Legal Reasoning. The court of appeal held that the contract entered into by the shipper, the Children's Memorial Hospital, with the carrier, Federal Express, clearly limited the liability of the carrier to $100, and although the contract provided the shipper with an opportunity to declare a higher value, the hospital did not do it. Under these circumstances of this case, it would seem unreasonable and unjust to hold Federal Express liable to Hampton. If Federal Express had known of the contents of the package, it might have charged a higher rate, exercised additional care, have obtained insurance, or might not have accepted the responsibility. Since Federal Express had no knowledge of the contents, and hence could not reasonably foresee the injury and damages that could be suffered, plaintiff Hampton cannot recover on its cause of action founded in tort. Federal Express, however, does not appeal from the district court's award of $100 in damages to Hampton, on partial summary judgment. Hence, Federal Express' liability is limited to $100, the amount declared in the airbill.
Legal Reasoning. The Supreme Court held that:
Legal Reasoning. The appeal court ruled based on that the documents illustrated what has been termed “the usual practice” in the making of bargains. One party indicates what he will do and what he requires in exchange and the other then agrees. This constituted offers which, when accepted by broker, constituted contracts. The contract is bilateral because it contains mutual promises made in exchange for each other by each of the two contracting parties. The only contemplated contract between the owner is a unilateral contract – a promise to pay commission for series rendered, but such an offer of a promise to pay a commission for services render is revocable by the owner by notice before the broker has rendered any part of the requested service. Moreover, an owner who puts his land on the hands of a broker for sale usually clearly promise to pay a commission but a broker rarely promises in return that he will produced a purchaser, although he often promises that he will make certain efforts to do so.
Legal Reasoning. The Superior Court judge determined that this was an oral gratuitous pledge, with no indication as to how the money should be used, or what the Congregation was required to do if anything in return for this promise.” There was neither legal benefit to the promisor nor detriment to the promisee, and thus no consideration. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record that the Congregation's plans to name a library after the decedent induced him to make or to renew his promise. A moral obligation is not a legal obligation.
Legal Reasoning. An agreement was made between both parties and after the action was performed they came to an agreement that the money will be held in the bank earning interest. It was founded upon a good consideration and therefore is valid and enforceable. It is not essential in order to make out a good consideration for a promise to show that the promisor was benefited or the promisee injured, a waiver of any legal right at the request of another party is a sufficient consideration for a promise. The nephew had a legal right to use tobacco and drink alcohol. He gave up this right for a period of years to comply with the promise hence the requirement of consideration was met. Therefore the contract was enforceable.
Legal Reasoning. The court of appeal held that while it is true that Texas enacted statutes legalizing some forms of gambling, such statutes hardly introduce a judicially cognizable change in public policy with respect to gambling generally. Although Xxxxx could have used the loaned chips for non-gambling purposes at the Casino, it is undisputed that they were in fact used exclusively for gambling. Xxxxx'x gambling debt therefore fits squarely within the terms of the public policy of Texas prohibiting enforcement of gambling debts owed to gambling participants incurred for the purpose of gambling.
Legal Reasoning. The concluded that the alleged false representations in the subject brochures were not statements of “opinion” or mere “puffing.” They were, in essence, representations that the DC-10 was a safe aircraft. Here, the evidence is overwhelming that Xxxxxxx' representations, that the landing gear were designed to breakaway from the wing without rupturing the wing fuel tank were material and Continental justifiably relied on them.
Legal Reasoning. This court has long recognized and applied the doctrine of impossibility as a defense to an action for breach of contract, Under that doctrine, “where from the nature of the contract it appears that the parties must from the beginning have contemplated the continued existence of some particular specified thing as the foundation of what was to be done, then, in the absence of any warranty that the thing shall exist ... the parties shall be excused ... [when] performance becomes impossible from the accidental perishing of the thing without the fault of either party
Legal Reasoning. FIRST. — These acts described, as well as those by persons who would bear the responsibility as material or intellectual authors, who would have held under their guard and custody the detainees, and who would have authorized or performed the acts described, could constitute several violations of Articles 608, 609 and 611 (3 in fine) and (7), in relation to Articles 607-bis (1), 8 and 173 of the Spanish Penal Code, in relation to the Geneva Convention on the treatment of prisoners of war and protection of civilians, dated 8/12/1949, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatments or Punishments, dated 12/10/84, ratified by Spain on 10/19/87, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Humane [sic – Tr.] and Degrading Treatment and Punishments, dated 11/26/1987, ratified on 5/2/89 and Articles 65(1)(e) and 23(4) of the Framework Law for the Judicial System (Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial), All of them being members of the American military or intelligence, as well as all those who executed and/or devised a systematic plan of inhuman and degrading torture or ill-treatment against the prisoners held in their custody, captured within the framework of the declared armed conflict in Afghanistan, and accused of terrorism.
