Organization of the Paper. The manuscript is structured section-wise. The related work is portrayed in Section II. A commentary about the system models is presented in Section III. The proposed scheme is exhibited in Section VI. Security analyses, both formal and informal, are discussed in Section V. The AVISPA tool is used for formal security verification and the findings are presented in Section VII. A comparative analysis is presented in Section VII. Section VIII, the final section, offers a succinct conclusion.
Organization of the Paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We start in Section 2 with some preliminaries, in- cluding a brief overview of the UC framework. In Section 3, we discuss our model in greater depth, formally specifying the asynchronous primitives we use as building blocks and motivating our novel modeling choices along the way. Section 4 contains our multi-valued asynchronous OCC construc- tion with optimal resiliency t < n/3, and its security proof. Finally, in Section 5 we present the impactful result that our OCC construction enables: a simplified and sound protocol for concurrent A-BA in expected-constant rounds. Appendix A contains our attack on the asynchronous construc- tion in [BE03] (along with the required background material), and Appendix B demonstrates that an asynchronous version of the binary to multi-valued BA extension in [TC84] works if and only if t < n/5. 2 Model and Preliminaries For m N, we use [m] to denote the set 1, . . . , m . Our protocols often use dynamically growing sets S; when S k, we denote by S(k) S the set containing the first k elements that were added to S. We also denote by F the field from which the protocols’ messages come. Our statements (in particular, the ones about statistical security) assume an (often implicit) security parameter κ which is assumed to be linear in max log F , n . We write our protocols using a series of numbered steps. The interpretation is that a party repeatedly goes through them in sequential order, attempting each instruction. Of course, in the asynchronous setting, the necessary precondition for carrying out an instruction might only be met much later in the protocol, and furthermore messages may be delayed. We discuss the latter below, in Section 2.2. Regarding the former, we frequently use statements of the form “Wait until [condition]. Then, [instruction],” which is to be executed at most once, or “If [condition], then [instruction],” which can be executed multiple times.
2.1 UC Basics We prove our constructions secure in the UC framework [Can20] and we briefly summarize it here. Protocol machines, ideal functionalities, the adversary, and the environment are all modeled as interactive Turing machine (ITM) instances, or ITIs. An execution of protocol Π consists of a series of activations of ITIs, starting with the environment who provides inputs to and collects outputs from the parties and the adversary ; parties can also give input to and collect output from sub-parties (e.g., hybrid...
Organization of the Paper. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews Xxxx et al.’s scheme, while Section 3 points out the weaknesses in Xxxx et al.’s scheme. Sections 4 and 5 present the proposed scheme and the security analysis of the proposed scheme, respectively. Section 6 analyzes the performance of the proposed scheme in terms of the computational and communication costs; and lastly, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Organization of the Paper. In section II-A we present an example of an orchestration, which is then used to illustrate the primary challenges involved in QoS studies of web services and their compositions. The example is also used in our experiments. In section III, we present our general ap- proach for contract composition and describe the TOrQuE tool supporting it. The simulations on contract composition, which x 104 show a potential for overbooking are given in section IV. In section V we introduce our technique for monitoring soft
Figure 1. Measurement records for response times, for Web service StockQuote. In fact, users would find it very natural to “soften” con- tracts: a contract should promise, e.g., a response time in less than T milliseconds for 95% of the cases, validity in 99% of the cases, accept a throughput not larger than N queries per second for 98% of a time period of M hours, etc. This sounds reasonable but is not used in practice, partly because soft contracts based on a single percentile (e.g., 95% or 99% of the cases) as above lack composition rules. To cope with this difficulty, we propose soft contracts based on probability distributions. As we shall see, such contracts compose well.
Organization of the Paper. This paper is comprised of five chapters. The first chapter is shows the proposal of this thesis. The second chapter deals with the Concept of traditional knowledge, genetic resources, their definition, objectives of TRIPS agreement.The third chapterdeals with overview of major International convention for the protection of traditional knowledge,protection of traditional knowledge in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) includinghow the standards of TRIPS agreement affect protection of traditional knowledge. In the fourth chapter I will deal with some EthiopianIP laws and proclamations and the protection of traditional knowledge related to genetic xxxxxxxxx.Xx the fifth chapter, the last chapter, I willgive conclusive remarks andrecommends the way forward/what should be done concerning protection of traditional knowledge related to genetic resources.
2.1 What is Intellectual Property?
Organization of the Paper. Section 1.1 reviews the related literature. Section 2 illustrates my approach with a simple example. Section 3 develops the main model and defines self-enforcing agree- ments. Section 4 states and proves the dense-collection principle. Section 5 applies my approach to deterministic games. Section 6 applies the approach to stochastic games.
Organization of the Paper. In the next section, we describe the asynchronous network model and formally define ABA, AVSS, AWC, AWSS and AICP. This is followed by the description of the existing tools used in our protocols. In section 3, we present our AICP, followed by our new primitive AWC in section 4; in the same section, we also compare our AWC scheme with the best known existing AWSS scheme of [25] and the ex- isting W-SVSS scheme of [1]. In section 5, we present our AVSS scheme. The existing common coin protocol from [8] is presented in section 6. In the same section, we show that a simple substitution of the existing AVSS scheme (sharing a single secret) by our AVSS scheme (sharing multiple se- crets) in the common coin protocol may lead to an incorrect common coin protocol. This is followed by the modifica- tions needed to get a correct (multi-bit) common coin proto- col. In section 7, we recall the existing voting protocol from [8], which is required along with the common coin protocol to get an ABA scheme. Finally, in section 8, we present our (multi-bit) ABA protocol.
