and Table. 19-1 of the Technical Provisions, Developer shall set forth in the Renewal Work Schedule, by Element, (a) the estimated Useful Life, (b) the estimated Residual Life, (c) a brief description of the type of Renewal Work anticipated to be performed at the end of the Element’s Residual Life, (d) a brief description of any Renewal Work anticipated to be performed before the end of the Element’s Residual Life, including reasons why this work should be performed at the proposed time, (e) the estimated cost of such Renewal Work and (f) the total estimated cost of Renewal Work in each of the years Renewal Work is anticipated to be performed under the Renewal Work Schedule.
and Table make clear, the coefficients on the export commodity price shock variables are consistently estimated to be negative and do not vary widely in the estimated size of the effect regardless of which model is chosen. So even when accounting for alternate explanations in multiple ways, there is still strong support for Hypothesis 1. As a result of positive price shocks to export commodities, authoritarian countries tend to have lower levels of judicial independence. But how substantively meaningful are these results? The export commodity price shock variable is constructed so that it has a mean of zero with a standard deviation of 1 and a 1 unit increase in the price shock variable represents an increase of 1 standard deviation in price shocks. Because the Latent Judicial Independence scale ranges from 0 to 1, it is not immediately clear whether or not price shocks have a substantively significant effect on judicial independence. One way to examine this effect is to compare it to the average variation in year- to-year LJI scores within regimes. There is generally little year-to-year variation within authoritarian countries and the average magnitude of change from year-to-year within country is about .012, with the median year-to-year change within country being .009. In light of the magnitude of the average and median yearly change in judicial independence, an estimated deviation in yearly trends in judicial independence Price Shockt Price Shockt−1 Price Shockt−2 Competition Conflict Coup Attempts −0.00428∗∗∗ −0.00354∗∗∗ −0.00354∗∗∗ −0.00426∗∗∗ −0.00337∗∗∗ −0.00359∗∗∗ 0.06872∗∗∗ (0.02347) 0.00124 (0.003638) −0.00150 −0.00426∗∗∗ −0.00336∗∗∗ −0.00358∗∗∗ −0.00427∗∗∗ −0.00354∗∗∗ −0.00354∗∗∗ −0.00428∗∗∗ −0.00354∗∗∗ −0.00355∗∗∗ −0.00426∗∗∗ (0.00062) −0.00337∗∗∗ (0.00061) −0.00359∗∗∗ (0.00062) Mediator Adjusted? None None Pol Comp Conflict Coup All Observations 3,051 3,009 3,009 3,051 3,051 3,009 R2 0.96472 0.96556 0.96383 0.96473 0.96472 0.96383 Adjusted R2 0.95964 0.96054 0.95860 0.95966 0.95964 0.95860 (0.000746) (0.00076) (0.00062) (0.00061) (0.00061) (0.000764) (0.00077) (0.00064) (0.00064) (0.00064) (0.000788) (0.00079) (0.00066) (0.00065) (0.00066) Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 of roughly between -.0025 and -.005 as a result of price shocks is a substantively meaningful and significant shift in judicial independence.
and Table. 4.1. reveal that, although, the DMP requires higher total energy consumption or MEC servers’ energy consumption than the other schemes, i.e., SDG, SD-only and dynamic optimum, its SDs’ energy consumption is much lower than the other schemes. Specifically, the MEC servers’ energy consumption of the DMP exceeds that of the SDG by around 6%, but the SDs’ energy consumption of the DMP has a about 56% reduction compared to that of the SDG. Because the CPU cycle frequency of the MEC server is much higher than that of SD, the MEC server consumes more energy than SD under the same amount of tasks. This result implies that the DMP is much more efficient than the other schemes in allocating computation-intensive tasks to the MEC and enduring the battery life of the SDs as a result.
and Table. 3-2. The agencies' proposals should be submitted to the City pursuant to a written schedule designed to allow time for negotiation of final scopes of work and memoranda of agreement within the City's annual budget cycle. If the agencies submit the necessary documentation immediately upon license issuance, the City may be able to fund the agencies’ projects in that year upon acceptance of the license. Failure by either agency to submit a proposal on the schedule required by the City may cause that agency’s portion of the funding cycle to be delayed without further indexing (Section 2.5.1) under this Agreement. If either agency is not able to enter into a memorandum of agreement with the City for all or part of the funding due in any particular year, the agency may request that the City retain outside contractors. The scope of work for such third party contracts shall be agreed upon by the City and the agency prior to the issuance of a Request for Proposals (RFP). The negotiation of scopes of work for spending of interpretive facility funds shall be subject to the following criteria: • All amounts indicated shall be spent; if the City and benefitting agency(s) cannot agree on a scope of work covering the amount allocated to any year, the unspent amount(s) shall be carried forward to the next year. In the event of failure to agree on a scope of work or memorandum of agreement for the expenditure of funds a second time, the dispute resolution provisions of this Agreement may be invoked. The City and the benefitting agency may agree to reallocate the funds in question to another function.
and Table. 19-1 of the Technical Provisions, Developer shall set forth in the Renewal Work Schedule, by Element, (a) the estimated Useful Life, (b) the estimated Residual Life, (c) a brief description of the type of Renewal Work anticipated to be performed at the end of the Element’s Residual Life, (d) a brief description of any Renewal Work anticipated to be performed before the end of the Element’s Residual Life, including reasons why this work should be performed at the proposed time, (e) the estimated cost of such Renewal Work and
