Committee Voting Sample Clauses

Committee Voting. Unless otherwise stated in this Agreement, all ---------------- matters requiring committee approval shall be approved by a three- quarters (75%) majority vote of committee representatives present at a meeting of the appropriate committee; provided, that a quorum of at least seventy percent (70%) of the respective representatives or their alternates are in attendance, in person or represented by proxy. Provided further, that written notice be given by the committee chairperson to each Party's designated committee representative(s) at least two (2) weeks in advance of the meeting unless otherwise agreed. Such notice shall include an agenda of the meeting.

Committee Voting. Directors of the Company (or members of the Committee) who are either eligible to receive Awards hereunder, or to whom Awards have been granted hereunder, may vote on any matter affecting the administration of the Plan or the granting of Awards under the Plan; provided, however, that no director (or member of the Committee) shall vote upon the granting of an Award to himself, but any such director (or Committee member) may be counted in determining the existence of a quorum at any meeting of the Board of Directors (or the Committee) at which the Plan is administered or action is taken with respect to the granting of any Award.

Committee Voting. ‌ The primary strand of related work on committee decision making begins with ▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇ and Banks (1996), who, using a version of the basic model below, show that for a binary group decision made by simultaneous vote, it is not always a ▇▇▇▇ equilibrium for members to vote in line with their own information. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Pesendorfer (1998) conclude that unanimity is an especially poor voting rule in this context, but ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2000) defends the rule with two extensions of the model. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇ (2006) show more generally that uncertainty about private, individual preferences is necessary for full information sharing, and if there exists a truth-revealing equilibrium under unanimous rule, there does for any voting rule (but the converse is not true). See ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. (2005) for an early survey of information aggregation in committee decision making. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Yariv (2007, 2008) approach the topic from the perspective of mecha- nism design, showing the equivalence of different voting rules when members deliber- 4However, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Davids (2012) criticize the models for effectively retrofitting data via free parameters, and Marcus and ▇▇▇▇▇ (2013) echo the sentiment (but see ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. 2012 for a rebuttal of the critique). ate before casting votes. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Tan (2013) find that when a committee consults experts who can conceal information but cannot lie, the maximization of information aggregation and total utility share no necessary relationship. While strategic voting and information aggregation are natural foci, other work ex- amines whether specialization is desirable in committee decision making (▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. 2012), how restricting communication protocol can improve group decisions (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2012), when a deliberating group will reach a consensus (▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 1974, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Winter 2008), and when that conensus is accurate (▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇- son 2010). ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2004) and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2003) examine the effect of voting rules and committee size on endogenous information collection. Those factors can be important in the group context but are omitted here to focus on the main result.