Communication Security. Modern secure communication between two remote peers is established using Transport Layer Security (TLS). In many cases, like IEEE 2030.5, the establishment of a TLS session requires mutual authentication using X.509v3 public key certificates. A DER Client will connect to a DER Server, such as a utility server, to receive a command or retrieve status information using the IEEE 2030.5 protocol. When setting up a secure TLS session, the DER Client and DER Server will perform mutual authentication using X.509 public key certificates for authentication as defined in the TLS protocol. The DER Server and DER Client have to be provisioned with certificates, as described in the use case within Section 5.4.3. The DER Client receives the DER Server’s certificate and can validate the certificate’s signature and trust chain. The DER Server receives the DER Client’s certificate and can then validate the certificate’s signature and trust chain. These validations do not provide information on the trustworthiness of the DER Client or DER Server’s cryptographic environment. For example, the DER Server will not be able to distinguish a DER Client whose private key is stored in plain text readable to everybody, from a DER Client whose private key is securely contained within a hardware protected environment like a SE or TPM. The Blockchain described within the present document allows DER Servers to independently validate the cyber- security properties of the DER Client, as described within this use case. There are three relevant actors in this use case- the Certificate Authority, the DER Client, and the DER Server, as shown in Figure 11. DER Client DER Server Certificate Authority
Communication Security. The security of our personal data and information stored in networks and network services is essential. We have therefore implemented documented measures to manage, control and se- cure our networks. Information services, users and information systems are kept separate from each other as required. We have policies and procedures for the transfer of information and data, as well as the agree- ments for the transfer of information to external bodies. Our electronic messaging is adequately protected. Among other things, we have taken measures to protect messages from unauthorized access, modification or denial of service in accordance with the classification scheme adopted by the organization. In order to protect our data, we conclude confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements as re- quired, which we review regularly.
Communication Security. (COMSEC) is the protection resulting from all measures designed to deny to unauthorised persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to ensure the authenticity of telecommunications.
Communication Security. 2.1. Information Transfer ● All data in transit (including cookies) must be encrypted to a secure standard (TLS 1.2 minimum) ● HTTPS content caching must be disabled ● System responses must not include version information about the web server components ● Any data transferred into the system must be validated for conformance against expected parameters
Communication Security. 8.1 Personal data processing resources containing personal data or which are part of the system of the processing shall be protected by adequate security.
8.2 The Data Processor shall apply up-to-date security measures for electronic messages to actively protect against viruses, malware, ransonware and other harmfull software.
8.3 Development, test and production environments shall be separated to minimise the risk for unauthorised access or changes in the production and other environments.
8.4 Data from the Data Controller cannot be used in test or development environments without removing or anonymising personal data.
Communication Security. As stated in [38], securing the communication at protocol level is very difficult in the case of IoT, since device communication and processing capabilities resources are constrained. This typically entails that bandwidth, power supply, processing capabilities, and security features have to be balanced. The model proposed hereafter has been designed under the assumption that the IoT device space can be divided into two main categories: constrained networks (NTU) and unconstrained networks (NTC) (See Networks and communication entities, Chapter 2 in [38]). The domain of constrained devices contains a great heterogeneity of communication technologies (and related security solutions) and this poses a great problem in designing a model encompassing all of them. Examples for such communication technologies can be found in the literature [10]. Moreover, there is also the problem of different functional and communication patterns between connected devices and auto-ID devices, which adds to the complexity of the situation. One solution can be to provide a security model with a very high degree of abstraction, so that the above heterogeneities can be mitigated. A very high degree of abstraction is not useful though, as it doesn’t provide enough constraints for defining a RA. The same issue may arise again when implementing a concrete architecture. As in the Communication Model (see Section 3.5), we will address the problem by introducing profiles which will group the highly heterogeneous devices into groups characterized by given specifications. Standard interfaces will also be provided in the future for making security features interoperable. On the edge between the domains of unconstrained and constrained devices, gateways have the role of adapting communication between the two domains (see Figure 26). This usually involves the adaptation between different protocol-layer implementations up to the network or ID layer (see Section 3.5). The fact that gateways are generally unconstrained devices means that they can also be used for scaling down functionalities (such as security) from the NTC domain to the NTU domain. They can also be used for managing security settings in peripheral (constrained-device) networks. Gateways have to provide the following functionalities in order to hide underlying heterogeneity: • Protocol adaptation between different networks (by definition). • Tunnelling between themselves and other nodes of the NTU domain. (Optional; impacts on trus...
Communication Security. The TA must use a pre-approved email address that must originate from the TA domain (e.g. a request from NZ Police would be required to include - xxxx@xxxxxx.xxxx.xx).
Communication Security. The security of our personal data and information stored in networks and network services is absolutely essential. We have therefore taken documented measures to manage, control and secure our networks. Information services, users and information systems are maintained separately from each other in line with demand. We have guidelines and procedures for the transmission of information and data, as well as agreements for the transmission of information to external locations. (for example CRM-Vendors) Our electronic messaging is suitably protected. Accordingly, we have taken other measures to protect the messages against unauthorized access, modification or denial of service, which comply with the classification scheme adopted by the organization. (protection class 1_E2) In order to protect our data, we conclude confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements according to needs, which we regularly review.
Communication Security. You must establish network controls to protect access to systems and applications that process data on behalf of the Four Media Network GmbH (e.g. firewall, web application firewall, IDS, etc.).
Communication Security a secure connection is used for all connections (external and internal) that are authenticated or related to sensitive data or functions; mechanisms are provided to prevent deterioration of the security of the connection.
