Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. [ H o w a r d , C .J. referred to E m m an u el et al v . Sym on.1] The remarks relevant to this case which appear in the judgments in. stu rgeon Brothers x . Xxxx on (supra) were made obiter. Gur. adv. vult. February 17, 1944. H o w a r d C .J.— The defendant in this case appeals from a judgm ent of the District Judge, Xxxxx xx, ordering him to render to the plaintiff, the respondent, a full and true account o f the business known as the Standard M otor Stores carried on at Fourth Cross street, Pettah, Xxxxx xx, including the stock in trade thereof and to pay .the balance half share o f the profits, to the plaintiff. In the alternative it was ordered that in the event o f the defendant failing to render an account he should pay the plaintiff a sum o f Us. 10,446.78 as profits up to M ay, 1939, together with further profits- from June, 1939, till paym ent in full. The plaintiff alleged that by virtue o f an agreement in writing dated M arch 5, 1927, the defendant, him self and one X . X . Xxxxxxx becam e partners in the business known as the Standard M otor Stores of which the defendant was the working and managing partner on w hom devolved the responsibility o f keeping proper and correct books of account. The plaintiff further alleged that the business was carried on until 1930 when X. X . Xxxxxxx ceased to be a partner and the business was thereafter carried on by the plaintiff and defendant, the remaining partners, each being entitled to a half-share o f the profits. In the year 1939 the defendant, so the plaintiff alleges, failed to render to him a true and proper account of the profits of the xx.xx business. In the D istrict Court it was contended on behalf o f the defendant that the latter was the sole proprietor of the said business, that the docum ent dated M arch 5, 1927, is of no force or avail to create- a partnership between the parties and does not constitute the writing- required by law for the establishm ent of such a partnership and that the- claim , if any, of the plaintiff is prescribed. In finding in favour of the- plaintiff the learned District Judge has held that (1) there was a partner ship between the plaintiff, defendant and Xxxxxxx and the defendant was xxxxx to render accounts and pay the plaintiff a one-thir'd share of the profits, (2) after 1930 the business was carried on by the plaintiff and! defendant, (3) the docum ent of March 5, 1927, was sufficient to create a partnership, and (4) the defendant broke the partnership ag...
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. 123 under the original partnership arose in 1930 and was, therefore, barred by prescription and that there was no evidence to- establish a fresh partnership. The only question that requires decision is whether the retirem ent of FoPEeka from the partnership operated in law as a dissolution of the partnership or whether the partnership continued under the agreem ent o f M arch 5, 1927, as betw een the plaintiff and the defendant ? In 1929, Fonseka com m enced proceedings against the defendant claim ing his share o f the profits under the agreement. Xxxxxxx did not ask for a dissolution o f the partnership. This case, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, 'w as settled on the footing that the plaintiff and defendant bought up Xxxxxxx’ s rights for B s. 3,000. The plaintiff apparently with difficulty liquidated his share o f this sum b y driblets. The m atter is o f course governed b y the Partnership A ct (1890) (53 and 54 V iet, o- 39) w hich is in force in Ceylon by virtue o f section 3 o f the Civil L a w Ordinance (Cap. 66). Sections 32 and 33 o f the A ct prescribe in w hat m anner a partnership is dissolved. E etirem ent o f a partner is not form ulated as operating in law to produce a dissolution. On the other hand, section 4 6 o f the A ct is worded as fo llo w s: — “ The rules o f equity and o f com m on law applicable to partnership, shall continue in force except so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions o f this A ct. ” I t would seem that prior to the enactm ent of the Partnership A ct, 1890, a partnership at com m on law w ould be dissolved b y the retirem ent o f a partner. Can it be said that the rule o f com m on law is inconsist e n t w ith the provisions of Sections 32 & 33 o f the A ct ? M x. Xxxxxx in support o f his contention that the partnership was dissolved relies on the
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. Xxxxxxxx shall each have delivered to Acquiror a non-competition agreement, precluding each of them from competing with business of Acquiror and its Subsidiaries for a period of three years from the later of the Closing Date or the date of payout under their respective existing employment agreements and containing such other terms and conditions as are reasonably satisfactory to Acquiror;
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. X. Xxxxxx are the sole trustees and lifetime beneficiaries of the Trust.
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. Executive also specifically acknowledges that his service as a director beyond the expiration of his current term in 2004 is subject to Executive's re-nomination as a director candidate by the Nominating and Governance Committee of the Company's Board of Directors and the election by shareholders, neither of which events are guaranteed by this Separation Agreement.
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the rights of the Participant upon a Change of Control (as defined in the Plan) shall be as set forth in section 9 of the Plan on the date hereof., in lieu of the vesting schedule set forth in Schedule 1. If as a result of the Change of Control, the Common Stock is exchanged for or converted into a different form of equity security and/or the right to receive other property (including cash), the Option may be exercised, to the maximum extent practicable, in the same form.
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx own beneficially and of record the shares of True Fiction free and clear of any liens and encumbrances.
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx knew that they would receive millions of dollars in illegal kickback payments from Privinvest in connection with the EMATUM loan while employed by Credit Suisse; (2) Firm 1 had expressly warned Credit Suisse about Privinvest and Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1’s history of “corruption and bribery”; and (3) a senior Credit Suisse executive had previously said “no” to Pearse to the combination of Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1 and Mozambique in November 2012.
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. X AFFILIATES ARE NOT LIABLE IN CONTRACT, TORT, NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY OR BY STATUTE OR OTHERWISE, FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER WITH RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE USE OF THE CLIENT DATA OR DELIVERABLES, WHETHER DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE, CONSEQUENTIAL, COLLATERAL, OR INCIDENTAL, FOR DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF OR CORRUPTION OF DATA OR INFORMATION, LOSS OF PROFITS, LOSS OF USE, LOSS OF OR INTERRUPTION OF BUSINESS OR LOSS OF ANTICIPATED SAVINGS. THE FOREGOING LIMITATION OF LIABILITY DOES NOT LIMIT XXXXX’X AND XXXXX’X AFFILIATES LIABILITY FOR ANY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEATH, BODILY INJURY, OR TANGIBLE DAMAGE TO PROPERTY. 5.2. Section 5 survives termination or expiration of the Agreement.
Xxxxxx and Xxxxx. Let P be a static group key agreement protocol for n parties allowing broadcasts.
