the United States. The parties expressly agree that the terms of this limited non-competition provision under this section are reasonable, enforceable, and necessary to protect the Company's interests, and are valid and enforceable. In the unlikely event, however, that a court of competent jurisdiction were to determine that any portion of this limited non-competition provision is unenforceable, then the parties agree that the remainder of the limited non-competition provision shall remain valid and enforceable to the maximum extent possible.
the United States. Each of the Underwriters hereby represents, warrants and agrees that, in relation to each member state of the European Economic Area which has implemented the Prospectus Directive (each, a “Relevant Member State”), with effect from and including the date on which the Prospectus Directive is implemented in that Relevant Member State (the “Relevant Implementation Date”) it has not made and will not make an offer of Securities which are the subject of the offering contemplated by this prospectus supplement to the public in that Relevant Member State other than: (i) to any legal entity which is a qualified investor as defined in the Prospectus Directive; (ii) to fewer than 100 or, if the Relevant Member State has implemented the relevant provision of the 2010 PD Amending Directive, 150, natural or legal persons (other than qualified investors as defined in the Prospectus Directive), as permitted under the Prospectus Directive, subject to obtaining the prior consent of the underwriters for any such offer; or (iii) in any other circumstances falling within Article 3(2) of the Prospectus Directive; provided that no such offer of Securities shall require the Company or any Underwriter to publish a prospectus pursuant to Article 3 of the Prospectus Directive. For the purposes of this provision, the expression an “offer of Securities to the public” in relation to any Securities in any Relevant Member State means the communication in any form and by any means of sufficient information on the terms of the offer and the Securities to be offered so as to enable an investor to decide to purchase or subscribe for the Securities, as the same may be varied in that Relevant Member State by any measure implementing the Prospectus Directive in that Relevant Member State; “Prospectus Directive” means Directive 2003/71/EC (and amendments thereto, including the 2010 PD Amending Directive, to the extent implemented in the Relevant Member State), and includes any relevant implementing measure in the Relevant Member State; and “2010 PD Amending Directive” means Directive 2010/73/EU; and
the United States. The parties expressly agree that the terms of this limited non-competition provision under this section are reasonable, enforceable, and necessary to protect Vectren's interests, and are valid and enforceable. In the unlikely event, however, that a court of competent jurisdiction were to determine that any portion of this limited non-competition provision is unenforceable, then the parties agree that the remainder of the limited non-competition provision shall remain valid and enforceable to the maximum extent possible.
the United States. As described above, the United States employs a mixed system,163 where common law is applied by Federal Courts. American Courts are used to handling distinct categories of law, which either spring from the Federal level or from each Federal State. Since the 1950’s, the United States has also been familiar with private uniform law, such as the Uniform Commercial Code, which remains, however, within national boundaries. The Supreme Court of the United States never attached a clear value to the Vienna hermeneutical principles,164 despite the Federal government considering other provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention as customary international law on the law of treaties.165 The Supreme Court has developed its own mechanisms of interpreta- tion, which have slightly varied over time. The core principles can be found in Xxxxx, where the following methodology was adopted: When interpreting a treaty, we ‘begin “with the text of the treaty and the context in which the written words are used”’. […] ‘Other general rules of construction may be brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages’. […] Moreover, ‘trea- ties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their meaning, we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, and the practical construction adopted by the parties’. […] We pro- ceed to apply these methods in turn.166 161 Xxxxx v. Xxxxxx Xxxx Tour Operator Ltd, (2014) UKSC 15, at 59.
the United States. On return to the United States, the Employee may return to their previous role or may be assigned to another role that will be decided at that time.
the United States. After many years of controversies resulting from the so-called antitrust revolution of the 1980’s,89 the antitrust law enforcement authorities of the USA have issued Guidelines for Licensing of Intellectual Property, which are based on the following express or implied principles:90 . Intellectual property is regarded as being essentially comparable to any other form of property, therefore no particular rules should apply to IPR-related re- straints of competition. . There is no presumption that intellectual property by itself creates market power. . Unless licensing agreements are concluded between competitors (or at least actual-potential competitors), it is generally recognized that intellectual property allows enterprises to combine complementary factors of production and, there- fore, is pro-competitive; this concerns in particular cross-licensing, but also field- of-use, territorial and other limitations on licenses. . Unless the combined market shares of the parties to a license agreement exceed 20 % of the relevant markets, the antitrust authorities will not intervene (so called “safe haven”).
the United States. The United States on the other hand — though it provided similar recommendations to the European Union such as “proportionality” and “risk-based approach” — explicitly advised against precautionary measures at the cost of innovation and growth. The Guidance proposed reducing regulatory barriers that may harm the United States competitiveness, stating that “agencies must avoid a precautionary approach that holds AI systems to an impossibly high standard such that society cannot enjoy their benefits and could undermine America's position as the global leader in AI innovation” (Xxxxxx, 2020, p. 2). Against that backdrop, the United States continues to promote self- regulation and voluntary compliance in the governance of AI. The United States has a long tradition of positioning cost-benefit analysis as a decisive tool when assessing the need for regulatory efforts (Sunstein, 2018). This method of monetizing benefits and determining the cost of risk to specify the corresponding regulation contrasts with the European Union approach of applying precaution on uncertainties. Whether this approach is effective in promoting greater AI innovation and deployment remains to be seen. However, it is worth noting that the United States currently boast the world’s largest number of AI startups16 and an AI adoption rate of 55 percent (in North America), which is slightly higher than Europe’s 51 percent in 2021 (Zhang et al., 2022). The United States governance structure is also distinct from the European Union and China in that the former regulates through a federal governance structure, while the latter two adopts a more centralized form of governance. The Guidance is literally a guiding document proposing recommendations for U.S. federal agencies on how to develop their own AI regulations, which implies that each agency will develop their own sector-specific regulations. Whereas the European Union and China expect the entirety of their regimes to follow the governance initiatives published by the central governing body. Nevertheless, recent directives from the United States government, such as Executive Order 13859 Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence and the U.S. Innovation and Competition Act (USICA), clearly signaled the United States’ intent on bolstering its global hegemony in AI.
the United States. If this Agreement shall be terminated pursuant to this Section 8, there shall be no liability of the Company to the Underwriters and no liability of the Underwriters to the Company; provided, however, that in the event of any such termination the Company agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Underwriters from all costs or expenses incident to the performance of the obligations of the Company under this Agreement, including all costs and expenses referred to in paragraphs (i) and (j) of Section 6 hereof.
the United States. Supreme Court acknowledges the legal standard for sport and athlete specific athletic codes of conduct.
the United States expressly disclaims any and all responsibility or liability to Recipient or third persons for the actions of Recipient or third persons resulting in death, bodily injury, property damages, or any other losses resulting in any way from the performance of this award or any other losses resulting in any way from the performance of this award or any contract, or subcontract under this award.
