Project Hypotheses. 1.2 Contributions Having provided an overview of my argument, what contributions does my research make to theoretical literatures? My research allows for a dramatic expansion of the number of cases to which the policy-environment strain of the VoC literature, which explains variation in xxxxx- xxxxx systems using political institutions and policy environments, can be applied. This is especially important since efforts to test the implications of the framework have hitherto largely been restricted to those countries from which it was induced. Several modifications and clarifications make this expansion in the framework’s scope possible. First, my framework incorporates a third possible type of economic xxxxx- xxxxx system and identifies the conditions that are expected to result in that system. In doing so, it clarifies theoretical ambiguities and accounts for anomalies in the use of a veto player model to explain the emergence of specific types of capitalist economies. It specifies the conditions under which single veto player autocracies will produce co- ordinated governance institutions and the conditions under which they will produce hierarchical governance institutions. I also offer an explanation as to why anomalous ‘many veto player’ countries, which the original veto player-VoC approach would ex- pect to be most likely to produce coordinated governance institutions, do not appear to do so. I have largely sidestepped the debate over whether the market or the state is better equipped to facilitate rapid economic development. Instead, by focusing on the de- terminants of various types of economic governance institutions, I provide analytical tools that can be useful to each camp. That is, regardless of whether one is con- vinced that market-driven liberal institutions or non-market coordinative institutions are more desirable, understanding the factors that produce each is critical. This is nowhere more true than in the policy arena. Throughout the 1990s the World Bank and the IMF promoted the creation of market-friendly policies and institutions across the developing world. It was argued that by getting the institutions ‘right’ (in other words recreating the liberal governance institutions of the United States) developing countries could get on the fast track to rapid growth. But my findings suggest that creating de jure governance institutions without altering the incentives created by the policy environment will only create a fa¸xxxx and do little t...
