SYLLABUS OF THE COURT. Consideration exists to support a noncompetition agreement when, in exchange for the assent of an at-will employee to a proffered noncompetition agreement, the employer continues an at-will employment relationship that could legally be terminated without cause. XXXXX, X.X. {¶1} Lake Land Employment Group of Akron, LLC (“Lake Land”), appellant, initiated this action by filing a complaint asserting that its ex-employee, appellee Xxx Xxxxxxxx, had breached a noncompetition agreement the parties had executed. The agreement provided that for a period of three years after his termination of employment Columber would not engage in any business within a 50- mile radius of Akron, Ohio, that competed with the business of Lake Land. Lake Land further claimed that Xxxxxxxx’x employment with Lake Land terminated in 2001 and that he thereafter violated the terms of the noncompetition agreement. Lake Land sought money damages and an order prohibiting Xxxxxxxx from engaging in any activities that violated the noncompetition agreement. {¶2} Xxxxxxxx answered and admitted that he had been employed by Lake Land from 1988 until 2001. He further admitted that he had signed the noncompetition agreement and that following his discharge from Lake Land he had formed a corporation that is engaged in a business similar to that of Lake Land. Xxxxxxxx pled lack of consideration in his answer. {¶3} Xxxxxxxx moved for summary judgment, claiming that the noncompetition agreement was unenforceable. He asserted that the agreement was not supported by consideration and that the restrictions in the agreement were overly restrictive and imposed an undue hardship on him. {¶4} Xxxxxxxx could remember very little about the presentation or execution of the noncompetition agreement. He could not remember whether he had been told that his continued employment was dependent upon execution of the agreement or whether he had posed questions about the restrictions it contained. He testified that he vaguely remembered signing the agreement after his employer presented it to him and told him to read and sign it. He acknowledged that he had read the agreement, but had not talked to an attorney or anybody else about it. The at-will relationship of the parties continued for ten years thereafter. {¶5} The trial court granted summary judgment in Xxxxxxxx’x favor. It found no dispute that Xxxxxxxx had been employed by Lake Land beginning in 1988 and that Xxxxxxxx signed the agreement in September 1991. It furt...
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT. 1. Where the vendee and builder-vendor enter into an agreement for the future construction of a residence, the vendee’s claim for breach of an implied duty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner arises ex contractu.
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT. 1. A recorded oil and gas lease is a title transaction under R.C. 5301.56(B)(3)(a).
SYLLABUS OF THE COURT. A provision in a residential-mortgage contract requiring a defaulting borrower to pay a lender’s reasonable attorney fees as a condition of terminating pending lender-initiated foreclosure proceedings on a defaulted loan and reinstating the loan is not contrary to Ohio statutory or decisional law or against Ohio public policy. (Leavans v. Ohio Natl. Bank (1893), 50 Ohio St. 591, 34 N.E. 1089, and Xxxxxx x. Xxxx (1911), 85 Ohio St. 186, 97 N.E. 372, distinguished.) XXXX, X. {¶ 1} In this case we decide whether a provision in a residential- mortgage contract requiring a borrower to pay the lender’s attorney fees as a condition of reinstatement of the borrower’s defaulted mortgage after the lender initiates foreclosure proceedings violates Ohio’s public policy. Because we conclude that such a provision does not violate public policy, we affirm the court of appeals’ judgment. {¶ 2} The 11 plaintiff-appellants (“borrowers”) in this matter filed a class-action complaint in August 2003 against various financial institutions (“lenders”), defendant-appellees herein. One of the plaintiffs, Xxxxxx Xxxxxxx, entered into a home-equity loan agreement with her lender. The agreement was secured by her primary residence. Upon Xxxxxxx’x default of the home-equity loan agreement, her lender instituted foreclosure proceedings. The agreement did not include a reinstatement provision, but it did allow Xxxxxxx to make additional payments on her balance at any time. Upon Xxxxxxx’x request, she was given a payoff statement from which she completely paid all amounts owed on her loan. The payoff balance paid by Xxxxxxx included attorney fees incurred by the lender because of the pending lender-initiated foreclosure proceedings. Once Xxxxxxx satisfied the payoff balance and resolved her default, the lender discontinued its foreclosure action against her. The attorney fees were included in the lender’s loan-payoff statement pursuant to a term in the home-equity agreement providing that “Mortgagor shall be liable to Mortgagee for all legal costs, including but not limited to reasonable attorney fees and costs and charges of any sale in any action to enforce any of its rights hereunder whether or not such action proceeds to judgment.” {¶ 3} The remaining plaintiff-appellants are borrowers who each entered into residential-mortgage contracts with their respective lenders. It is undisputed that each borrower defaulted on the mortgage and the respective lenders instituted foreclosure proce...
