Paper Organization. In Section 2, we revisit the notion of group key agreement. Section 3 presents a generic ASGKA construction from ASBBs with key homomorphic property and aggregatability. An ASBB scheme is efficiently realized in Section 4 and the one- round ASGKA protocols naturally follow from the generic formula. Section 5 is a conclusion.
Paper Organization provides background: it gives the full list of assigned characters of an imaginary quadratic order and it recalls how its ideal class group acts on oriented elliptic curves. Our main Section 4.3 contains a proof of Theorem 4.1.1, as well as statements and proofs for the even-modulus counterparts.
Paper Organization. Section 2 briefly describes our motivation to explore the potential of Distributed Ledger Technology and federated consensus mechanisms for establishing secure and valid interoperation between federated platform instances. Section 3 reviews trust mechanisms in distributed systems, which are used for sharing content that is collectively confirmed (agreed) through the consensus. Here, we look at the Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) mechanism, Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) and a variety of existing community consensus mechanisms. Section 4 introduces the FBA algorithm for trust and reputation in NIMBLE. Section 5 illustrates the message flow between the Stellar Consensus Protocol (SCP) and NIMBLE applications. Section 6 presents our conclusions.
Paper Organization. Section 2 contains our cryptographic tools. Section 3 contains the communication and adversarial models for SAS-MCA and SAS-AKA protocols. We propose our SAS-MCA / SAS-AKA protocol in Section 4. In the same section we argue that this protocol is a secure SAS-MCA scheme, but for lack of space we relegate the (very similar) argument that this protocol is also a secure SAS-AKA scheme protocol) to the full version of this paper [8].
Paper Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the mathematical model. The problem is formulated in Section 3, in which the utility functions of the participants are presented and the characteristics required of the insurance contract are defined. In Section 4, we derive expres- sions for the bidding strategies of the participants in the day-ahead market, as well as their conditions to sign the contract, which are then used to prove the feasibility of the insurance contract and to analyze the profitability of the storage owner. Section 5 presents our case studies, which are followed by final conclusions and some directions for future work in Section 6.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II the system architecture is shown. Section III describes the proposed approach for key management. Section IV, V and VI describe the modules, results and finally concludes the paper.
Paper Organization. Section 2 provides definitions for Byzantine Agreement, (0, 1), and (0, 1, 2)- Graded d-Detecting Byzantine Agreement as well as for the cryptographic primi- tives we use such as Signature schemes and common coin. In Section 3, we discuss the intuition and the construction of the deterministic early-stopping protocol, along with its correctness proof. In section 4, as well as the intuition and con- struction of the randomized protocol. We defer some supplementary protocols and definitions to the Appendix.
Paper Organization. The paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we discuss related work in cross chain atomic swaps and time based cryptography. In Section 3 we outline the state of affairs regarding Hash Time Lock Contracts, give an introduction to Xxxxx and Xxxx’s timed commitment scheme, and briefly explain the transformation from multi- party computation to zero knowledge proofs (“MPC in the head”), in sections 4 and 5 we describe our protocol for cross chain atomic swap and explain our proposed AVTC primitive. We conclude our work in Section 6.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we model CBE and define its security. In Section 3, we present a collusion-resistant regular public-key BE scheme with aggregatability. Efficient CBE schemes are realized in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 2 Modeling Contributory Broadcast Encryption We begin by formalizing the CBE notion bridging the GKA and BE primitives. In CBE, a group of members first jointly establish a public encryption key, then a sender can freely select which subset of the group members can decrypt the ciphertext. Our definition incorporates the up-to-date definitions of GKA [32] protocols and BE [3] schemes. Since the negotiated public key is usually employed to transmit session keys, we define a CBE scheme as a key encapsulation mecha- nism (KEM). Knowing this public encryption key, anyone can send a session key ξ to any subset of the initial group members. Only the intended receivers can extract ξ. Even if all the outsiders including group members not in the intended subset collude, they receive no information about ξ.
2.1 Syntax {U · · · U } We first define the algorithms that compose a CBE scheme. Let λ ∈ N denote the security parameter. Suppose that a group of members 1, , n wants to jointly establish a CBE system, where n is a positive integer and each member U ≤ ≤ CBE
Paper Organization. In Section 2 we provide background information about CryptoMemory devices and their advertised security. We summarize previous work and we briefly sketch their security mechanisms. In Section 3 we develop an attack path for DPA attacks, and we provide the details and results of our attacks in Section 4. We discuss the implications of our findings as well as potential countermeasures in Section 5. We briefly conclude in Section 6.
