Culpability. The University and the Association agree that a staff member’s performance problems may be culpable (with blame) or non-culpable (without blame) in nature or may involve both culpable and non-culpable elements.
Culpability. The Enforcement Policy specifies that higher liabilities should result from intentional or negligent violations as opposed to accidental violations. It specifies use of a multiplier between 0.5 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional or negligent behavior.
Culpability. Higher liabilities should result from intentional or negligent violations as opposed to accidental violations. A multiplier between 0.5 and 1.5 is used, with a higher multiplier for negligent behavior.
Culpability. 1.2 This factor considers a discharger’s degree of culpability prior to the violation. Higher liabilities should result from intentional or negligent violations as opposed to accidental violations. The test for whether a discharger is negligent is what a reasonable and prudent person would have done or not done under similar circumstances. Under the 2017 Enforcement Policy, the culpability multiplier ranges between 0.75 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct and gross negligence. A neutral assessment of 1.0 should be used when a discharger is determined to have acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have. A reasonable and prudent person would have ensured that their project followed all applicable regulations for construction sites. A multiplier of 1.2 is assigned as the Discharger did not act as a reasonable and prudent person would have by ensuring that a QSP developed REAPs for the site for likely precipitation events.
Culpability. The Discharger constructed a Reverse Osmosis (RO) Plant to remove salt from its domestic water supply, provide higher quality drinking water to the inmates, and produce a higher quality effluent discharge from the Facility. When the RO Plant is not operational or not operating at its optimal condition, constituents that pose a concern to water quality are discharged in concentrations that the Facility cannot properly treat. In a letter from Siemens’ project manager, Siemens observed in 2011 that debris that had been accumulating on the membrane bioreactor (MBR) modules. Siemens cautioned CDCR that the lack of maintenance and cleaning of the membranes could have damaged the membranes and reduced its long term integrity. Trash and debris was again observed during a 25 January 2013 inspection by a service technician. In a letter from Evoquo Water Technologies dated 24 July 2014, CDCR was once again cautioned that the membranes collected trash and debris. The lack of operation of the RO plant, coupled with the lack of proper cleaning of the membranes, have caused the modules to lose efficiency over a period of years, and eventually, the modules can no longer be cleaned sufficiently to properly operate. A higher culpability factor is appropriate because CDCR was aware of the risk of not properly maintaining the membrane bioreactor modules and chose not to employ adequate measures and processes to prevent the accumulation of trash and debris which likely severely impaired the functionality and effectiveness of the membranes. The compromised membranes prevented CDCR from adequately treating its wastewater thereby resulting in pollution to Xxxxx Drain. A factor of 1.3 is conservatively applied. Cleanup and Cooperation The Regional Board Prosecution Team has engaged in several meetings with CDCR to discuss compliance, however, this compliance assistance process has been insufficient. CDCR staff expressed the desire to comply contending that they “have taken every step necessary to correct the deficiency.” (see Letter from Xxxx Xxxxx dated January 28 2016). However, CDCR has not complied with key requirements and actions in the CAO which were prescribed to improve its wastewater treatment system. Despite the numerous attempts to work cooperatively with CDCR, the Discharger continues to pollute Xxxxx Drain by discharging wastewater that contains constituents which exceed the mandatory limits protective of Xxxxx Drain’s beneficial uses. A factor of 1.2 is conservative...
Culpability. Violation 5: 1.4 A multiplier of 1.4 is assigned for this violation because the Discharger knew of the requirement as evidenced in SWPPPs that were submitted and certified on SMARTS on March 25, 2015, and April 30, 2019. Each SWPPP referenced the requirements of Attachment C, Section C.3 to clean streets in a manner that prevents discharge to surface water or MS4s and provided BMPs to fulfill the requirement. BMP inspection reports completed by the QSP on May 8 and 28, 2018, and June 7 and 20, 2018 identified failures to clean sediment, debris, or mud from public roads where they intersect with site access roads. The QSP continuously documented such issues at the Site indicating the Discharger’s knowledge of the requirement. Furthermore, BMP inspection reports completed by the QSP on February 7, February 20, March 14, March 27, April 26 and July 15, 2019 identified failures to clean sediment, debris, or mud from public roads. BMP inspection reports from March 14 and 27, 2019 stated that there were no functioning BMPs at the Site. Additionally, BMP inspection reports on March 14 and March 27, 2019 documented no functioning BMPs at the Site and that the front was in terrible condition. November 8 and 15, 2019 BMP inspection reports also reported that additional cleaning of Del Rey Avenue needed to be done. On April 9, 2019 Regional Water Board staff conducted a non-filer inspection and observed sand and sediment track-out on Glencoe Avenue, Beach Avenue, and Del Rey Avenue. Regional Water Board staff observed accumulated sediment, waste materials, broken sandbags, and turbid water at a curb and gutter, along a chain-linked face on Beach Avenue, without perimeter controls. Sand and sediment were observed accumulated and tracked onto Glencoe Avenue. Regional Water Board staff informed the Project Superintendent of the track-out concerns and on April 9, 2019 the Project Superintendent emailed Regional Water Board staff projected corrective actions such as cleaning the Site’s perimeter within the subsequent five days and ordering xxxxxxx or fiber rolls for installation within 48 hours. On April 11, 2019, the Project Superintendent emailed photographs showcasing areas where cleanup activities were conducted. However, the QSP’s April 26, 2019 BMP inspection report documented dirt tracked off-site in areas along Del Rey Avenue where BMPs were not installed and no BMPs along Beach Avenue in the July 15, 2019 BMP inspection report. The Discharger was therefore aware ...
Culpability. An unplanned discharge by its very nature should be considered a non-negligent discharge except when Cal Water, or its agent(s), took action or failed to act in a manner that caused or exacerbated the unplanned discharge.
Culpability. Higher liabilities should result from intentional or negligent violations as opposed to accidental violations. A multiplier between 0.5 and 1.5 is used, with a higher multiplier for negligent behavior. For the violation, the culpability multiplier is 1.2, because Cal Water did not exercise reasonable care in reacting to a pressure drop it detected on October 25, 2013, the first day of the discharge. The discharge continued until a Cal Water operator noticed water surfacing through the road bed on Xxxxxxxx Road and took actions to stop and fix the problem. At least one Cal Water inspector failed to observe the discharge during inspections between October 25 and October 28. Moreover, Cal Water’s supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system had sent notifications to its operators and managers of a suction pressure drop for pump MPS 26 beginning on October 25, 2013, at or around 11:51 p.m. Despite this notification, Cal Water did not thoroughly investigate the cause of the pressure drop and instead stated that it attributed the pressure drop to algae clogging meter screens on the supply line owned and operated by the SFPUC. Cal Water provided no evidence to support that this was a reasonable assumption to make at the time. Cal Water also did not consult with SFPUC staff at the time about its suspicion of algal growth or screen clogging within the SFPUC supply system3. Evidence shows that Cal Water staff did not contact SFPUC until October 28, 2013, after it discovered the discharge (based on Cal Water’s June 14, 2014, additional information report). SFPUC then sent crews to inspect its own system on the same day it received a call from Cal Water and found no problem within SFPUC’s system and communicated its findings to Cal Water crews working to repair the broken pipeline at the shoulder of Xxxxxxxx Road.
Culpability. The Discharger has a minor degree of culpability. This assessment is based on the fact that the Discharger had no knowledge that the laboratory it had been using was not properly certified. Therefore, the Prosecution Team assigned a culpability factor is 0.5.
Culpability. 1.2 This factor considers a discharger’s degree of culpability prior to the violation. Higher liabilities should result from intentional or negligent violations as opposed to accidental violations. The test for whether a discharger is negligent is what a reasonable and prudent person would have done or not done under similar circumstances. Under the 2017 Enforcement Policy, the culpability multiplier ranges between 0.75 and 1.5, with a higher multiplier for intentional misconduct and gross negligence. A neutral assessment of 1.0 should be used when a discharger is determined to have acted as a reasonable and prudent person would have. A reasonable and prudent person would have ensured that their project followed all applicable regulations for construction sites. A multiplier of 1.2 is assigned as the Discharger did not act as a reasonable and prudent person would have by implementing good housekeeping practices such as spill prevention and cleanup, and stockpile management using plastic sheeting and gravel bags.
