Formalisation. 4.1. According to the wording in the paragraph of the same name in the General Part of the General Terms and Conditions of Contract.
Formalisation. According to the wording in the paragraph of the same name in the General Part of the General Terms and Conditions of Contract.
Formalisation. Confirmation of vision and objectives, decision-making framework, key issues and tasks and project programme.
Formalisation. In those negotiations in which the amount is indeterminate, the formalisation of the contract may be carried out through a commercial quotation accepted by means of a purchase order or service order.
Formalisation. Execution of legal agreement between AB and Sponsor UA through the issue and acceptance of a Grant Offer letter setting out the terms and conditions of EDF support.
Formalisation. 4.1. In negotiations where the quantity is not determined, the formalization of the contract may be performed through a commercial offer accepted by a purchase order or a service order.
Formalisation. We will use UML-B as our common language for expressing safety requirements. UML-B is one of the specification languages, which will be used for verification, cf. deliverable D.D.4.1 (Validation and Verification Strategy). UML-B has the advantage that the safety requirements and the functional behaviour can be specified in independent vocabularies, and it therefore provides a flexible yet formal language in which we can formulate and disambiguate safety requirements. Moreover, specifications in UML-B can be visualised using the graphical tools of the Rodin platform. We expect this graphical interface to be useful when communicating and discussing the requirements with our non-academic partners. At the present moment, we cannot formulate safety requirements in the property languages of the model checking tools FDR2 and mCRL2, since here a safety requirement is a formula in a logical language whose vocabulary is determined by the names of state variables and transition labels used in the formal model. By using UML-B as our common specification language, we can formulate precise safety requirements at a more general level independently of the formal model. The UML-B formalisation is easily adapted to the property languages of the tools FDR2 and mCRL2 once the formal model is available. We point out that the creation of software tools for building the formal model is a major subtask of our verification activities (cf. D.D.4.1 Documented Strategy), and it has not yet been completed at this early stage of the project. In addition, the Interlocking Model itself (deliverable D.D.3.3) is only due in Month 28, and hence a formal Interlocking Model is only available after D.D.3.3. So even if detailed safety requirements were available to us already, they can presently not be put into the formal formats required by all the verification tools. To demonstrate our approach, we present in this document an example formalisation in UML-B of safety requirements obtained from the document methodology “Mini Interlocking -- Hazards and Requirements” by X. Xxxxxxxx (Xxxxxxxx 2009) – available on the UIC extranet. X. Xxxxxxxx'x document presents a structured hazard analysis and derives concrete safety requirements.
Formalisation. In accordance with the same article in the General Part of these Contract General Terms and Conditions.
