SAUDI ARABIA Sample Clauses

SAUDI ARABIA. NOTIFICATIONS

SAUDI ARABIA. Securities Law Notice This document may not be distributed in the Kingdom except to such persons as are permitted under the Rules of the Offers of Securities and Continuing Obligations issued by the Capital Market Authority. The Capital Market Authority does not make any representation as to the accuracy or completeness of this document, and expressly disclaims any liability whatsoever for any loss arising from, or incurred in reliance upon, any part of this document. Prospective purchasers of the securities offered hereby should conduct their own due diligence on the accuracy of the information relating to the securities. If you do not understand the contents of this document you should consult an authorized financial adviser.

SAUDI ARABIA. Notifications Notifications

SAUDI ARABIA. The provisions of this Country Schedule for Saudi Arabia provide additional definitions and conditions for the purpose of granting RSUs which are intended to be granted to Employees and corporate officers who are resident in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for tax, labor or securities law purposes.

SAUDI ARABIA. If the Territory includes any country other than the United States, Distributor hereby consents to and is bound by the terms of Attachment B-1, International Terms.

SAUDI ARABIA. The Ceaseless Quest for Security (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 1. However, it moves very quickly over the Xxxxxxx years, failing to capture the essence of Xxxxxxx’x strategies towards the Saudi government. 25 Bass, Support Any Friend…, 64. traditional Middle East friends had been conservative monarchs”26, and that, above all other considerations, the Xxxxxxx administration’s approach to the Middle East was driven by Cold War necessities.27 These arguments are largely supported in this thesis. Indeed, evidence shows that Xxxxxxx sought closer ties with Xxxxxx as part of a regional strategy, and even aspired to a more extended Third World strategy, aimed at reducing Soviet gains among Arab nationalists and world neutralist leaders. However valuable and comprehensive Bass’s work is, this thesis differs from “Support any Friend: Xxxxxxx’x Middle East and the Making of the US-Israel Alliance” on a number of key points. The first one is his very interpretation of the result of Xxxxxxx’x Middle East experience. Xxxx argues that “The Xxxxxxx administration... constitutes the pivotal presidency in U.S.-Israel relations, the hinge that swung decisively away from the chilly association of the 1950s and toward the full-blown alliance we know today.”28 But coming from such a standpoint prevents Bass from stressing the unintentional nature of such an outcome. According to Xxxx, Xxxxxxx sought to support any friend in the Middle East in order to “advance his wider Cold War strategy”29 and this eventually resulted in closer ties with Israel, the only country, together with the Arab monarchies, willing to take advantage of Xxxxxxx’x strategy of supporting any friend. Bass comments that “Xxxxxxx had spoken of supporting any friend; in the Middle East he found takers only in Israel and the Arab kingdoms and emirates”30, but Xxxxxx too took advantage of Xxxxxxx’x opening, until Congress’s intervention in late 1963 crushed the relationship between the two Presidents.

SAUDI ARABIA. The participation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the Agreement shall in no way imply recognition of Israel and shall not lead to entry into dealings with Israel under this Agreement. SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC15 "It is understood that the ratification of this Agreement by the Syrian Arab Republic does not mean in any way recognition of Israel by the Syrian Arab Republic. Furthermore, no treaty relations will arise between the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel." "The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [notifies the Secretary- General] in accordance with article 10, section 2 (b) (ii) of the Agreement, that the standard clauses of the Convention on the privileges and immunities of the specialized agencies shall apply to the Fund in the United Kingdom, subject to the following modifications:

SAUDI ARABIA. Securities Law Notification The Restricted Stock Unit award was made in the United States of America, is subject to the laws of the State of California and any issuance of Shares pursuant to it will be conducted through a stockbroker in the United States of America.

SAUDI ARABIA. The presence of China and India in Gwadar and Chabahar, respectively, has brought the emerging Asian giants to the doorsteps of Arabia with far reaching ramifications for the regional balance of power in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East; for the security of shipping lines through the Strait of Hormuz; and for the intensifying naval competition between the two Asian powers in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. Iran’s strategy of using Chabahar as its main strategic base for projecting power in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean poses a direct threat to the Arab Gulf States making them to conduct immediate counter-measures to protect their interests. Given the close Arab-Pakistan ties, the Saudis are certain to support their ally in the competition between Chabahar and Gwadar. Iran-Pakistan cooperation has been shaken by major tensions in their relations emanating from their competing interests in Chabahar and Gwadar and their alliances with opposing powers, namely India and China as mentioned before. Saudis could benefit from this friction. In addition, Iran-Pakistan relations could come under further stress due to the intensifying Arab-Iranian rivalry in the Arabian Gulf and the pressure it creates on Pakistan to take a side. However, given Pakistan’s weak position vis à vis India, it can hardly afford to take the Arab side against Iran as shown by Islamabad’s refusal to enter the Yemen conflict as expected by the Saudis. These developments could pave the way for an opening toward Arab support for the Baluch struggle against Iran. Saudis could persuade Pakistan to soften its opposition to any potential Saudi support for the Iranian Baluch. There are compelling geopolitical reasons for such a Saudi policy. After all, Arabs, Persians, and Baluch are the three main actors in the Gulf. In this equation, Arab support for the Iranian Baluch is a matter of strategic necessity in confronting the Iranian hegemony in the region, a policy that can benefit Pakistan as well. The Arab- Baluch alliance is deeply rooted in the history of the Gulf region and their opposition to Persian domination. Anyway, Saudis are acting decisively to protect their interests as demonstrated in Yemen and will not defer to an outside power when their vital interests are threatened. The Baluch Factor: The Major Hurdle The major hurdle in developing Chabahar is fierce opposition by the Baluch nationalists fighting for independence. There are active and growing insurgencies in both Iranian a...

SAUDI ARABIA. The world factbook. CIA. 2012; Available from: xxxxx://xxx.xxx.xxx/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.