Independent Variables. ANC: ANC variables included receipt and quality measures. ANC receipt was measured by a timing variable (Early enrollment (1st trimester) vs. late enrollment (2nd or 3rd trimester) of first ANC visit) and a frequency variable (<4 ANC visits vs. ≥4 ANC visits) according to WHO standards92. ANC quality variable comprised 18 practices and counseling topics measured by the survey instrument. These topics did not address IFA administration or counseling but were included as an overall quality measure of ANC services. There were 9 ANC practices (weight, height, blood pressure, blood test, urine test, breast exam, abdomen exam, sonogram/ultrasound, and delivery date given) and 9 ANC counseling topics (advice regarding delivery, nutrition, breastfeeding, keeping the baby warm, cleanliness at delivery, family planning for spacing and limiting, improved maternal and child nutrition, and importance of institutional delivery). We removed 5 variables (blood pressure, urine test, delivery advice, keeping the baby warm, and family planning for limiting) from the analysis because they were too highly correlated, causing a singular matrix. We used the remaining variables to conduct an exploratory factor analysis using polychoric correlation matrices. These have been shown to result in more accurate correlations between categorical variables, as compared to Xxxxxxx correlations93. We then extracted factors from a principal components analysis and rotated them orthogonally using the varimax method. The 13 variables separated into two distinct factors with eigenvalues >1: ANC practice and ANC counseling topics. We retained variables in factors which contained factor loadings of ≥ 0.5. These two factors explained 89% of the cumulative variance.
Independent Variables. Proportionality I rely on a measure of district magnitude to capture proportionality. Using this measure has at least two advantages over the dichotomous proportional vs majoritarian indicator variable used by Xxxxxxxx and Xxxxxx (2002) and the trichotomous measure used in Xxxxxx and Volpin (2005). First, district magnitude allows me to capture the considerable variation that exists among proportional systems. For example, many countries have a district magnitude of 2, indicating a modestly proportional electoral system. The Netherlands, which pools candidates in a single, national district has a district magnitude of 150. Likewise, the Israeli Knesset pools across a single national district, resulting in a district magnitude of 120. These are meaningful differences that would be lost using a dichotomous or trichotomous measure. There are two sources of district magnitude that I am aware of in publicly available datasets. The first comes from the Database of Political Institutions (henceforth: DPI) compiled by Xxxx, Xxxxxx and Xxxxx (2001). This database spans a wide cross-section of countries from 1975 through 2006 and records, along with many other variables, the average district magnitude. An alternative variable comes for Golder's (2005) Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946-2000, which notes average and median district magnitude for a wide cross-section of countries from 1946 through 2000. When there is overlap, these measures correlate very closely. While I prefer to use Golder's measure of median district magnitude on grounds of construct validity, my primary concern is temporal coverage. Using the Xxxxxx measure would necessitate truncating 2 (out of 10) years of data. I therefore use the DPI measure. Competitive Pressures I use two measures to capture the extent of competitive pressures, one to capture competition stemming from geographic neighbors, and the other to capture competition from countries at similar development levels. Regional Diffusion is meant to proxy for cultural, linguistic, and other similarities that are typically geographically correlated. As noted above, cultural, linguistic and geographic proximity all reduce informational asymmetries, with the effect that portfolio managers tend to cluster their assets in similar countries. As such, countries that share similarities in culture, language and geography will effectively be competing with one another for investment capital. To the extent that geographic proximity ...
Independent Variables. My key independent variables are operationalized as follows. Veto players are actors whose assent is required for change to the policy status quo to occur. I limit the 10Very large firms may sometimes find it in their interest to engage in activities with positive externalities that will benefit the entire sector. These activities may include creating horizontal and vertical organizations that serve the interests of the sector. Although such behavor is initiated by large firms for self-interested reasons, I count it as evidence of coordinative interfirm institutions when the actions of the resulting institutions serve the interests of the horizontal or vertical bodies broadly. scope of this project to single, non-alternating veto player regimes and countries with a very high number veto players.11 Following XxxXxxxxx (2003a,b), I chose not to code ideology, but rather focused on the number of discrete, partisan actors who have formal veto authority over the particular policy space. Where factions are potentially important players within collective veto players, I use the level of direct, zero-sum competition among factions to determine whether to code them as veto players. So, though military factions may be important actors within a junta, they are only be counted as separate veto players where they are actively trying undermine one another via promotion channels or a coup. Likewise, a faction within a political party will only be counted as a separate veto player if it competes for votes with other factions in the same party. I am distinguishing between macro and micro economic policy stability because, while both are important for actors’ perceptions of the risks involved in forming coordinating institutions, they may be decided by different numbers of veto players. Additionally, they may be of unequal importance. It may be that the presence of particularistic interests in macro policy is more likely to result in highly hierarchical institutions than in micro policy.12 Though some have suggested that additional veto players may have non-linear effects on a variety of outcomes (XxxXxxxxx, 2003a,x; Xxx & XxXxxxxxx, 2001), none have specified precisely where such a threshold would be. The observations I use to 11I do not assume all authoritarian governments are single veto player regimes. Xxxxxxxx (2002; 1995) notes that powerful and distinct actors may be sharing power through institutionalized means with or without mass participation or protections of ci...
Independent Variables. Veto Authority In 1957 Field Xxxxxxx Xxxxx Xxxxxxxx staged a coup d’´etat. The following year he centralized control over the Thai state. Xxxxx’s subordinates headed key ministry posts and state enterprises and directed the bureaucracy (Pasuk & Xxxxx, 1998). Economic policy decisions, both macro and sectoral, followed the junta’s agenda. Two factors problematize characterizing the military rule period as a single veto player govern- ment: the autonomy of the Finance Minister and factionalism in the military. I shall consider these in turn. In macro policy, Xxxxx delegated significant authority to Xx. Xxxx Xxxxxxxxxx, the country’s leading technocrat, who served both as Governor of the Bank of Thailand Military Rule Instability Semi- Democracy Coalition Governments Post Crisis Single Party Rule Year 1957-1973 1973-1979 1979-1988 1988-1997 1997-2001 2001-2006 Systemic Vulnerability Moderate High Moderate Low Moderate Low Veto Players Single Many/Single Single (Macro) Many (Sectoral) Many Many Single Expected Policy Environment Mixed Stable Particularistic Stable Mixed Particularistic Particularistic Particularistic Expected Economic Governance Institutions Mixed Hierarchical Mixed Hierarchical Hierarchical Hierarchical 51 Table 3.1: Variation in the Thai Case (BoT) and as Minister of Finance. Numerous scholars have noted the importance of Dr. Puey and his autonomy in handling economic affairs (Pongsudhirak, 2001; Xxxxx, 2009; Muscat, 1994; Siamwalla, 1997). Xxxxxxxx defines a veto player as an actor whose approval is required for a change from the policy status quo. This concept includes both the institutions that define which actors have this power and the partisan makeup of the actual actors that wield this power. Xxxxx came to power by means of force of arms and ruled via martial law and an interim constitution that gave him virtually limitless authority. He had opponents in and out of government removed, arrested, or otherwise silenced. In such a situation, any authority granted to a Finance Minister or Bank Governor was completely dependent upon the continued support of the military ruler. Dr. Puey had no actual authority to prevent any policy strongly desired by Xxxxx or Xxxxxx, nor had he any ability to pursue any policy that was not favored by them.1 I argue that, though Dr. Puey asserted considerable influence in crafting economic policy throughout his career, he did not possess veto authority. Though rifts existed and deepened within the military a...
Independent Variables. Veto Authority The Kriangsak military government established a constitution and oversaw new elec- tions. In 1979 Xxxxxxxxx served as PM of an otherwise elected government coalition. The renewed pressures of high oil prices and general unpopularity within sections of the military forced him to step down in 1980 and General Xxxx headed coalition governments for the next eight years. Once in office, Prem recreated the firewall be- tween macroeconomic management and the line ministries, bifurcating policy along the lines set forward by Xxxxx. Macroeconomic decisions were deemed critical and insu- lated from partisan politics. Xxxx’s subordinates were quickly placed in direct control over the powerful Ministry of Finance (MoF) and he effectively held off both military and civilian efforts to steer these policies away from his conservative preferences. Fiscal policies were enacted by the Minister of Finance, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB), and the Office of the Prime Minister, all of which were accountable directly to Prem (Xxxxx & Laothamatas, 1994). The Parliament had no ability to increase the size of the budget, only (in theory) to reduce it. The partisan government coalition partners did fight continuously for control of lucrative government projects once the budget allocation process was complete, but they had almost no say on fiscal policy generally.10 Monetary and exchange rate policies were 10 Early in the semi-democratic period there was conflict between Xxxx and his deputy PM Xxxxxxx over spending. Xxxxxxx’s desire to engage in ‘pump-priming’ ran contrary to the austerity program preferred by Prem. The conflict, which ended in the dismissal of Boonchu and the temporary withdrawal of his Social Action Party from the ruling coalition, demonstrated Xxxx’s sole authority mostly decided by the BoT, under the direction of the (MoF). Trade policies were decided by the Finance Minister who was able to alter tariff rates without legislative approval (Xxxxx & Laothamatas, 1994). This means that, though Xxxx may have delegated policy formation to the bu- reaucracy (especially the MoF), those institutions represented his preferred policy directions and he served as the sole veto player in macroeconomic issue areas. As this veto authority did not change hands, the framework would lead us to expect the nature of the overall macro policy environment to be determined by the level of systemic vulnerability. Microeconomic policies, meanwhile...
Independent Variables. The main independent variables in this study are the time periods and racial groups. Xxxxxxx et al. looked at the birth outcomes of Hispanic, Asian/Pacific Islander, White non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, and other women and also take a step further to look into the ancestry of said women, especially looking into whether they were from a country where there were travel bans imposed, etc. On the other hand, this study looks simply at the outcomes of four different racial groups: Black non-Hispanic, White non-Hispanic, Hispanic, and Other. The “other” category includes Asians, Pacific Islanders, Native Hawaiians, American Indians, and Alaska Natives while excluding those of mixed race and unidentified race. While Xxxxxxx et al. utilized the three time periods of the 2016 election (campaign, nomination to the inauguration, and post-inauguration), this study also looks at these three time periods in addition to the four months following the Unite the Right rally in Charlottesville, VA. Similar to Xxxxxxx et al., this study also looked at one particular region of the United States which had been affected by a traumatic race-related event (in the case of NYC this was federal immigration raids aimed at Hispanics, while in the case of this study Charlottesville, VA was the location of the Unite the Right rally). Time Period 1: During the presidential campaign, before candidate nominations (September 2015 to July 2016) Examples of the potentially harmful rhetoric during this period include the following: • His labeling of Mexican immigrants as “rapists” who are “bringing crime and drugs” to the U.S. when he launched his campaign • His call for a ban of all Muslims entering the country • His response to a question regarding whether all 1.6 billion Muslims harbor a hatred for the U.S. being “a lot of them.” • His refusal in February 2016 to disavow Xxxxx Xxxx and the Klu Klux Klan • At the 2016 Republican convention, Xxxxx took on the position of the “law and order” candidate… “an obvious dog whistle playing to white fears of black crime, even though crime in the U.S. is historically low” (Xxxxx 2019).
Independent Variables. We use two approaches to measure incarceration history to approximate the effects of both the timing and length of incarceration on the seven outcomes of interest. At the time of the baseline survey, fathers were asked a series of questions about their experiences with the 3We summed the number of days (0–30) that a father participated in each of the 6 activities and divided by the number of potential activities (6). We then averaged this for each child if a father had more than one nonresident child. criminal legal system including if they had ever been convicted of a crime, if they had ever spent time in an adult correctional institution, the longest amount of time they had ever been incarcerated, and their most recent date of release from either jail or prison. This set of questions allowed us to approximate both the timing and maximum length of a father’s incarceration.
Independent Variables. The key hypothesis tested in this thesis is that states with a greater commitment to conservation will be more likely to have lower levels of illegal wildlife imports. This analysis uses four variables—FWS land, FWS funds, issued permits, and citizen petition—to indicate a state’s commitment to conservation. As previously stated, the term commitment refers to the extent to which a state has mobilized its resources to protect species. The indicators for commitment were chosen with guidance from Xx. Xxxx Xxxxxxx’ partnership federalism model, which provides four roles that states may take on when committing to conservation policy: proprietors (FWS funds), resource manager (FWS lands), permit authorities (issued permits), and content-providers (citizen petition). Additionally, the framework of the ESA provided guidance in to how best measure the four roles. Each indicator for commitment came with its own methodological challenges as explained in the upcoming sections; however, with the backing of theory, ESA framework, and guidance from FWS officials, these variables were chosen as the best possible proxy for a state’s commitment to conservation.
Independent Variables. FWS State Lands Building on the findings that listed species with protected habitat are more than twice as likely to recover, Xxxxxxx’ concept of partnership federalism takes this emphasis on protected habitat and applies it to states’ roles as resource managers (“Protecting Critical Habitat” 2012). Xxxxxxx writes that the most evident role a state plays in endangered species conservation is as manager of land (Melious 2001). This analysis reflects Xxxxxxx’ role of resource manager by arguing that a state with a high number of FWS lands indicates an increased commitment to the natural resource manager role, resulting in increased policy responsiveness. Given this, I hypothesize that a state with high FWS land percentage indicates its commitment to the role of resource manager. In addition, I utilized the purpose of the ESA as described in Section 4, “to protect the ecosystems upon Figure 10: Chart of Average FWS Land Percentage per State 2001 – 2016 (data from “Annual Report of Lands” 2018) which they (imperiled species) depend” (Title 16, Section 4 2004). Each year, FWS releases its annual Lands Report through the National Wildlife Refuge System, detailing areas currently under the Services’ authority (“Annual Report of Lands” 2018). FWS oversees national protected areas set aside for listed species, wetland areas utilized for the Migratory Bird Conservation Act, refuges managed directly by the state, administrative sites, and national fish hatcheries (“Annual Report of Lands” 2018). All FWS lands are partially to completely overseen by states. Because of this, all FWS lands serve the proxy for Xxxxxxx’ role of resource manager, indicating state commitment to the ESA, shown in Figure 10. Data FWS land is presented as a relative percentage to control for a state’s area. As Figure 10 shows, Alaska has the highest average relative percentage at 20.5% and also the highest amount of absolute FWS land with an average of 76,817,213 acres. Kentucky has the lowest average relative percentage at 0.04% and also the lowest absolute land with an average 10,715 acres. However, it is not always the case that a state’s ranking of the relative percentage of FWS land and the absolute value of FWS land are the same. In the case of Hawaii, the state has the 2nd highest relative percentage at 4.28%, but has the 9th highest absolute land value of 200,317 acres. The variable FWS land remains fairly constant throughout the 15 years analyzed, however, there are some significant f...
Independent Variables. Susceptibility to peer influence is a mean over ten items and was developed by Xxxxxxxxx (2000) to assess how much adolescents act autonomously from their peers (α= .73). Individuals are given two conflicting scenarios 2 A more comprehensive measure for self-reported delinquency would be better. Ideally, a measure of the frequencies of each act would be computed for the previous 6 months. However, the dataset does not include a frequencies for acts committed in the previous 6 months. One could not be computed due to certain sensitive variables (rape and murder) being masked. and are then asked to choose the one that most likely reflects their own behavior. The scenarios presented are not criminal or delinquent in nature (see Appendix D for full scale). For example, “Some people go along with their friends just to keep their friends happy” and “Other people refuse to along with what their friends want to do, even though they know it will make their friends unhappy.” This measure of susceptibility gives a non-criminal and unbiased view of the influence of peers on juveniles. By using neutral items that do not specify delinquent or conventional behaviors juveniles are measured on their susceptibility to all peers, not just deviant peers. Furthermore, the participant is asked to rate the degree to which the statement is accurate (i.e. “sort of true” or “really true”). The response categories range from 1) It’s really true, I prefer to be an individual,
