Safety Assessment. APSA. Supporting procedures applicable to the Letter of Agreement published in MATS Part 2
Safety Assessment. 1 Perform site specific safety hazard assessment related to project.
Safety Assessment. APSA. Supporting procedures applicable to the Letter of Agreement published in MATS Part 2
A.1 Map of the Airspace
Safety Assessment. APSA. Supporting procedures applicable to the Letter of Agreement published in MATS Part 2
A.1.1 The defined areas are detailed in 2.3. Maps depicting the areas are shown below.
A.1.1.1 Scottish Upper Area (North and South)
A.1.1.2 Scottish Lower Area (North and South)
Safety Assessment. The ENGINEER shall review the crash history within the corridor for the most recently- available ten (10) years to identify crash patterns, identify high crash locations, and identify potential near-term and long-term safety improvement strategies. The ENGINEER shall follow the Federal Highway Administration’s (FHWA’s) systemic safety planning process to identify sites for potential safety improvement and suggest projects for safety investment not typically identified through the traditional site analysis approach. The systemic safety planning process builds on the FHWA guidance to develop State Highway Safety Programs (SHSPs) and structure a Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) using data-driven processes. The four-step process uses basic types of crash, roadway, and traffic volume data that are recommended by FHWA for use in safety analysis efforts. Systemic safety planning is the process of evaluating an entire system using a defined set of criteria to identify candidate locations for safety investments to reduce the occurrence of and the potential for severe crashes. The systemic approach to safety is a complementary analytical technique intended to supplement the traditional site analysis approach and results in a more comprehensive safety management program. The systemic approach to safety: Shall identify a "problem" based on system wide data, such as rural lane departure crashes, urban pedestrian crashes, or rural unsignalized intersection crashes. These crashes are often spread across the network with few or no locations experiencing a "cluster" of crashes during a typical 3 year analysis period. Shall look for characteristics (e.g., geometry, volume, or location) frequently present in severe crashes. These characteristics, also known as risk factors (For purposes of the Systemic Safety Project Selection Tool, the term "risk factor" DocuSign Envelope ID: 9E4E3B84-8519-409C-AEF8-0383FB0D2E89 refers to a common characteristic of the locations where severe crashes occurred; therefore, the presence of a risk factor at other locations is an indicator of the potential for a future severe crash.), can be used to identify and prioritize locations with few or no crashes that could be potential candidates for safety investments. Shall focus on deploying one or more low-cost countermeasures to address the underlying circumstances contributing to crashes on a majority of roads. Addressing crash types experiencing low densities (crashes per intersect...
Safety Assessment. The study confirmed good safety and tolerability profiles for AFM13. All doses from 0.01mg/kg to 7mg/kg once a week, and 4.5 mg/kg b.i.w. proved to be well tolerated and safe. The MTD was not reached. No trend for increased cytokine release has been observed after AFM13 treatment.
Safety Assessment. Additional research is needed to identify how the capabilities of airborne wake vortex systems and vulnerability of follower aircraft can properly be taken into account in wake vortex safety assessments (see §6.2) and using which metrics (see §5.5.2.5). • Definition of means of compliance and safety case requirements Probably the biggest hurdle towards the development of airborne systems aiming at reducing wake turbulence separation requirements while assuring today’s safety level is the uncertainty with regard to means of compliance and safety case requirements. While there have been recent advances related to wake turbulence safety assessments (e.g. A380, WIDAO), these primarily take into account the characteristics of the wake vortex but not specifically the capabilities of the follower aircraft. Industry will remain cautious towards developing new aircraft wake vortex systems as long as it is unclear if and how such systems’ new capabilities will be taken into account in future separation standards and how such systems can be qualified.
Safety Assessment. The safety of DF treatment will be assessed by analysing:
1. Non-fatal major bleeding (any bleeding requiring transfusion of at least 2 blood units or requiring surgery).
2. Minor bleeding: any bleeding which does not meet the definition for Major Bleeding.
3. Any adverse reaction causing treatment withdrawal.
Safety Assessment. The Safety Assessment shall be an investigation, to arrive at a judgement, based on evidence, and on the suitability of the Rail Infrastructure System and its constituent elements, that all the conditions for safety acceptance have been satisfied. The results of these activities shall be documented in the Safety Assessment Report.
1. Contractor shall provide for the role of Independent Safety Assessor (ISA), in accordance with the requirements of EN50129 as directed by the Authority.
2. Contractor shall submit for Approval its proposal for the appointment of an ISA within 4 weeks following NTP.
Safety Assessment. In all situations concerning assault and/or abuse, assess and take necessary immediate measures to ensure client’s safety.
