The Xxxxxx Xxxxx Sample Clauses

The Xxxxxx Xxxxx. Land Corporation and the GNWT acknowledge that Canada is developing a new national fiscal policy including a transparent methodology for determining levels of federal funding that may be provided to self-governing aboriginal groups in Canada to support the delivery of agreed upon programs and services, taking into account the ability of each self-governing aboriginal group to generate revenues from its own sources.

The Xxxxxx Xxxxx. Land Corporation and Canada acknowledge that they have been advised of the GNWT’s approach to the provision of funding to self- governing aboriginal groups in the NWT.

The Xxxxxx Xxxxx concerned; that on the 29th of August, 1878, he was forcibly dispossessed of said vessel by one J. F. S. Xxxxx, who claims to have been appointed master. A majority in interest of the owners appear as claimants and deny the material aver- ments of the libel in respect to the alleged agreement with the libellant They also deny the forcible dispossession, and allege that Xxxxx is the duly appointed master of the vessel. The evidence wholly fails to sustain libelant's claim of the alleged agreement either with Xxxxxxxx or with himself. Under the agreement with Xxxxxxxx, which was in writ- ing, no right is given to Xxxxxxxx to transfer, with his share in the vessel, his right to command her. It contained an agreement that he should command and sail the vessel, but that right is not by the terms of the agreement, nor by its nature, transferable. On the contrary, it is a contract in its nature resting in personal confidence and strictly personal. The evidence also does not show any agreement on the part of the other owners with the libellant, at the time of his purchase, that he should continue to command the vessel so long as he held this interest He bought, and was encouraged to buy, the interest formerly held for the benefit of Xxxxxxxx, in the expectation that he would be appointed master, as indeed he was, and he gave for it a larger price than the share was worth to anybody else, because he expected to be master; but nothing took place between the parties im- pairing in any way the rightful authority of the majority in interest at any time to displace him and appoint another master. The case is also within the provisions of section 4250 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that “any person or body corporate having more than one-half ownership of any vessel, shall have the same right to remove a master, who is also part owner of such vessel, as such majority owners have to remove a master not an owner. This section shall not apply where there is a Valid written agreement subsisting, by virtue of which such master would be entitled to possession, nor in any case where a master has possession as part-owner obtained before the 19th day of April, 1872.” The alleged contract with the libellant was not in writing, and, therefore, if proved, would not avail him. There was then no legal claim on the part of the libellant, nor any reasonable pretence of such legal claim, that he held his position of master except subject to the will of the majority of the owners....