Commonality. “[C]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury,’” and the plaintiff’s common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. x. Xxxxx, 000 X. Xx. 0000, 2551 (2011) (citation omitted). Here, the commonality requirement is satisfied. Multiple questions of law and fact centering on Defendant’s class-wide practices are common to the Plaintiff and the Settlement Class, are alleged to have injured all members of the Settlement Class in the same way, and would generate common answers central to the viability of the claims were this case to proceed to trial.
Commonality. Plaintiff has also demonstrated “[t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class” in relation to the proposed Settlement Class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Commonality. 10. Here, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Comcast entered into a series of market allocating swap and acquisition agreements with other cable companies that caused all class members to be harmed by paying supracompetitive prices. Plaintiff further alleges that all class members paid supracompetitive prices because of anticompetitive conduct. Accordingly, this Court finds the commonality requirement is satisfied.
Commonality. The threshold for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) is
Commonality. Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), even a single common question will do.” Xxxxx, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal quotation and alterations omitted); see also In re: Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14519, at *16 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013) (“We start from the premise that there need be only one common question to certify a class.”); see also Baby Xxxx x. Xxxxx, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.”). The key inquiry for the commonality analysis is whether a common question can be answered in a classwide proceeding, such that the answer will “drive the resolution of the litigation.” Xxxxx, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Applying these principles, Plaintiffs satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). The key question in this case is whether the gas produced by Chesapeake is marketable at the well and thus, whether Chesapeake may deduct the costs at issue. This is a question that can be answered on a classwide basis, satisfying Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.
Commonality. There are questions of law and fact, with regard to the alleged activities of Defendants, common to the Settlement Class.
Commonality. There are some questions of law or fact common to the Class with regard to the alleged activities of Sony in this case. These issues are sufficient to establish commonality under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Commonality. There are some questions of law or fact common 3 to the Class with regard to the alleged activities of Toyota in this case. These issues 4 are sufficient to establish commonality under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Commonality. There are questions of law and fact common to Plaintiff and the 26 Class that predominate over any questions affecting only individual members of the Class. These 27 common questions of law and fact include, without limitation:
Commonality. Common questions of law and fact exist to all members of the Putative Class and predominate over any questions solely affecting individual members of the Putative Class, including but not limited to:
