PPAs Sample Clauses

PPAs. The PPA's shall be in full force and effect as of the ----- Closing Date.
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PPAs. Related to the three categories of power purchase agreements that can be used to serve Western Interconnection Member load as described in Rate Schedule No. 281, Tri-State and United Power have agreed the net Proposed Buyout Amount is $0.00 for the Renewables PPAs, Basin CROD PPA, and WAPA Agreements, so the Final Western Interconnection PPA Adjustment upon withdrawal will not result in a credit or debit to the Final Payment Amount (as those terms are defined in Rate Schedule No. 281).
PPAs. Related to the power purchase agreement serving Eastern Interconnection Member load as described in Rate Schedule No. 281, the Final Eastern Interconnection PPA Amount will be calculation pursuant to the FERC-accepted and effective version of Rate Schedule No. 281 as of April 24, 2024.
PPAs. Related to the power purchase agreement (i.e. the Basin All-Requirements PPA) serving Eastern Interconnection Member load as described in Rate Schedule No. 281, the Final Eastern Interconnection PPA Amount of the Basin All-Requirements PPA will be the CMVE (as those terms are defined in Rate Schedule No. 281).
PPAs. An internationally standardized definition is also not yet available for PPA, Power Purchasing Agreement. At the EU level, the above-mentioned RES Directive (EU 2018/2001 Article 2 Definition (17)) defines that “renewables power purchase agreement means a contract under which a natural or legal person agrees to purchase renewable electricity directly from an electricity producer.” The definition given by XXXXX (2018) is more specific that is “an arrangement under which a company enters into a long-term contract with an independent power producer or a utility and commits to purchasing a specific amount of renewable electricity or the output from a specific asset (sleeved or virtual), at an agreed price”. Having these, this paper defines PPA as “a medium-to-long-term electricity supply agreement concluded between a seller (plant operator) and a buyer, e.g. an energy supplier or final electricity consumers, such as large industrial consumers, data centres, and large buildings”. In principle, PPAs have a very wide scope of application, which can include a wide variety of design forms. This makes the scientific discussion more difficult because PPAs are a collective term for various different types of contracts, which do not necessarily have a novelty value, compared to the current status of known energy contracts. Classic direct marketing or electricity trading contracts, for example, also fall under this term according to their wording. The only defining feature of any PPA seems to be that it is a civil law contract in the electricity sector with certain individually designed conditions to the contract contents which are to be regulated compellingly. This concerns, for example, a remuneration agreed for the purchase of electricity. In the current discussion, however, it is also regularly a question of certain additional elements of an electricity purchase or purchase that can qualify a PPA: This concerns, for example, the negotiation of a comparatively long contract term, if a PPA is intended to secure the refinancing of an investment in renewable energy plants, the passing on of guarantees of origin as proof of the green electricity property or the proof of further characteristics of the electricity to be supplied, such as a certain regional purchase. PPAs are often, but not necessarily, regarded as a counter-model to FIT or FIP/MP support. In addition, the focus is particularly on forms in which electricity is sold and supplied directly from a producer or d...
PPAs. 4.2.1 Overview of incentives and barriers for market actors in each model Type of market actor Incentives and opportunities Barriers and threats Table 11: Incentive/opportunities and barrier/threats of PPAs 4.2.2 Potential positive and negative impacts for markets and the energy system in total 1) PPAs could promote post-FIT renewable plants to continue their production and an investment on new renewable plants in a post-FIT era, as both the existing or planned projects (cf. chapter 3) and the analysis of incentives and barriers for market actors in the previous subchapter reveal. There seem to be far less barriers and threats for all actors in the market, suggesting that an implementation of PPA is much easier compared to a P2P trading. This also implies that PPAs could be employed for promotion of renewables in the short to medium term, while at least in Japan P2P trading could be seen as a much longer-term tool in the future, since even PPA has not widely been implemented yet in the country. In other words, over the next decade or so, PPAs could become a main driver to increase renewable energy at a large scale. This would be an important benefit for the energy system in total. At the same time, preparations for P2P trading, addressing a number of issues identified including costs of IT devices, or privacy risks of consumers/prosumers, would proceed for an eventual implementation of P2P trading. P2P trading also seems more appropriate for smaller to medium generators, prosumers, and consumers than direct PPAs. However, green power suppliers concluding PPAs with large generators (such as the Greenpeace Energy example in Germany), and aggregation of generators e.g. through VPP for marketing via PPA, could also enable the use of PPAs for smaller generators and consumers – although not so much for connecting prosumers to each other. A further exception from the empirical finding that PPA has so far mainly been available for big consumers or suppliers is the special model in Germany aiming to enable tenants to purchase electricity from a PV plant on the building they live in (named ‘Mieterstrom’ in German). 2) In contractual relationships between large generators, suppliers, and large customers, the margins are usually much smaller than in the traditional supply of residential and other smaller final customers. Therefore, the potential economic efficiency gains for society will also be much smaller. For on-grid PPA, this may mean that smaller incentives and ...
PPAs. For deciding on whether to support the development of PPAs through policies, and if so, how to support it, policy should take the same principal decision: does it wish to continue with a FIT/FIP/MP scheme, including auctions for FIP/MP, or rather with market solutions? The crucial requirement for broad success of PPAs is that the cost of FIT-expired renewable energy generators or even of new generators is lower than the supply prices achievable or consumers in the general electricity market or at least the green electricity market. Currently, given the projects mentioned in chapter 3, this seems to be the case for on-site PPAs using PV in both Germany and Japan, and for on-grid PPAs with FIT-expired wind power plants and new large- scale PV in Germany. Even with a continued FIT/FIP/MP scheme, there may be market niches for these types of PPAs. Just as for P2P trading, we recommend that policy-makers should continue to legally allow and enable the use of PPAs but closely monitor their development. For example, if on-site PPAs grow a lot in capacity, this may erode the revenues of DSOs and TSOs. It may create the need to change the grid fees for consumers benefitting from such PPAs, so that they cover a fair share of grid costs. In Germany in any case, the model that has been created by law o supply tenants from a PV plant on the roof of the building they inhabit (called “Mieterstrom” in German) should be improved to make it more successful. Japan may consider to analyze the usefulness and feasibility of similar on-site models for multi-family houses. 1.2: 1) a kind of “macro-PPA” regulation or 2) a “2nd FIT period” scheme. As discussed in chapter 5.1.2 as well, an alternative to on-grid PPAs for new investments without the FIP could be to offer a special slot in auctions for FIP/MP to customers interested in direct power purchase from new installations. This may ensure that both these consumers and the general public pay the same average price for electricity from new RES-E capacities. 6.1 Conclusions and recommendations for P2P trading and PPAs 1) enabling the continued economic operation of the post-FIT renewable plants, for which their FIT support period ended; their numbers and capacity will be increasing, particularly for wind and solar plants from 2021 in Germany, and a large number of residential roof- top solar plants even from 2019 in Japan; 2) financing new renewable power plants in a post-FIT era without FIT/FIP-type payments, as it may be useful...
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