DMA. The term “
DMA. The term "DMA" shall mean a Designated Market Area as defined by X.X. Xxxxxxx Company from time to time.
DMA. Nothing herein shall prohibit Executive from (i) being a passive owner of not more than five percent (5%) of the outstanding stock of any class of a corporation which is publicly traded, so long as Executive has no active participation in the business of such corporation, or (ii) during the one year period following the termination of Executive's employment, owning, operating or investing in up to five (5) movie theatres, so long as each such theatre is outside of a 25-mile radius of the theatres being operated by the Company or any of its Subsidiaries or under consideration by the Company or any of its Subsidiaries for opening, in each case, as of the time of termination of Executive's employment. During the one-year period following the termination of Executive's employment for any reason, Executive shall provide reasonable notice to the Company of his plans for acquiring ownership in, commencing operations of, or investing in, any movie theatre prior to any such event. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Executive's obligations under this Section 4.2 shall terminate and become null and void if Executive terminates his employment with Good Reason.
DMA. “Designated Market Area,” as described in the Code of Federal Regulations at 47 C.F.R. § 76.55(e).
DMA. 1. Finance Management;
2. Behavioral Health, Clinical Policies and Programs;
3. Quality, Evaluation and Health Outcomes (QEHO)
4. Waiver Development ; and
DMA. The Data Act also interacts with the Digital Markets Act, for example by prohibiting the transfer of connected product data to undertakings designated as “gatekeepers” under the DMA.
DMA. If a platform meets certain thresholds relating to annual turnover (over 65 billion EUR in the last financial year), active users (over 45 million monthly active end-users and over 10000 61 DMA, recital 10. 62 DMA, recital 10. 63 European Commission 16 October 2003, COM-C/1-37415, Deutsche Telekom; General Court 10 April 2008, T-271/03, ECLI:EU:T:2008:101 (Deutsche Telekom/Commission); CJEU 14 October 2010, C-280/08P, ECLI:EU:2010:603 (Deutsche TelecomCommission);
DMA. The adoption of non-compliance decisions should lead to a dia- xxxxx between gatekeepers and the Commission, which highlights how gatekeepers plan to implement such decisions.
DMA. If a market investigation reveals that a gatekeeper has systematically in- fringed its obligations and has further strengthened or extended its gate- keeper position, the Commission has the authority to impose remedies on this gatekeeper. Such remedies may be of structural nature81 and may even lead to the divestiture of a business or parts of it.82 It is, however, stressed that such remedies may only be imposed, provided that no equally effec- tive behavioural remedy is available, or that an equally effective behavi- oural remedy is more burdensome for the gatekeeper concerned. In other words, the principle of proportionality must be observed. In our view, the structural remedies provisions should be welcomed. Under Regulation 1/2003, which also allows adopting structural (and behavioural) reme- dies,83 it is uncertain whether structural remedies could entail that parts of 80 The Commission adopted, e.g. commitments made by Amazon to no longer make use of certain parity clauses. See European Commission 4 May 2017, Case AT.40153, E-book MFNs and related matters.
DMA. One of the criteria for such designation is similar to designating VLOPs and VLOSEs, regarding the number of active users being 45 million a year. However, the designation process in the DMA also includes the evaluation of further qualitative and quantitative criteria. For example, one quantitative criterion looks at whether the yearly turnover of the core platform service provider in the EU amounts 1041 The DSA refers to “intermediation service” providers (see GLOSSARY). See Id. recs. 7–15. 1042 The DSA builds on the landmark e-Commerce Directive of 2000 and primarily includes intermediation liability rules for online businesses. Nevertheless, the DSA gives particular importance to digital platforms (including search engines) due to their reach, and, therefore, imposes special obligations to them. See Digital Services Act, supra note 38, recs. 75-76. The DSA adopts the threshold of 45 million active monthly users. Further, DSA distinguishes Very Large Online Platforms (VLOP)s and Very Large Online Search Engines (VLOSEs). 1043 Digital Services Act, supra note 38, art. 33. 17 VLOPs: Alibaba AliExpress, Amazon Store, Apple AppStore, Xxxxxxx.xxx, Facebook, Google Maps, Google Play, Google Shopping, Instagram, LinkedIn, Pinterest, Snapchat, TikTok, Twitter, Wikipedia, YouTube, Zalando; 2 VLOSEs: Google Search, Microsoft Bing. See DSA: Very Large Online Platforms and Search Engines, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, xxxxx://xx.xxxxxx.xx/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_2413 (last visited Apr 28, 2023). 1044 Digital Services Act, supra note 2, art. 33. 1045 Digital Markets Act, supra note 14, art.2(2). 1046 Id. to at least €7,5 billion.1047 For designating gatekeepers, it is essential that such core platform providers hold a particularly “durable” and “entrenched” position. 1048 Designated gatekeepers and VLOPs/VLOSEs are overlapping concepts. In case core platform services that gatekeepers provide are “online platforms” and “online search engines”, they are also VLOPs/VLOSEs. However, VLOPs/VLOSEs are not always gatekeepers (e.g., Snapchat) because they do not meet further Article 3 DMA criteria.1049 The DMA addresses structural xxxxx on the market stemming primarily from the “data power” of designated gatekeepers and promotes contestability and fairness in the EU single market.1050 The DSA and the DMA include several provisions that set boundaries for consumer manipulation via OBA. The EU legislator considered the complete ban on OBA when advertising relied on pro...
