Commission Findings. The Commission must make findings that demand management activities are necessary to help assure continued compliance with Article III of the Colorado River Compact;
Commission Findings. We accept sections 3.4 and 5 of the Uniform Compliance Program. For the reasons discussed below, we find that NERC’s procedures generally comply with the requirements of the ERO Certification Order. We also identify modifications to be addressed by NERC.
Commission Findings. We accept sections 6 and 7 of the Uniform Compliance Program. We also identify modifications to be addressed by NERC. The ERO Certification Order held that remedial actions would be required to: (i) achieve prospective compliance with reliability standards; and (ii) reduce the risk to bulk-power system reliability if actions that appear to be in violation of reliability standards are not corrected.62 Sections 6 and 7 of the Uniform Compliance Program generally satisfy these objectives.
Commission Findings. 104. We accept section 5.4 of the Uniform Compliance Program. We also identify modifications to be addressed by NERC. We find that, in general, section 5.4 sets out procedures that will encourage settlements when appropriate, consistent with the requirements of the ERO Certification Order. However, the time period specified in section 5.4 during which settlement may be pursued warrants revision to include the period prior to the issuance of a notice of alleged violation. Accordingly, we direct NERC to modify section 5.4 to state that settlement negotiations may occur at any time until a notice of penalty is filed with the Commission or an applicable governmental authority.
Commission Findings. We find that section 3.8 sets out procedures that will promote the fair and judicious processing of complaints, consistent with the requirements of the ERO Certification Order. Accordingly, we accept section 3.8 of the Uniform Compliance Program. We also identify modifications to be addressed by NERC. First, where NERC is required to review a complaint and conduct an investigation, due to its being “related to Regional Entities,” we construe the scope of that disqualification to include the Regional Entity and any of its affiliates, divisions, committees or subordinate structures. 117. In addition, the use of the term “Alleged Violation,” in section 3.8.2, in reference to the allegations made in an anonymous complainant is inconsistent with NERC’s
Commission Findings. 125. We accept sections 3.4 and 9.3 of the Uniform Compliance Program. We find that, in general, sections 3.4 and 9.3 set forth procedures that will protect confidentiality, consistent with the requirements of the ERO Certification Order. However, we also identify modifications to be addressed by NERC.
Commission Findings. We accept section 5.1(iv) of the Uniform Compliance Program, without revision. GSOC’s recommendation that notices of an alleged violation should be required to state whether the alleged violator saw its violation as an economic choice is unnecessary. While the ERO Certification Order required that a Regional Entity or NERC justify a penalty determination, in part, on these grounds, a section 5.1(iv) notice may not be the appropriate forum for doing so. A notice of alleged violation, rather, is a notice that the compliance enforcement authority concludes that evidence exists that an entity violated one or more requirements of a reliability standard, not a determination of penalty. Such a notice, then, need not address this factor.
Commission Findings. We find that the MRO bylaws and the representations made in Exhibit B of the MRO Delegation Agreement satisfy the governance requirements of FPA section 215 and the pro forma Exhibit B Governance Criteria. We also identify modifications to be addressed by NERC and MRO. We note that MRO is not a user, owner, or operator of bulk-power system facilities. Moreover, the MRO board will be comprised of directors chosen from all industry segments, with no two sectors able to control a vote. No single sector will be able to veto a measure, given MRO’s quorum and voting protocols. As such, MRO’s board composition and voting protocols are designed to ensure that MRO will be governed by an appropriate balance of stakeholder interests. 274. However, membership fees, which are set by the board on an annual basis, could upset this balance, particularly if set too high. Accordingly, in order to provide the Commission the opportunity to review them, any fees that MRO proposes to charge members must be identified in its annual budget and business plan.
Commission Findings. 297. We find that the NPCC bylaws and the representations made in Exhibit B of the NPCC Delegation Agreement satisfy the governance requirements of FPA section 215 and the pro forma Exhibit B Governance Criteria. First, we note that NPCC is not a user, owner, or operator of bulk-power system facilities. Moreover, the NPCC board will be comprised of directors chosen from all industry segments, with no two sectors able to control a vote. No single sector will be able to veto a measure, given NPCC’s quorum and voting protocols. As such, NPCC’s board composition and voting protocols are designed to ensure that NPCC will be governed by an appropriate balance of stakeholder interests. 298. We clarify, however, that the NPCC bylaws are “rules,” under our regulations, which are subject to NERC approval and, if approved by NERC, Commission approval.167
Commission Findings. 22. We accept NERC’s proposal to include, in Exhibit C of the pro forma Delegation Agreement, 34 Common Attributes that govern the development of reliability standards. These Common Attributes are generally consistent with NERC’s procedures for the development of reliability standards that the Commission has approved in the ERO Certification Order.27 We also find that these Common Attributes will serve as a useful benchmark in identifying the procedural elements necessary to ensure an open and fair process capable of producing reliability standards that are both technically sound and able to achieve a valuable reliability goal. We also agree that it will be appropriate, consistent with the flexibility afforded by FPA section 215, to consider, on a case-by-case basis (as we do below), the specific voting procedures applicable to this standards development process.
23. However, while we accept as reasonable NERC’s Common Attributes as part of the pro forma Delegation Agreement and as an appropriate mechanism for NERC to evaluate a proposed reliability standards development process, we will look to the statute, e.g., section 215(c) and (e), Order No. 672, and other Commission precedent to determine whether a proposed reliability standard is appropriate and whether the regional development process is acceptable. Thus, in reviewing Exhibit C in a given case (e.g., in the context of the individual Delegation Agreements considered below in section V), we will consider the underlying documentation (i.e., the bylaws or manuals approved by each proposed Regional Entity’s board of directors), not only the narrative explanation accompanying each Common Attribute that appears in the individual Delegation Agreements. The scope of these Common Attributes will not limit the factors that we consider and our assessment of the requirements for a standards development process may be different from that provided by NERC’s Common Attributes.
24. We disagree with GSOC that the Common Attributes are vague and require clarification. The term “functional classes of entities,” as used in Common Attribute 32, is clearly referring to the types or categories of entities to which a reliability standard would apply.28 Likewise, the purpose and function of the term “measures,” as used in Common Attribute 33, has been clarified by NERC and discussed by the Commission in
