Safety modelling and analysis Sample Clauses

Safety modelling and analysis. The first part of this section contains a comparative, critical review of the SOTA in model-based safety analysis, a relatively new field of research that has dynamic grown and yielded a plethora of new results over that last fifteen years. The review discusses important results and identifies techniques that could provide a basis for the definition of appropriate safety/error modelling & analysis concepts in EAST-ADL2. The second part of this section focuses on ISO 26262, the emerging automotive safety standard. The standard is likely to influence developments in the sector and should, therefore, be also considered towards the definition of relevant concepts in EAST-ADL. 3.1.3.1 Model-Based Safety Analysis Model-based safety analysis is an increasingly important technique in the design of safety-critical systems. This is particularly true of Real-Time Embedded Systems (RTES), which are growing ever more complex and which are increasingly distributed across a networked architecture or incorporated into cooperative systems. Often RTES are used in order to improve the safety of a system; for example, Electronic Stability Control in vehicles have been shown to be effective in maintaining control and saving lives by significantly reducing the number and severity of crashes [14]. Because RTES are widely used in safety-critical industries such as the automotive and aerospace industries, it is vital to be able to perform a thorough and accurate safety analysis of those systems to ensure they meet their dependability requirements. By identifying areas in a system where reliability or safety is deficient, actions can be taken to remedy the weaknesses and thereby improve the design of the system. Firstly, because the analysis takes place using informal knowledge of the failure behaviour of the system, the safety analysis is stored separately from the knowledge of the structure of the system, which is typically modelled more formally, and this can result in discrepancies or inconsistencies. Secondly, the primarily manual nature of the analysis process increases the risk of introducing errors or producing an incomplete analysis, particularly as the systems in question grow more intricate. Furthermore, a manual analysis is usually much more difficult and expensive, meaning that it is rarely carried out more than once and often only at the end of the design process to ensure that the design meets safety requirements, despite the potential benefits that multiple safety a...