CONCLUSION. 147. The Court notes that the complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
CONCLUSION. The Commission has at this stage doubts as to the compatibility of the aid for the conversion to biomass of the first Unit of the Drax power plant with the internal market. In particular, the Commission doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that the distortions of competition on upstream biomass market are not too significant. In accordance with Article 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure, thereby inviting the United Kingdom to submit its comments. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests the United Kingdom to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately. The Commission wishes to remind the United Kingdom that Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/ 1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.
CONCLUSION. The Commission has at this stage doubts as to the compatibility of the aid for the conversion to biomass of the Lynemouth power plant with the internal market. In particular, the Commission doubts that the aid is limited to the minimum necessary and that the distortions of competition on upstream biomass market are not too significant. In accordance with Article 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 the Commission has decided to open the formal investigation procedure, thereby inviting the UK to submit its comments. In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the TFEU, requests the UK to submit its comments and to provide all information which may help to assess the measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests the UK authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipients of the aid immediately. The Commission wishes to remind the UK that Article 108(3) of the TFEU has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 (27), which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient. The Commission warns the UK that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.’
CONCLUSION. Managers with anticipatory emotions have higher current utility if they are optimistic about the future. We have modeled an employment contract between an (endogenously) opti- mistic manager and realistic investors. After showing the existence of a potential conflict over memory strategy, we have shown that the manager’s optimism may be affected by monetary incentives. More specifically, we have found that for sufficiently low anticipa- tory emotions, investors’ and manager’s preferences over optimal recollection are perfectly aligned, so that the second-best contract CSB that solves the moral hazard problem also satisfies a non-forgetfulness constraint. However, if the manager places a large weight on anticipatory utility, the second-best outcome cannot be achieved because contract CSB fails to induce the manager to recall his private information correctly. This gives rise to a third- best world in which investors must distort effort levels and payments to make the manager indifferent between forgetting and remembering bad news. What happens in our setting if effort is verifiable but the signal is still private information? If payments are contingent on the outcome, so that a better outcome is associated with a higher payment, the manager will always have an incentive to forget bad news. To prevent this, investors can offer a flat contract and obtain the first-best utility. In other words, not only the presence of an emotional manager, but also a second imperfection is required to make our analysis interesting. To conclude, we think that the interaction between overoptimism and managerial com- pensation is a significant issue and warrants further investigation, both theoretical and em- pirical. At the theoretical level, it has been shown that optimism may exacerbate incentive problems. At the empirical level, our analysis derives some interesting predictions on how behavioral traits affect managerial compensation and recruitment. In particular on the rela- tionship between riskiness of an industry and the personality of managers. In the analysis to follow, the limited liability constraint on w0 is always binding. Thus, throughout all the proofs, we set w0 = 0.
CONCLUSION. The performance of joint precoding across cooperating TXs under varying back- haul data symbol routing overhead is studied. Simulation results shows that the proposed routing algorithm out performs the the conventional time-sharing schemes for practical backhaul overhead values.
CONCLUSION. 53. In the light of these considerations, the Court takes the view that the applicants had a fair trial and that there has been no violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (d).
CONCLUSION. 70. The Court will therefore confine its examination to the other matters complained of by the applicant, namely (1) the orders requiring her doctors to give evidence in the criminal proceedings against her husband, (2) the seizure of her medical records and their inclusion in the investigation file, (3) the decision to make the material in question accessible to the public as from the year 2002 and (4) the disclosure of her identity and medical condition in the Court of Appeal’s judgment.
CONCLUSION. 66. There has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 taken together with Article 6 para. 3 (d).
CONCLUSION. CAPITOLO 3 CAPITOLO 2 Il capitolo ha delineato le buone prassi sindacali esistenti volte a migliorare la trasparenza dei salari. Tuttavia perman- gono molti problemi in diversi paesi. I dati specifici di genere di buona qualità sono di vitale importanza per i negoziatori sinda- cali. Alcuni sindacati sono riusciti con successo a concludere accordi e rafforzare le proprie competenze nel reperire e analiz- zare i dati disaggregati per genere, come base per la contratta- zione collettiva. Senza l’accesso a questi dati, i sindacati sono impossibilitati a combattere la segregazione professionale o la sottovalutazione del lavoro delle donne.
CONCLUSION. 71. Consequently, Claimant 2 is entitled to an amount of USD 42,803.00 from the Club. 72. Claimant 3 claims payment of the total amount of USD 29,600.00.