Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights” Revision 16 (June 1, 2014), p. 22. agreements must also remain in effect for the planning period covered by the allocation. • Stage 2. Stage 2 of the annual ARR allocation is a three-step procedure, with one-third of the remaining system capability allocated in each step of the process. Network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs from any hub, control zone, generator bus or interface pricing point to any part of their aggregate load in the control zone or load aggregation zone for which an ARR was not allocated in Stage 1A or Stage 1B. Firm, point-to-point transmission service customers can obtain ARRs consistent with their transmission service as in Stage 1A and Stage 1B. Prior to the start of the Stage 2 annual ARR allocation process, ARR holders can relinquish any portion of their ARRs resulting from the Stage 1A or Stage 1B allocation process, provided that all remaining outstanding ARRs are simultaneously feasible following the return of such ARRs.9 Participants may seek additional ARRs in the Stage 2 allocation. Effective for the 2015 to 2016 planning period, when residual zone pricing will be introduced, an ARR will default to sinking at the load settlement point, but the ARR holder may elect to sink their ARR at the physical zone instead.10 ARRs can also be traded between LSEs, but these trades must be made before the first round of the Annual FTR Auction. Traded ARRs are effective for the full 12-month planning period. When ARRs are allocated, all ARRs must be simultaneously feasible to ensure that the physical transmission system can support the approved set of ARRs. In making simultaneous feasibility determinations, PJM utilizes a power flow model of security-constrained dispatch that takes into account generation and transmission facility outages and is based on assumptions about the configuration and availability of transmission capability during the planning period.11 PJM may also adjust the outages modeled, adjust line limits
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 15 (October 10, 2013), pp. 31 and “IARRs for RTEP Upgrades Allocated for 2011/2012 Planning Period,” <xxxx://xxx.xxx.xxx/~/media/markets-ops/ftr/annual-arr-allocation/2011-2012/iarrs-rtep-upgrades- allocated-for-2011-12-planning-period.ashx>.
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 15 (October 10, 2013), pp. 55-56. simultaneously feasible, customers are allocated prorated shares in direct proportion to their requested MW and in inverse proportion to their impact on binding constraints: Equation 13‑1 Calculation of prorated ARRs Individual prorated MW = (Constraint capability) X (Individual requested MW / Total requested MW) X (1 / MW effect on line).22 The effect of an ARR request on a binding constraint is measured using the ARR’s power flow distribution factor. An ARR’s distribution factor is the percent of each requested MW of ARR that would have a power flow on the binding constraint. The PJM methodology prorates ARR requests in proportion to their MW value and the impact on the binding constraint. PJM’s method results in the prorating only of ARRs that cause the greatest flows on the binding constraint. Were all ARR requests prorated equally, regardless of their proportional impact on the binding constraints, the result would be a significant reduction in market participants’ ARRs. Table 13-21 shows the top 10 principal binding transmission constraints that limited the 2013 to 2014 Annual ARR Allocation. For the 2013 to 2014 ARR Stage 1A allocation, PJM was required to increase capability limits for several facilities in order to make the ARR allocation feasible.23 Table 13‑21 Top 10 principal binding transmission constraints limiting the Annual ARR Allocation: Planning period 2013 to 2014 Constraint Type Control Zone Xxxxxxx - Xxxxxx Flowgate MISO Silver Lake - Cherry Valley Line ComEd Electric Junction - Xxxxxx Line ComEd Oak Grove - Galesburg Flowgate MISO Waukegan-Zion Line ComEd Zion - Lakeview Line ComEd Lakeview Transformer MISO Zion Transformer ComEd Braidwood - East Frankfort Line ComEd Greystone - West Xxxxxxx Line JCPL 22 See the MMU Technical Reference for PJM Markets, at “Financial Transmission Rights and Auction Revenue Rights,” for an illustration explaining this calculation in greater detail.
Examples of Manual 6 in a sentence
Status: Not adopted.) • The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models, including the use of probabilistic outage 12 See “PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights,” Rev.
In an apparent effort to manage FTR revenues, PJM may adjust normal transmission limits (rather than the 38 See “PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights,” Rev.
There were 44,823 MW of ARRs associated with $339,500 of revenue that were reassigned in the receiving the asserted benefit of higher ARR value that 28 See “PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights,” Rev.
Network transmission service customers can obtain ARRs up to their share of zonal peak load, which is the highest daily peak load in the prior twelve month period increased by load growth projections, based on generation to load 18 “PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights,” Rev.
PJM can assume higher outage levels and PJM can decide to include additional constraints (closed loop interfaces) both of which reduce 29 See “PJM Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights,” Rev.
More Definitions of Manual 6
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 15 (October 10, 2013), pp. 55-56. feasibility requirement is necessary to ensure that there are sufficient revenues from congestion charges to satisfy all resulting ARR obligations. If the requested set of ARRs is not simultaneously feasible, customers are allocated prorated shares in direct proportion to their requested MW and in inverse proportion to their impact on binding constraints, except Stage 1A ARRs: Equation 13-1 Calculation of prorated ARRs Individual prorated MW = (Constraint capability) X (Individual requested MW / Total requested MW) X (1 / MW effect on line).26 The effect of an ARR request on a binding constraint is measured using the ARR’s power flow distribution factor. An ARR’s distribution factor is the percent of each requested MW of ARR that would have a power flow on the binding constraint. The PJM methodology prorates ARR requests in proportion to their MW value and the impact on the binding constraint. PJM’s method results in the prorating only of ARRs that cause the greatest flows on the binding constraint. Were all ARR requests prorated equally, regardless of their proportional impact on the binding constraints, the result would be a significant reduction in market participants’ ARRs. auction model. While the more conservative approach to outages in the Annual FTR Auction reduces revenue inadequacy, which was caused in part by Stage 1A ARR overallocations, it does not address the Stage 1A ARR overallocation issue directly and it resulted in decreased Stage 1B ARR allocations through proration, decreased Stage 2 ARR allocations through proration and decreased FTR capability. Stage 1A ARRs were not affected by the more conservative treatment of outages because they may not be prorated. Figure 13-15 shows the historic allocations for Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARRs from the 2011 to 2012 to 2014 to 2015 planning periods. There was an 84.9 percent decrease in Stage 1B ARRs allocated and an 88.1 percent decrease in total Stage 2 ARR allocations from the 2013 to 2014 planning period to the 2014 to 2015 planning period. Figure 13-15 Historic Stage 1B and Stage 2 ARR Allocations from the 2011 to 2012 through 2014 to 2015 planning periods Stage 1B Stage 2-1 Stage 2-2 Stage 2-3 25,000.0 20,000.0
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 17 (June 1, 2016) p. 56.
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 17 (June 1, 2016), pp. 21. 12 See “Residual Zone Pricing,” PJM Presentation to the Members Committee (February 23, 2012) <xxxx://xxx.xxx.xxx/~/media/committees-groups/committees/mc/20120223/20120223-item- 03-residual-zone-pricing-presentation.ashx>.
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 15 (October 10, 2013,) p. 56. 12 See PJM. “Manual 6: Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 15 (October 10, 2013,) p. 56. Table 13‑7 Annual FTR Auction market volume: Planning period 2015 to 2016 Trade Type Type FTR Direction Bid and Requested Count Bid and Requested Volume (MW) Cleared Volume (MW) Cleared Volume Uncleared Volume (MW) Uncleared Volume Buy bids Obligations Counter Flow 98,979 406,755 120,598 29.6% 286,157 70.4% Prevailing Flow 321,737 1,650,128 211,385 12.8% 1,438,742 87.2% Total 420,716 2,056,883 331,984 16.1% 1,724,899 83.9% Options Counter Flow 86 17,253 21 0.1% 17,231 99.9% Prevailing Flow 31,107 363,829 22,625 6.2% 341,204 93.8% Total 31,193 381,081 22,646 5.9% 358,435 94.1% Total Counter Flow 99,065 424,007 120,619 28.4% 303,388 71.6% Prevailing Flow 352,844 2,013,956 234,011 11.6% 1,779,946 88.4% Total 451,909 2,437,964 354,630 14.5% 2,083,334 85.5% Self-scheduled bids Obligations Counter Flow 63 1,045 1,045 100.0% 0 0.0% Prevailing Flow 2,629 22,654 22,654 100.0% 0 0.0% Total 2,692 23,699 23,699 100.0% 0 0.0% Buy and self-scheduled bids Obligations Counter Flow 99,042 407,800 121,643 29.8% 286,157 70.2% Prevailing Flow 324,366 1,672,781 234,039 14.0% 1,438,742 86.0% Total 423,408 2,080,581 355,682 17.1% 1,724,899 82.9% Options Counter Flow 86 17,253 21 0.1% 17,231 99.9% Prevailing Flow 31,107 363,829 22,625 6.2% 341,204 93.8% Total 31,193 381,081 22,646 5.9% 358,435 94.1% Total Counter Flow 99,128 425,052 121,664 28.6% 303,388 71.4% Prevailing Flow 355,473 2,036,610 256,664 12.6% 1,779,946 87.4% Total 454,601 2,461,662 378,328 15.4% 2,083,334 84.6% Sell offers Obligations Counter Flow 53,483 162,830 23,986 14.7% 138,844 85.3% Prevailing Flow 70,454 205,920 39,619 19.2% 166,301 80.8% Total 123,937 368,750 63,605 17.2% 305,144 82.8% Options Counter Flow 2 15 0 0.0% 15 100.0% Prevailing Flow 3,462 9,979 378 3.8% 9,601 96.2% Total 3,464 9,994 378 3.8% 9,616 96.2% Total Counter Flow 53,485 162,845 23,986 14.7% 138,859 85.3% Prevailing Flow 73,916 215,899 39,997 18.5% 175,902 81.5% Total 127,401 378,744 63,983 16.9% 314,761 83.1% Figure 13-6 shows the bid volumes of the Annual FTR Auctions from the 2009 to 2010 planning period through the 2015 to 2016 planning period and the associated planning period payout ratios, represented by the background bars. The payout ratio for the current planning period is shown as dotted background because it is not yet final. Bid volume has not changed significantl...
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 16 (June 1, 2014), p22. 16 PJM 2015/2016 Stage 1A Over allocation notice, PJM FTRs, <xxxx://xxx.xxx.xxx/~/media/markets-ops/ftr/annual-arr-allocation/2015- 2016/2015-2016-stage-1a-over-allocation-notice.ashx> (March 5, 2015). Figure 13-2 shows the predicted and estimated impact of Stage 1A infeasibilities on funding for the 2012 to 2013 through 2015 to 2016 planning periods, as well as predicted impact on funding for the 2016 to 2017 planning period. The predicted funding is based on the infeasible ARR MW and the nodal price of the source and sink in the Annual FTR Auction. The estimated funding is calculated assuming every infeasible ARR MW is self scheduled, and uses the hourly congestion LMP values. In the 2015 to 2016 planning period Stage 1A ARR infeasibilities accounted for $304.7 million in over allocation. Figure 13‑2 Stage 1A Infeasibility Funding Impact Predicted Estimated $350 $300 Funding Impact (Millions) $250 $200 show Stage 1A source points that are no longer in service for the most recent Stage 1A allocation period. Figure 13‑3 Overallocated Stage 1A ARR source points $150 $100 $50 $- 12/13 15/16 16/17 Revenue ARRs are allocated to qualifying customers rather than sold, so there is no ARR revenue comparable to the revenue that results from the FTR auctions.
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights,” Revision 15 (October 10, 2013,) p. 56. Table 13‑5 Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auction market volume: 2015 Monthly Auction Type Trade Type Bid and Requested Count Bid and Requested Volume (MW) Cleared Volume (MW) Cleared Volume Uncleared Volume (MW) Uncleared Volume Jan-15 Obligations Buy bids 252,024 1,586,427 144,179 9.1% 1,442,248 90.9% Sell offers 99,255 247,626 61,026 24.6% 186,600 75.4% Options Buy bids 10,732 263,464 2,787 1.1% 260,678 98.9% Sell offers 2,886 15,735 4,571 29.1% 11,164 70.9% Feb-15 Obligations Buy bids 266,009 1,417,759 161,646 11.4% 1,256,112 88.6% Sell offers 96,236 237,844 51,752 21.8% 186,091 78.2% Options Buy bids 12,280 284,062 6,106 2.1% 277,956 97.9% Sell offers 3,281 16,999 5,332 31.4% 11,667 68.6% Mar-15 Obligations Buy bids 254,361 1,467,192 151,571 10.3% 1,315,621 89.7% Sell offers 97,054 259,360 54,239 20.9% 205,121 79.1% Options Buy bids 7,894 216,952 8,671 4.0% 208,281 96.0% Sell offers 4,158 28,822 8,783 30.5% 20,039 69.5% Apr-15 Obligations Buy bids 195,242 1,239,939 133,675 10.8% 1,106,263 89.2% Sell offers 67,401 211,198 53,998 25.6% 157,200 74.4% Options Buy bids 6,529 189,448 6,364 3.4% 183,084 96.6% Sell offers 3,049 23,932 7,442 31.1% 16,490 68.9% May-15 Obligations Buy bids 118,504 696,460 81,864 11.8% 614,596 88.2% Sell offers 35,828 104,822 36,911 35.2% 67,910 64.8% Options Buy bids 3,709 120,692 2,524 2.1% 118,169 97.9% Sell offers 1,366 12,379 4,778 38.6% 7,600 61.4% Jun-15 Obligations Buy bids 384,766 2,017,412 187,357 9.3% 1,830,054 90.7% Sell offers 180,141 553,702 102,726 18.6% 450,976 81.4% Options Buy bids 12,429 352,799 7,999 2.3% 344,800 97.7% Sell offers 11,041 57,100 15,172 26.6% 41,928 73.4% Jul-15 Obligations Buy bids 427,398 1,909,109 208,278 10.9% 1,700,831 89.1% Sell offers 185,213 575,921 111,179 19.3% 464,742 80.7% Options Buy bids 16,004 432,537 9,019 2.1% 423,517 97.9% Sell offers 14,202 52,274 15,790 30.2% 36,483 69.8% Aug-15 Obligations Buy bids 379,565 1,624,183 174,941 10.8% 1,449,242 89.2% Sell offers 147,217 405,601 92,842 22.9% 312,759 77.1% Options Buy bids 14,473 421,949 8,971 2.1% 412,978 97.9% Sell offers 12,307 46,856 12,875 27.5% 33,981 72.5% Sep-15 Obligations Buy bids 416,971 2,241,148 249,881 11.1% 1,991,267 88.9% Sell offers 146,522 420,845 86,461 20.5% 334,385 79.5% Options Buy bids 12,489 387,724 9,252 2.4% 378,472 97.6% Sell offers 11,516 48,013 12,315 25.6% 35,698 74.4% 2014/2015* Obligations Buy bids 3,360,128 21,777,160 2,2...
Manual 6. Financial Transmission Rights” Revision 16 (June 1, 2014), p. 56. • The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate portfolio netting to eliminate cross subsidies among FTR marketplace participants. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted. Pending before FERC.) • The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate subsidies to counter flow FTRs by applying the payout ratio to counter flow FTRs in the same way the payout ratio is applied to prevailing flow FTRs. (Priority: High. First reported 2012. Status: Not adopted.) • The MMU recommends that PJM eliminate geographic cross subsidies. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.) • The MMU recommends that PJM improve transmission outage modeling in the FTR auction models. (Priority: Low. First reported 2013. Status: Adopted partially, 14/15 planning period.) • The MMU recommends that PJM reduce FTR sales on paths with persistent overallocation of FTRs including clear rules for what defines persistent overallocation and how the reduction will be applied. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Adopted partially, 14/15 planning period.) • The MMU recommends that PJM implement a seasonal ARR and FTR allocation system to better represent outages. (Priority: Medium. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.) • The MMU recommends that the basis for the Stage 1A assignments be reviewed and made explicit, that the role of out of date generation to load paths be reviewed and that the building of the transmission capability required to provide all defined Stage 1A allocations be reviewed. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted.) • The MMU recommends that PJM apply the FTR forfeiture rule to up to congestion transactions consistent with the application of the FTR forfeiture rule to increment offers and decrement bids. (Priority: High. First reported 2013. Status: Not adopted. Pending before FERC.) • The MMU recommends that PJM examine the mechanism by which self scheduled FTRs are allocated when load switching among LSEs occurs throughout the planning period. (Priority: Low. First reported 2011. Status: Not adopted.)