach an agreement with the Palestinians that will end the conftict between them. There is also a lack of faith in the principle of land for peace. From what is considered the failure of the unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon and the disengagement from Gaza, the Israeli public has concluded that withdrawing from territories and transferring them to the Palestinian side only generates new threats against Israel. This sentiment was reftected in the results of the last elections, which brought a largely right wing government into power. Furthermore, the continued deep split in the Israeli political system weakens the government and makes it hard to reach and implement decisions on controversial issues. The negotiations with the Palestinians are at the center of a fierce debate in the Israeli public and necessitate tough decisions on sensitive issues, such as evacuation of a large number of settlements, division of neighborhoods in Jerusalem, control of the Temple Mount and other holy sites, and a solution to the refugee problem. Like the Palestinians, the Israeli side is hard pressed to demonstrate ftexibility on the sensitive issues, and will also find it difficult to implement an agreement in these areas. There are various ways to deal with the difficulty of reaching a permanent agreement and implementing it. The approach that was chosen for the Annapolis process was to maintain parallel tracks. On the one hand, there were talks on a permanent agreement and an atte...
November 2009 off under the heading of implementing the first phase of the Roadmap, a process of building Palestinian capabilities and institutions, primarily in the area of security, which would enable the Palestinians to implement the agreement they reach. From the outset, this approach had two main problems. First, it did not address the main obstacles, described above, that prevent reaching an agreement. Second, there was a lack of synchronization between the two processes. The deadline for completing the talks was the end of 2008, even though it was clear that the process of building capabilities, which is more gradual, could not evolve at the same rate. The attempt to solve this problem led to the development of the idea of a shelf agreement, in other words, an agreement that is not designed for immediate implementation after it has been concluded, rather implementation on a gradual basis, determined by when and at what rate Palestinian Authority capabilities are successfully generated. This solution also entails significant weakness, as signing an agreement without actually realizing it can only increase the mistrust of both sides with regard to the ability to reach and implement a permanent agreement. Thus, it could impinge on the ability to xxxxxx the conditions that make it possible to implement the agreement. In the current political reality of both sides to the talks, and in particular, following the elections in Israel, it is doubtful whether it will be possible to continue utilizing the approach of the Annapolis process. On the other hand, a situation of total stagnation is dangerous. There is a danger that the situation on the ground will become irreversible, and a two-state solution will become impossible. Stagnation will also not be acceptable to the international community and, in particular, to the Obama administration, which in contrast with the previous administration views a solution of the Arab-Israeli conftict as urgent. The European Union takes a similar view and will pressure Israel to continue participating in a political process with the Palestinians, beyond improving the basic conditions of the Palestinian population (which has been called “economic peace”). For all these reasons an alternative approach should be considered. This approach centers on bypassing the difficulty of reaching and implementing a permanent settlement within a short time frame, particularly regarding the sensitive issues. At the same time, it avoids stagnation and can...
November 2009 address many of the problems between the sides and persuade both publics that they are capable of living side by side. One possible approach is the generation of a gradual process of attaining and implementing partial agreements so that in effect, the two sides are brought closer to the permanent agreement even if during the course of the process they encounter difficulties in reaching agreement on various sensitive areas. At the same time, a process of partial agreements also has its fair share of disadvantages. First, the Palestinian side will be concerned that the temporary will become permanent and that by means of the partial agreements, Israel will create a permanent reality that does not provide a solution for the needs of the Palestinians and obviates the need to make the concessions demanded by a permanent agreement. This is why Palestinian Authority president Xxxxxxx Xxxxx strongly opposes negotiations that do not relate to a permanent settlement. It will be difficult to persuade the Palestinian side to participate in a process of partial agreements, and certainly such that do not refer to the political horizon of two states. In addition, the Israeli side will be concerned about entering a gradual process of concessions over negotiating assets without obtaining “an end to the conftict” and Palestinian concessions on issues that are central for the Israelis, such as a solution to the refugee problem, in a manner that does not threaten Israel’s identity. And third, gradual process can become a process of confidence destroying instead of confidence building between the two peoples if the sides do not meet their commitments. In such a case this will reduce the chance of reaching a permanent agreement instead of bringing the sides closer to it. This is what happened with the Oslo process: the sides did not honor their commitments and it became a process of shattering trust. This paper represents work by an INSS team that was created in order to develop a workable approach to partial agreements with the Palestinians. The team analyzed the potential for possible partial agreements with the Palestinians in the various areas, and attempted to imbue them with content in a manner that takes into consideration the sides’ respective realities and constraints. The main premise is that a permanent agreement is not feasible at the moment, due to the internal political situation on both sides that does not allow them to bridge the gap in their stances. Furthermor...
