Expectations in Territorial/Social. Identity Conflicts Like most of the prevailing theories concerning important insurgent conflict dynamics, the theory this project advances rests on the assumption that the willingness of noncombatants to share information with counter-insurgents is a function of the security situation as well as the support preferences of noncombatants. Where this project diverges from the more established theories centers on the relationship between these two factors. Whether implic- itly or explicitly stated, most theories posit that these two factors complement each other. An increased security presence will shift the distribution of noncombatants’ support prefer- ences towards the government, and it is easier for the government to improve the security situation when the distribution of noncombatants’ support preferences is in its favor. However, while the former is almost self-evident, the latter is not. And, while security is paramount, it is also perceiver-dependent. It is entirely possible that noncombatants might perceive counter-insurgents as a threat rather than a protector. As Sambanis, Xxxxxxxxxx- Xxxx and Shayo (2012, 807) note, “Security-seeking is a key motivator, but it is not al- ways paramount, and human behavior is shaped by parochialism.” They posit that “any identity-based boundary that can plausibly define the government and counter-insurgents as belonging to an out-group in reference to the target population can activate parochial- ism.” This project argues the same, and builds on their argument by identifying potential conflict environments in which these complications are likely to arise. When security operations help protect noncombatants from harm or help reduce fear, anxieties, or grievances, they will have a positive influence on noncombatants’ support preferences. They will promote both physical and psychological separation, as is the case in governmental/political ideology conflicts. However, if the heavy-hand of the government is a prominent theme in an insurgent group’s strategic narrative, if it is a general factor that helped fuel the growth of an insurgency in the first place, then deploying more troops to an area can aggravate the situation. Insurgents will move underground, gaining concealment from an accommodating noncombatant community. Attempts at physical separation can xxxxxx psychological bonds. If noncombatants perceive that counterinsurgency security operations are a threat to or part of a broader campaign against their social...
