Initialization. During initialization, port drivers register each communication port as well as all supported interfaces. User code creates an asynUser, which is a "handle" for accessing asynDriver facilities, by calling pasynManager->createAsynUser(processCallback,timeoutCallback); An asynUser has the following features: • An asynUser is the means by which asynManager manages multiple requests for accessing a port. • processCallback,which is used by queueRequest described below, is the addresss of a user supplied callback routine. • timeoutCallback is the address of caller supplied callback that will be called if a queueRequest remains on the queue too long. • Device support code should create an asynUser for each "atomic" access to low level drivers, i.e. a set of calls that must not be interlaced with other calls to the low level drivers. For example device support for EPICS record support should create an asynUser for each record instance. • Device support code should NOT try to share an asynUser between multiple sources of requests for access to a port. If this is done then device support must itself handle contention issues that are already handled by asynManager. User code connects to a low level driver via a call to status = pasynManager->connectDevice(pasynUser,portName,addr); pasynInterface = pasynManager->findInterface(pasynUser,asynOctetType,1);
Initialization. Set (i) t = 0; (ii) WeakEpochs, WeakUsers = ∅; and (iii) G[∗], Rand[∗], ST[∗] ← ⊥, K[∗] ← ⊥. • Gen() executes (ST, PK) ←$ Gen(), sets ST[PK] ← ST, and returns PK. • Add(PK, PK∗) first aborts if (i) PK = PK∗; (ii) t ƒ= 0 and PK ∈/ G[t]; or (iii) PK∗ ∈ G[t]. Otherwise it: ← ←
Initialization. To initialize a group for users (id 1, . . . , idn), user id 1 first generates the $ dummy key-pair (pk , sk ) ← skuPKE.Gen(1λ). They then set up a left-balanced binary ratchet tree T = (V, E), where the ith leaf corresponds to user idi. T is completely blanked except for the leaves, that are set to have the corresponding user’s initialization public key as associated key and further contain their signature verification key. Further, vid1 .stsec contains id 1’s secret decryption and signing key. id 1 incorporates (pkc, skc), T , a copy Tnext of T , and an empty list Onext in their state and then computes ((∆i, δi, Ci)i, κ) ← gen-path-upd(id 0.xx ). ((∆i, δi)i, κ) is added to id 1’s state together with epoch counter ectr = 1 and Knext is set to the zero string. The resulting welcome message is W = (T.stpub, (∆i, Ci)i, (pkc, skc), σ, id 1), where σ is a signature of (T.stpub, (∆i, Ci)i, (pkc, skc)) under sskid1 .
Initialization. User id 1 runs (id 0.xx, W ) ← baCGKA.Init(G, (pkid1 , . . . , pkidn ), sskid1 ) to initialize a session. Here G = (id 1, . . . , idn) specifies the group, pkidi is the initialization encryption public-key of user idi, and sskid1 the initialization authentication secret key of the party setting up the group. The output consists of user id 1’s initial state and a welcome message W . ←
Initialization. For every (l, m) such that Hml = 1, let q0 = 1 — p′(t—1) and
Initialization. The NETN Initialization module provides a standard way of documenting and providing key data related to the initial states and relationships among units represented in a scenario. Preparation of a distributed CAX environment includes the distribution and initialization of common data including but not limited to Order of Battle (ORBAT), environment datasets and other initial scenario settings. The Military Scenario Definition Language (MSDL) [9] is the core standard used by NETN to represent ORBAT and initial scenario data. NETN also defines the following MSDL extensions: • Initial allocation of modelling responsibilities as additional deployment information • Extended unit and equipment type identification based on SISO-REF-010 enumerations • Representation of a unit's holdings of platform, equipment, human and other resources • Extended description of humans to capture rank and category codes • Embarkment added as new type status for a unit's support role to indicate that a unit or equipment is embarked on another unit. The representation of Aggregate Units and Physical Object in NETN is based on the RPR-FOM representation with extensions to better reference data captured in MSDL. In particular, a Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) is added to all Aggregate and Physical Entities in the federation. The UUID use the same format as in MSDL and is used to provide a unique identifier of simulated objects to its corresponding scenario description in MSDL format. The RPR-FOM has been extended with subclasses for all platforms and the AggregateEntity object class to add the UUID attribute and additional information. The MSDL standard is currently undergoing revision and new versions of this standard will impact how initialization data is represented in future versions of NETN FAFD. Representation of task organization, internal organizational relationships and relationships between different organizations may in some situations need to change dynamically during execution of a federation. Future versions of the NETN Initialization module will provide standards for both initialization and dynamic update of this type of information.
Initialization. NS underwrites the Agreement and gives proxy to Mx. Xxxxxxx Xxxxxxx, Esq., to initial the previous pages and the Enclosures.
Initialization. There are a number of steps necessary for an OS to bring its Host Controller Driver to an operational state: ?? Load Host Controller Driver and locate the HC ?? Verify the HC and allocate system resources ?? Take control of HC (support for an optional System Management Mode driver) ?? Set up HC registers and HC Communications Area ?? Begin sending SOF tokens on the USB Note: Due to some devices on the USB that may take a long time to reset, it is desirable that the Host Controller Driver startup process not transition to the USBRESET state if at all possible. The description of driver and controller initialization in following sections takes this into account. OpenHCI Operational Registers Mode HCCA Status Event Frame Int Ratio Control Bulk Host Controller Commications Area Interrupt 0 Interrupt 1 Interrupt 2 Interrupt 31
Initialization. Execute the Minit procedure by querying (M, MK) ← eram-init() and compute Uinit for
Initialization. This subsection illustrates that how n members U1, , Un can establish a group key to create a secure multicast session among them. The entire group key establishment process divided in two algorithms: Algo- rithm 1 and Algorithm 2. Algorithm 1 is run by KGC while Algorithm 2 is to be run by every user after com- pletion of Algorithm 1. On completion of Algorithm 1 every user got their long term private key < Si, Ri > though some secure channel. On receiving the same every user can validate it by check- ing whether the following equation hold: R + H (ID ).P = S . (1) Ki+2R = Xi+2 ⊕ Ki+1R KnR = Xn ⊕ Kn−1R K1R = X1 ⊕ Kn R = X ⊕ K R. Ki−1 i−1 i−2
1: Begin
2: On taking k Z+ as the input. KGC chooses a k -bit prime p and determines the following: where k is the security parameter. E/Fp: an Elliptic curve over Fp. G: Cyclic additive group formed by points on E/Fp with an extra point O called point at infinity.
i. e. G = (x, y) E/Fp : x, y Fp O P : Generator of G.
3: Choose a master private key s ∈R Zp∗ and compute i 1 i pub i master public key Ppub = s.P . The private key is valid if the equation holds and vice versa. Since: R + H (ID ).P = r .P + h .s.P = (r + H1 : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}k, H2 : G × G → {0, 1}k s.hi).P = Si.P .
1 i pub i i ≤ ≤
