Withdrawal Penalty. An Interconnection Customer shall be subject to a Withdrawal Penalty if it withdraws its request from the Queue or the Generating Facility does not otherwise reach Commercial Operation, unless (1) the Utility determines that, consistent with Good Utility Practice, the withdrawal does not negatively affect the timing or cost to interconnect of equal or lower queued projects; or (2) the cost responsibility for the Interconnection Facilities and Upgrades identified for that Interconnection Customer in the current DISIS Phase 2, Phase 3, or Facilities Study report increased by more than twenty-five percent (25%) compared to the costs identified in the previous DISIS report.
Withdrawal Penalty. Except as provided in Appendix 8 of Transmission Provider’s QF-LGIP, an Interconnection Customer shall be subject to a penalty (“Withdrawal Penalty”) if it withdraws its Interconnection Request or the Generating Facility does not otherwise reach Commercial Operation unless (1) the withdrawal does not negatively affect the timing or cost of other projects within the same Cluster as determined by Transmission Provider; (2) the Interconnection Customer withdraws after receiving the most recent Cluster Study Report and the costs assigned to the Interconnection Request identified in that report have increased by more than twenty-five percent (25%) compared to costs identified in the previous Cluster Study Report; (3) the Interconnection Customer withdraws after receiving the individual Facilities Study report and the costs assigned to the Interconnection Request identified in that report have increased by more than 100 percent compared to costs identified in the most recent Cluster Study Report. For the avoidance of doubt, Small Generating Facilities participating in the Cluster Study process pursuant to Article 7 shall not be subject to Withdrawal Penalties.
Withdrawal Penalty. A shareholder may withdraw from being a shareholder. The shareholder withdrawing shall give a 30 days’ notice of such an intention in writing to the Public Officer. In making a payment, the value of the shareholder shall be the shareholding as calculated at the end of the month preceding the month where the notice to withdraw was received, less all debt and penalties. There shall be a withdrawal penalty; this penalty is split into two: ● A 3% penalty on the accumulated shareholding for all the years before the withdrawal financial year ● A 20% penalty on the accumulated shareholding for the withdrawal financial year Example: Xxxxx has an accumulated shareholding balance in his account of R10 000 since joining Itenity. Xxxxx’s accumulated shareholding is R3 000 for the withdrawal financial year. Withdrawal penalty = [3% x R7 000] + [20% x R3 000] = R210 + R600 = R810 Withdrawal payment to Sipho = Total shareholding – Withdrawal penalty = R10 000 – R810 = R9190 All payments to shareholders will be a transfer to the shareholder’s preferred bank account and no other forms of payment shall be used.
Withdrawal Penalty. If any party withdraws from the negotiations relating to the Project or from the Amended Project Agreements at any time prior to the Phase I Project Acceptance Date, the remaining parties will receive the withdrawing party's equity interest on a pro-rata basis and will assume all responsibilities and benefits flowing from such equity interest. The withdrawing party shall pay all direct out-of-pocket costs, up to an aggregate of $50,000 to all other parties together, incurred by the remaining parties and the Project as a result of such withdrawal. For purposes of this Paragraph 10, PTEC shall be deemed not to be a party.
