Commonality. “[C]ommonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suffered the same injury,’” and the plaintiff’s common contention “must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution – which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. x. Xxxxx, 000 X. Xx. 0000, 2551 (2011) (citation omitted). Here, the commonality requirement is satisfied. Multiple questions of law and fact centering on Defendant’s class-wide practices are common to the Plaintiff and the Settlement Class, are alleged to have injured all members of the Settlement Class in the same way, and would generate common answers central to the viability of the claims were this case to proceed to trial.
Commonality. The threshold for commonality under Rule 23(a)(2) is
Commonality. 10. Here, Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that Comcast entered into a series of market allocating swap and acquisition agreements with other cable companies that caused all class members to be harmed by paying supracompetitive prices. Plaintiff further alleges that all class members paid supracompetitive prices because of anticompetitive conduct. Accordingly, this Court finds the commonality requirement is satisfied.
Commonality. Plaintiff has also demonstrated “[t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class” in relation to the proposed Settlement Class. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Commonality. Rule 23(a)(2) requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The Supreme Court has emphasized that “for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), even a single common question will do.” Xxxxx, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (internal quotation and alterations omitted); see also In re: Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 14519, at *16 (6th Cir. July 18, 2013) (“We start from the premise that there need be only one common question to certify a class.”); see also Baby Xxxx x. Xxxxx, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994) (“The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.”). The key inquiry for the commonality analysis is whether a common question can be answered in a classwide proceeding, such that the answer will “drive the resolution of the litigation.” Xxxxx, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. Applying these principles, Plaintiffs satisfy the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2). The key question in this case is whether the gas produced by Chesapeake is marketable at the well and thus, whether Chesapeake may deduct the costs at issue. This is a question that can be answered on a classwide basis, satisfying Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement.
Commonality. There are questions of law and fact, with regard to the alleged 5 activities of Defendants, common to the Settlement Classes.
Commonality. There are some questions of law or fact common to the Class with regard to the alleged activities of Sony in this case. These issues are sufficient to establish commonality under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Commonality. Plaintiff has also demonstrated “[t]here are questions of law or fact common to the class.” 12 O.S. § 2023(A)(2).
Commonality. There are some questions of law or fact common 3 to the Class with regard to the alleged activities of Toyota in this case. These issues 4 are sufficient to establish commonality under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2).
Commonality. 14 30. There are questions of law and fact common to the Class that predominate over any 15 questions affecting only individual Class Members. These common questions of law and 16 fact include, without limitation:
17 (1) Whether SAFE HAVEN and/or DOES violated the Labor 18 Code and/or applicable IWC Wage Orders in failing to pay its non-exempt
20 (2) Whether SAFE HAVEN’s and/or DOES’ uniform policies 21 and/or practices whereby non-exempt employees were pressured and/or 22 incentivized to forego taking meal and/or rest periods.
23 (3) Whether SAFE HAVEN and/or DOES violated Labor Code 24 section 226.7, IWC Wage Order No. 4-2001 or other applicable IWC Wage 25 Orders, and/or California Code of Regulations, Title 8, section 11090, by 26 failing to authorize, permit, and/or provide rest periods to its non-exempt 27 employees for every four (4) hours or major fraction thereof worked and/or 28 failing to pay said employees one (1) hour of pay at the employee’s regular 1 rate of compensation for each work day that the rest period was not 2 authorized, permitted and/or provided.
3 (4) Whether SAFE HAVEN and/or DOES willfully failed to 4 pay, in a timely manner, wages owed to members of the proposed Class who 5 left SAFE HAVEN’s and/or DOES’ employ or who were terminated.
6 (5) Whether SAFE HAVEN and/or DOES violated Labor Code 7 section 203, which provides for the assessment of a penalty against the 8 employer, by willfully failing to timely pay all wages owed to employees
10 (6) Whether SAFE HAVEN and/or DOES had uniform policies 11 and/or practices of failing to provide employees accurate and itemized wage 12 statements.
13 (7) Whether SAFE HAVEN and/or DOES had uniform policies 14 and/or practices of failing to timely pay all wages owed to employees who 15 left SAFE HAVEN’s and/or DOES’ employ or who were terminated.
16 (8) Whether SAFE HAVEN and/or DOES had uniform policies 17 and/or practices of failing to reimburse or indemnify Non-Exempt 18 Employees for business expenses incurred as a consequence of the 19 discharge of their work duties.
20 31. The answer to each of these respective questions will generate a common answer capable 21 of resolving class-wide liability in one stroke.
22 32. Said common questions predominate over any individualized issues and/or questions 23 affecting only individual members.
