DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. In Xxxxxx’x opinion, the amended and restated contract between PG&E and CalRENEW-1 merits CPUC approval:
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. In Xxxxxx’x opinion, the amended and restated contract between PG&E and Shiloh Wind Project 2 merits CPUC approval: • The CPUC found the original PPA to be reasonable, including its pricing, which is unaltered in the amended contract. While Xxxxxx currently ranks the PPA’s contract price as high and net market value as likely low compared to recent competing proposals, the relevant peer group considered by the Commission when approving the original PPA would have included competing proposals submitted to PG&E’s 2006 and 2007 RPS solicitations, not perfect foresight of market conditions in 2017. • The insertion of provisions for PG&E to exercise a buyer curtailment option ' provides ratepayers with a material benefit with no change in contract price. This allows PG&E to avoid taking delivery of the project’s energy when CAISO market prices turn negative, when ratepayers would otherwise pay the facility for delivering a product that is worth less than zero. The CAISO is already experiencing a modest frequency of such negative- price episodes and could experience more as additional intermittent resources are built and come on line in California. Xxxxxx does not have an independent estimate of the value for incorporating the buyer curtailment option into the Shiloh Wind Project 2 PPA. PG&E performed a valuation of the new buyer curtailment option based on net market value (rather than Portfolio-Adjusted Value) as the metric. Using the utility’s current model inputs, PG&E’s net market value methodology attributes a value ' to the option, as the present value of ratepayer benefits through avoiding purchases of energy during periods of negative market pricing. This estimate does not count additional system benefits that the Portfolio-Adjusted Value methodology would ascribe to the curtailment option beyond the net market value of energy. • By taking on the role of scheduling coordinator from the seller, PG&E’s ratepayers will be exposed to a greater likelihood of paying CAISO imbalance costs and penalties. It is not yet evident how much costlier to ratepayers the incidence of imbalances for this facility will be under the revised CAISO tariff. Xxxxxx does not have a basis for estimating the incremental average cost to ratepayers of PG&E taking on the scheduling coordinator role. That being said, PG&E’s ratepayers already absorb these risks for hundreds of megawatts of projects under contract, and the number will continue to rise as new contracted projects come on...
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. Xxxxxx concurs with PG&E management that the ERP contract amendment merits CPUC approval, although Xxxxxx has a few reservations about the amendment, described in greater detail in the confidential appendix to this report. In Xxxxxx’x opinion the contract
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. Xxxxxx concurs with PG&E management that the SGS-1 contract merits CPUC approval. In Xxxxxx’x opinion the contract offers moderate net value, a moderate contract price, moderate portfolio fit, and moderate to high project viability. It would contribute to PG&E's efforts to meet its long-term RPS Goals, and will likely also support its short-term RPS goal under flexible compliance rules. Xxxxxx’x opinion is that negotiations between parties were conducted fairly, and that the resulting contract is fair to ratepayers and to competing developers.
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. Xxxxxx concurs with PG&E management that the Shiloh III contract merits CPUC approval. In Xxxxxx’x opinion the contract offers moderate to high net value, low contract price, moderate portfolio fit, and high project viability. It would contribute to PG&E's efforts to meet its short-term RPS Goals and its long-term target as well. The negotiations resulted in a contract that varies in interesting ways from PG&E’s Form Agreement, but Xxxxxx’x opinion is that, overall, the result is fair to ratepayers and to competing developers.
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. In Arroyo’s opinion, the 83WI 8ME contract merits CPUC approval:
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. Based on an opinion that the North Star Solar contract likely ranks as moderate for net valuation and contract price, moderate for project viability, and moderate for portfolio fit, Xxxxxx agrees with PG&E that the PPA merits Commission approval.
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. In Xxxxxx’x opinion, the RE Astoria contract merits CPUC approval:
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. Xxxxxx concurs with PG&E management that the DG Fairhaven contract amendment merits CPUC approval, although Xxxxxx has a few reservations about the amendment, described in greater detail in the confidential appendix to this report. In Xxxxxx’x opinion the contract offers low to moderate net value, low to moderate contract price, and high project viability. It would contribute to PG&E's efforts to meet its short-term RPS Goals under flexible compliance rules. In particular, the contract amendment would support continued compliance with Executive Order S-06-06 regarding the goal for biomass-fueled generation in the state; it would protect against employment losses in a locality with a higher proportion of low-income residents than the state at large.
DISCUSSION OF MERIT FOR APPROVAL. Xxxxxx concurs with PG&E management that the HLP contract amendment merits CPUC approval, although Xxxxxx has a few reservations about the amendment, described in greater detail in the confidential appendix to this report. In Arroyo’s opinion the contract amendment offers moderate net value, moderate contract price, and high project viability. It would contribute to PG&E's efforts to meet its RPS Goals. In particular, the contract amendment would support continued compliance with Executive Order S-06-06 regarding the goal for biomass-fueled generation in the state. It would protect against employment losses in a locality with a higher proportion of low-income residents than the state at large.
