Trade Remedies. Global safeguard measures
Trade Remedies. This chapter aims to address problems caused either by unfair practices such as dumping and subsidisation, or by a sudden increase in imports. It is a very good result, in particular due to carefully crafted bilateral safeguard clauses, which will apply to both industrial and agricultural goods subject to preferential treatment. It will give the Parties the possibility to provide relief if certain conditions are met, but the rules cannot be abused to remove preferences without due justification. In concrete terms, the trade remedies chapter consists of two parts. The first one covers the WTO trade defence instruments: anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and global safeguards; and the second one covers bilateral safeguard measures. The agreement confirms that WTO trade defence instruments should remain at the disposal of the Parties in order to address problems caused either by unfair practices such as dumping and subsidisation, or by a sudden increase in imports. In addition to the confirmation of the Parties' rights and obligations under the WTO agreements, some additional elements are included, such as increased transparency and extra consultations. The text also provides for imposing a lower duty than the dumping/subsidy margin if this is sufficient to remove the injury caused by the dumped or subsidised imports (the so- called ‘lesser duty rule’) and to take into consideration the interests of users and consumers of the imported product. The bilateral safeguard clause provides an opportunity to remedy economic damage caused by unexpected or significant increases in preferential imports resulting from the agreement. This clause is limited in time (up to 18 years from the entry into force of the agreement) and allows for the suspension of preferences during a period of up to two years, with a possible extension of another two years. A provision is also included to cater for the specific circumstances of the outermost regions of the EU and it ensures that there is no risk of disrupting the markets in these regions through imports from Mercosur.
Trade Remedies. This Chapter regulates the parties’ recourse to anti-dumping duties, countervailing duties and safeguard measures in volatile markets. This area is already highly circumscribed by the WTO framework. A UK/EU Agreement could copy over the identical wording.
Trade Remedies. As compared to the existing agreement, the Trade Remedies chapter brings clarity and legal certainty to the economic operators by making a clear distinction between the different instruments and clarifying the conditions for their application. The chapter contains three sections. Two are related to the use of the existing WTO instruments (anti-dumping/anti-subsidy and global safeguards), and one relates to bilateral safeguards. While the aim of a free trade agreement is to open markets, the WTO trade defence instruments should remain at the disposal of economic operators, in order to address problems caused by either unfair practices such as dumping and subsidization, or by a sudden increase of imports. In addition to the confirmation of the parties' rights and obligations under the WTO agreements, some additional elements have been included, such as increased transparency and additional consultations. The text also includes provisions allowing for the possibility to introduce a limited level of duties if this is sufficient to remove the injury caused by dumped or subsidized imports (the so called lesser duty rule) and a public interest test. The objective of the bilateral safeguard clause is to remedy economic damage caused by an unexpected and significant increase of preferential imports. This clause is limited in time (in general 10 years) and allows for the suspension of preferences during a period of up to 2 years, with a possible extension of one year. While the clause is sufficient to give relief to an industry if the conditions are met, it is also designed in a way that it cannot be abused to remove preferences without due justification.
Trade Remedies. Section A.
Trade Remedies. Section A: Bilateral Safeguard Measures Article 7.1:
Trade Remedies. The agreement has confirmed the right of both parties to apply trade defence instruments according to the WTO rules. The agreement has also defined some additional rules ensuring transparency and right of defence during the trade remedy investigations. Both parties have also agreed on a bilateral safeguard clause by which preferences can be temporarily suspended in order to allow a domestic industry to adjust to any significant and unexpected increase of imports resulting from the elimination or reduction of the customs duties.
Trade Remedies. Section A. Anti-dumping, Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
Trade Remedies. The Trade Remedies chapter retains both Parties’ ability to use trade remedies in accordance with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules on anti-dumping, countervailing measures and safeguards. It also enhances transparency in the administration of trade remedy actions through cooperation and consultation.
Trade Remedies. ANZTEC does not affect New Zealand’s rights to apply anti-dumping, countervailing and global safeguard measures for trade with Chinese Taipei, consistent with WTO rights and obligations (Article 1). A party taking a global safeguard action must exclude imports of originating goods from the other party if such imports do not cause or threaten to cause serious injury (Article 2). ANZTEC provides for consultation between contact points on any matter arising from the implementation of the chapter (Article 3).
