FTR Forfeitures Clause Samples
The FTR Forfeitures clause defines the conditions under which a party must forfeit their rights to Financial Transmission Rights (FTRs) in energy markets. Typically, this clause outlines scenarios such as regulatory violations, default, or failure to meet certain obligations, which can trigger the loss of FTR entitlements. By specifying these circumstances, the clause ensures that only compliant and financially responsible parties retain FTRs, thereby maintaining market integrity and reducing the risk of market manipulation or default.
FTR Forfeitures. An FTR holder may be subject to forfeiture of any profits from an FTR if it meets the criteria defined in Section 5.2.1 (b) of Schedule 1 of the PJM Operating Agreement. If a participant has a cleared increment offer or decrement bid for an applicable hour at or near the source or sink of any FTR they own and the day-ahead congestion LMP difference is greater than the real-time congestion LMP difference the profits from that FTR may be subject to forfeiture for that hour. An increment offer or decrement bid is considered near the source or sink point if 75 percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn, and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus, is reflected on the constrained path between the FTR source or sink. This rule only applies to increment offers and decrement bids that would increase the price separation between the FTR source and sink points. Figure 13-1 demonstrates the FTR forfeiture rule for INCs and DECs. The INC or DEC distribution factor (dfax) is compared to the largest impact withdrawal or injection dfax. If the absolute difference between the virtual bid and its counterpart is greater than or equal to 75 percent, the virtual bid is considered for forfeiture. This is the metric in the rule which defines the impact of the virtual bid on the constraint. In the first part of the example in Figure 13-1, the INC has a dfax of 0.25 and the maximum withdrawal dfax on the constraint is -0.5. The difference between the two dfaxes is -0.75 (0.25 minus -0.5). The absolute value is
FTR Forfeitures. Hourly FTR Cost
FTR Forfeitures. Total forfeitures for the first four months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period were $0.3 million for Increment Offers, Decrement Bids and UTC Transactions. • Credit Issues. There was one collateral default in January through September 2016 which was promptly resolved.
FTR Forfeitures. For the period of January 19, 2017, through December 31, 2018, except November 2018 which is not yet settled, total FTR forfeitures were $13.1 million. • Credit. There were 14 collateral defaults in 2018 not involving GreenHat Energy, LLC, for a total of $643,371. Most collateral defaults were cured promptly. There were 74 payment defaults in 2018 not involving GreenHat Energy, LLC for a total of $136,120, which resulted in the default of Amerigreen Energy, Inc. on June 12, 2018.7 On June 21, 2018, GreenHat Energy, LLC was declared in default for two collateral calls totaling
FTR Forfeitures. Total forfeitures for the first nine months of the 2012 to 2013 planning period were $492,556 (0.06 percent of total FTR target allocations). • Credit Issues. Four participants defaulted during 2013 from eight default events. The average of these defaults was $68,812 with four based on inadequate collateral and four based on nonpayment. The average collateral default was $13,275 and the average nonpayment default was $124,349. The majority of these defaults were promptly cured. These defaults were not necessarily related to FTR positions.
FTR Forfeitures. An FTR holder may be subject to forfeiture of any profits from an FTR if it meets the criteria defined in Section 5.2.1 (b) of Schedule 1 of the PJM Operating Agreement. If a participant has a cleared increment offer or decrement bid for an applicable hour at or near the source or sink of any FTR they own and the day-ahead congestion LMP difference is greater than the real time congestion LMP difference the profits from that FTR may be subject to forfeiture for that hour. An increment offer or decrement bid is considered near the source or sink point if 75 percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn, and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus, is reflected on the constrained path between the FTR source or sink. This rule only applies to increment offers and decrement bids that would increase the price separation between the FTR source and sink points. Figure 12-2 shows the FTR forfeitures values for both counter flow and prevailing flow FTRs for each month of June 2010 through December 2012 by company type. 14 The volume data presented in Table 12-8 are not included in the monthly FTR ownership, volume or revenue data. Total forfeitures for the first seven months of the 2012 to 2013 planning period were $398,630. 2010/2011 2011/2012 2012/2013 Physical Traditional Physical Counter Financial Traditional Financial Counter The credit issues reported here were not necessarily related to FTR positions. In June 2012, PJM processed $38 million of billing adjustments associated with marginal loss surplus allocations. These billing adjustments required participants to repay refunds which had been previously ordered by FERC and subsequently reversed by FERC. Five of the companies required to repay the allocation defaulted based on inadequate collateral and fifteen defaulted on payment of their billing adjustments, totaling $28.3 million in defaults. One company cured its payment default. Default Allocation Assessments were included in the next monthly bill for non-defaulted members to cover the unpaid billing adjustments. Twenty five additional members defaulted on $96,000 of their payment obligations resulting from these billed Default Allocation Assessments. In addition, unrelated to the marginal loss surplus billing adjustments, twenty participants defaulted during 2012 from twenty one default events. The average of these defaults was $381,772, with nine based on inadequate collateral and eleven based on nonpayment. The average collateral default ...
FTR Forfeitures. FTR forfeitures were not billed after January 19, 2017, pending retroactive implementation of a new FTR forfeiture rule until the September bill, when PJM began retroactive billing under the new FTR forfeiture rule. In the period without FTR forfeiture bills, no information on forfeitures was provided to participants and behavior could not be adjusted. For the period of January 19, 2017, through June 30, 2018, total FTR forfeitures were $12.0 million.
FTR Forfeitures. An FTR holder may be subject to forfeiture of any profits from an FTR if it meets the criteria defined in Section 5.2.1 (b) of Schedule 1 of the PJM Operating Agreement. If a participant has a cleared increment offer or decrement bid for an applicable hour at or near the source or sink of any FTR they own and the day-ahead congestion LMP difference is greater than the real time congestion LMP difference the profits from that FTR may be subject to forfeiture for that hour. An increment offer or decrement bid is considered near the source or sink point if 75 percent or more of the energy injected or withdrawn, and which is withdrawn or injected at any other bus, is reflected on the constrained path between the FTR source or sink. This rule only applies to increment offers and decrement bids that would increase the price separation between the FTR source and sink points. The credit issues reported here were not necessarily related to FTR positions. Six participants defaulted during 2013 from ten default events. The average of these defaults was $55,939 with seven based on inadequate collateral and three based on nonpayment. The average collateral default was $16,587 and the average nonpayment default was $147,761. The majority of these defaults were promptly cured, with one partial cure. Table 12-6 provides the Annual FTR Auction market volume for the 2013 to 2014 planning period. Total FTR buy bids were 3,274,373 MW, up 27.8 percent from 2,561,835 MW for the previous planning period. For the 2013 to 2014 planning period 391,148 MW (12.1 percent) of buy bids cleared, up 5.3 percent from 371,295 MW for the last planning period. There were 417,118 MW of sell offers with 37,821 MW (9.1 percent) clearing for the 2013 to 2014 planning period. Table 12-7 provides the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction market volume for the entire 2012 to 2013 planning period and the first month of the 2013 to 2014 planning period. There were 12,956,832 MW of FTR buy bid obligations and 3,922,225 MW of FTR sell offer obligations for all bidding periods in the 2012 to 2013 planning period. The monthly balance of planning period auctions cleared 2,171,751 MW (16.8 percent) of FTR buy bid obligations and 468,426 MW (11.9 percent) of FTR sell off obligations. Trade Type Hedge Type FTR Direction Bid and Requested Count Bid and Requested Volume (MW) Cleared Volume (MW) Cleared Volume Uncleared Volume (MW) Uncleared Volume Buy bids Obligations Counter Flow 76,647 365,441 103,81...
FTR Forfeitures. Total forfeitures of FTR profits resulting from the FTR forfeiture rule for the 2013 to 2014 planning period, through August 2013, were $440,526 for Increment Offers and Decrement Bids. • Credit Issues. Eight participants defaulted in 2013, through August, from twelve default events. The average of these defaults was $320,125 with nine based on inadequate collateral and three based on nonpayment. The average collateral default was $377,579 and the average nonpayment default was $147,761. The majority of these defaults were promptly cured, with one partial cure. These defaults were not necessarily related to FTR positions.
FTR Forfeitures. For the period of January 19, 2017, through September 30, 2018, total FTR forfeitures were $12.5 million. • Credit. There were 13 collateral defaults in the first nine months of 2018, not involving GreenHat Energy, LLC, for a total of $640,670. Most collateral defaults were cured promptly. There were 36 payment defaults in the first nine months of 2018, not involving GreenHat Energy, LLC for a total of $86,666, which resulted in the default of Amerigreen Energy, Inc. on June 12, 2018.9 On June 21, 2018, GreenHat Energy, LLC was declared in default for two collateral calls totaling $2.8 million and two payment defaults totaling $3.9 million.10 GreenHat held a large FTR position which, according to current tariff provisions, must be liquidated in the FTR auctions closest to the effective dates of the positions held.11 The net gain or loss on these liquidated positions will be added to the payment default amount that will then be allocated to PJM members according to OA sections 15.1.2A(1) and 15.2.2. On July 26, 2018, PJM filed a waiver request at FERC asking that PJM only be required to liquidate FTRs for the prompt months to allow Member discussion on how to proceed with GreenHat’s large FTR portfolio.12 Members selected to settle GreenHat’s FTR portfolio at the time the FTRs are due, so default allocation assessment charges will continue to accrue through May 2021.