Xxxxxxx, No. 2:11-CV-03079-GEB-EFB, 2013 WL 4710498, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2013). The Court finds that res judicata applies in this case, and this Court is bound by the judgments of the tax court and the Ninth Circuit on these issues. As to the fraud on the court issue – the claims are the same, there has been a final judgment on the matter, and the parties are identical. See Turtle Island, 673 F.3d at 917. As to the tax assessments for xxx Xxxxxxx for 1992-1994, which Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx has not specifically denied at any point, those have been litigated and determined in a stipulated judgment, and twice upheld. See Xxxxxxx, 2013 WL 4710498, at *3. At the hearing on the Motion, the Court gave Xxxxxxx Xxxxxx an opportunity to present evidence and argument as to why the earlier decisions should be set aside. However, there was no admissible evidence presented that, even construed in the light most favorable to him, could raise a genuine issue of material fact that he was not liable for the amount at issue in the Deficiency Decision or that there had been fraud upon the court. See Xxxxxxx x. Xxxxxxxxx, 734 F.3d 967, 976 (9th Cir. 2013) (stating that, at summary judgment, the court “must determine, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant substantive law” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). Thus, the Court CONCLUDES that xxx Xxxxxxx were properly assessed tax liabilities according to the Deficiency Judgment and there was no fraud on the court. Further, the Government has included three Certificates of Assessments, Payments, and Other Specified Matters (Forms 4340s), for xxx Xxxxxxx for tax deficiencies from tax years 1992- 1994. [Hendon Decl., Exhs. 3-5.] These Forms 4340, all dated September 13, 2013, show tax liabilities, penalties, and assessed interest up through late 2003, amounting to $77,575.59, $258,738.47, and $78,961.79, respectively. [Id.] Forms 4340 are “presumptive evidence that a tax has been validly assessed[.]” Xxxx v. United States, 10 F.3d 1440, 1445 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States x. Xxxxxxx, Civil No. 11-00664 JMS-KSC, 2013 WL 3947757, at *4-5 (D. Hawai`i July 30, 2013). Again, there was no evidence presented to rebut these documents or their substance. Thus, even if res judicata did not apply, the Court would grant the Motion as to xxx Xxxxxxx’ federal tax assessments and penalties against them fo...
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Xxxxxxx, No. Civ.A. 94-1722, 1994 WL 622136, at *7 (X.X.Xx. Nov. 8, 1994)(plaintiff could not maintain claims upon implied promise it inferred from defendant’s silence and conduct). See also Xxxxxxx v. Communications Satellite Corp., 698 X. Xxxx. 1241, 1249 (X.X.Xx. 1988)(reliance based Superior Court noted that its research did not produce any factually similar cases. Id. Quite simply, Xxxxxxxxx does not support NDC’s claim. solely upon subjective expectations and not upon any clear promise by defendants was unjustified). This claim is therefore dismissed. NDC’s claim for unjust enrichment is also defeated by the existence of the contract between the parties. “Under Pennsylvania law, ‘the quasi-contractual doctrine of unjust enrichment is inapplicable when the relationship is founded on a written agreement or express contract.’” Xxxxxxxxx, 1999 WL 387329, at *6 (quoting Hershey Foods Corp. v. Xxxxx Xxxxxx, Inc., 828 F.2d 989, 999 (3d Cir. 1987)). “[W]here an express contract governs the relationship of the parties, a party’s recovery is limited to the measure provided in the express contract; and where the contract ‘fixes the value of the services involved,’ there can be no recovery under a quantum meruit theory.” Id. (citations omitted); see also Emtec Inc., v. Condor Tech. Solutions, Inc., No.Civ.A. 97-6652, 1998 WL 834097, at *2-3 (X.X.Xx. Nov. 30, 1998)(plaintiff denied leave to amend complaint to include unjust enrichment claim because parties’ relationship was based on express written contract); Xxxxx Co., 1993 WL 147289, at *2 (“Unjust enrichment is inapplicable when the relationship is controlled by a written agreement or express contract.”)4 Accordingly, this claim is also dismissed. 4 Confusingly, NDC repeatedly insists that its claims for promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment are “complementary” to
Xxxxxxx, No. C.A. 17995, 2000 WL 1277372 at *4 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2000), aff’d, 781 A.2d 696 (Del. 2001) (managers of a manager-managed limited liability company owe a duty of loyalty to the limited liability company, its members and their fellow managers). However, the Castiel case was decided before the DLLCA was amended in 2004 to permit the ‘‘elimination’’ (as opposed to merely the ‘‘limitation’’) by a limited liability company agreement of fiduciary duties, so it is doubtful whether those cases will have any continuing force in light of the amended statute. As amended in 2004, DLLCA § 18–1101(c) provides: To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability company or to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement, the member’s or manager’s or other person’s duties may be expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability company agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Xxxxxxx, No. CJ-2006-4713 in the District Court, Tulsa County, State of Oklahoma.
Xxxxxxx, No. 1:08-cv-01184-JB-RLP, 2010 WL 11601205, at *2 (D.N.M. Dec. 22, 2010) (unpublished) (“New Mexico courts and federal courts have traditionally supervised settlements benefitting minors and incapacitated adults, reviewing the proposed settlement to ascertain whether the agreement promotes the best interest of the minor or incapacitated beneficiary.”).
Xxxxxxx, No. 20010926 (A. Ct. Crim App. Mar. 20, 2007) (unpub.). The accused challenged guilty plea to conspiracy, alleging that the facts raised the defense of withdrawal and the military judge did not explain the defense during the providence inquiry. The court held the plea provident because the accused “did not sufficiently raise the defense of withdrawal to substantially conflict with his pleas.” The accused provided sufficient facts on the record to establish that the withdrawal defense did not apply. Although the accused did not participate in the crimes, he did not comply with the legal requirements for withdrawal and believed that he was still part of the agreement to commit
Xxxxxxx, No. 20030534 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 30, 2004) (unpub.) (holding a plea of consensual sodomy between the accused and an adult female civilian in the accused’s barracks room was improvident). But see United States x. Xxxxx, 2005 CCA LEXIS 59 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 28, 2005) (unpub.) (determining accused’s plea to sodomy with two adult females was provident because military factors existed, specifically his subordinates and the local Japanese nationals knew about his extra-marital affairs).
Xxxxxxx, No. 20030173 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Feb. 2, 2005) (unpub.). During providence inquiry the accused pled guilty to a five day AWOL. On the second day of the AWOL the accused went to the psychiatric clinic for depression and during providence inquiry asserted he was “mentally” prevented from going to work. Failure to advise the accused of the mental responsibility defense results in reversible error for that finding.
Xxxxxxx, No. 3 PLC (registered number 11001450) whose registered office is at 00xx Xxxxx, 000 Xxxxxxxxxx Xxxxxx, Xxxxxx XX0X 0XX as ("Issuer");
