Initialization Clause Samples
The Initialization clause establishes the procedures and requirements that must be fulfilled before a contract or project officially begins. Typically, it outlines the necessary steps such as the delivery of initial documentation, payment of upfront fees, or completion of pre-conditions by one or both parties. By clearly defining what constitutes the official start, this clause ensures that all parties are aligned on when obligations commence, thereby preventing disputes over whether the contract is in effect or if performance can be demanded.
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Initialization. During initialization, port drivers register each communication port as well as all supported interfaces. User code creates an asynUser, which is a "handle" for accessing asynDriver facilities, by calling pasynManager->createAsynUser(processCallback,timeoutCallback); An asynUser has the following features: • An asynUser is the means by which asynManager manages multiple requests for accessing a port. • processCallback,which is used by queueRequest described below, is the addresss of a user supplied callback routine. • timeoutCallback is the address of caller supplied callback that will be called if a queueRequest remains on the queue too long. • Device support code should create an asynUser for each "atomic" access to low level drivers, i.e. a set of calls that must not be interlaced with other calls to the low level drivers. For example device support for EPICS record support should create an asynUser for each record instance. • Device support code should NOT try to share an asynUser between multiple sources of requests for access to a port. If this is done then device support must itself handle contention issues that are already handled by asynManager. User code connects to a low level driver via a call to status = pasynManager->connectDevice(pasynUser,portName,addr); pasynInterface = pasynManager->findInterface(pasynUser,asynOctetType,1);
Initialization. Set (i) t = 0; (ii) WeakEpochs, WeakUsers = 𝜙; and (iii) G[∗], Rand[∗], ST[∗], K[∗] → ⊥. • Gen() executes (ST, PK) →$ Gen(), sets ST[PK] → ST, and returns PK. • Add(PK, PK∗) first aborts if (i) PK = PK∗; (ii) t =/ 0 and PK ∈/ G[t]; or (iii) PK∗ ∈ G[t]. Otherwise it:
Initialization. User id 1 runs (id ▇.▇▇, W ) ← baCGKA.Init(G, (pkid1 , . . . , pkidn ), sskid1 ) to initialize a session. Here G = (id 1, . . . , idn) specifies the group, pkidi is the initialization encryption public-key of user idi, and sskid1 the initialization authentication secret key of the party setting up the group. The output consists of user id 1’s initial state and a welcome message W . ←
Initialization. To initialize a group for users (id 1, . . . , idn), user id 1 first generates the $ dummy key-pair (pk , sk ) ← skuPKE.Gen(1λ). They then set up a left-balanced binary ratchet tree T = (V, E), where the ith leaf corresponds to user idi. T is completely blanked except for the leaves, that are set to have the corresponding user’s initialization public key as associated key and further contain their signature verification key. Further, vid1 .stsec contains id 1’s secret decryption and signing key. id 1 incorporates (pkc, skc), T , a copy Tnext of T , and an empty list Onext in their state and then computes ((∆i, δi, Ci)i, κ) ← gen-path-upd(id ▇.▇▇ ). ((∆i, δi)i, κ) is added to id 1’s state together with epoch counter ectr = 1 and Knext is set to the zero string. The resulting welcome message is W = (T.stpub, (∆i, Ci)i, (pkc, skc), σ, id 1), where σ is a signature of (T.stpub, (∆i, Ci)i, (pkc, skc)) under sskid1 .
Initialization. For every (l, m) such that Hml = 1, let q0 = 1 — p′(t—1) and
Initialization. NIZKc.gen() crsw ← NIZKw.gen() return crs = (crs crs ) c, w G Proof of Thm. 3: Security of the Construction without Robustness
Initialization. Execute init and set sec[·] ← s. If z = 0, define H := H , otherwise, H := H .
Initialization. There are a number of steps necessary for an OS to bring its Host Controller Driver to an operational state: ?? Load Host Controller Driver and locate the HC ?? Verify the HC and allocate system resources ?? Take control of HC (support for an optional System Management Mode driver) ?? Set up HC registers and HC Communications Area ?? Begin sending SOF tokens on the USB Note: Due to some devices on the USB that may take a long time to reset, it is desirable that the Host Controller Driver startup process not transition to the USBRESET state if at all possible. The description of driver and controller initialization in following sections takes this into account. OpenHCI Operational Registers Mode HCCA Status Event Frame Int Ratio Control Bulk Host Controller Commications Area Interrupt 0 Interrupt 1 Interrupt 2 Interrupt 31
Initialization. To initialize a group with parties G = {ID1, . . . , IDn}, ID1 creates a ratchet tree as follows. First, ID1 retrieves the public initialization keys (pk, svk) = ({pkID1 , . . . , pkIDn }, {svkID1 , . . . , svkIDn }) of all group members (including themselves), redefines G ← (G, pk, svk) to include these, and initializes a left- balanced binary tree with n leaves, assigning each pair of keys in (pk,svk) to a leaf. Let v be ID1’s leaf. They then sample new secrets for v’s path (∆, K) Re-key(v), store the new keypairs (skj, pkj ) in the corresponding nodes on the created tree and compute and store in γ′ the parent hashes and signatures for the nodes in path(v): (H, Σ) ← PHash.Sig(ID1, γ′), where recall that each σj ∈ Σ is a signature of (pkj, 0, hj, Htrans, 0) for some vj ∈ path(v) with hj ∈ H its corresponding new parent hash pair (here PKpr and confTag are set to 0 initially). For every vj ∈ path(v) \ v, let wj be the parent of vj not in path(v). Then, for each yj,l ∈ Res(wj), ID1 computes ej,l = PKE.Enc(pkyj,l , ∆j), together with the signature
Initialization. Since the cornerstone for success is laid at the start, a pilot unit is selected, a team is assembled and a sponsor from management is sought.