SBA. Finance represents and warrants to, and agrees with, the Initial Purchasers on and as of the date hereof and the Closing Date that:
SBA. Lender has received a license from the U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to extend loans as a small business investment company (“SBIC”) pursuant to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended, and the associated regulations (collectively, the “SBIC Act”). Portions of the loan to Borrower will be made under the SBA license and the SBIC Act. Addendum 1 to this Agreement outlines various responsibilities of Lender and Borrower associated with an SBA loan, and such Addendum 1 is hereby incorporated in this Agreement.
SBA. 1. Delegates its 8(a) contract execution functions to the DHS, in accordance with 13 CFR § 124.501(a); delegates its authority under section 8(a)(1)(A) of the Act to enter into 8(a) prime contracts, and its authority under section 8(a)(1)(B) of the Act to arrange for the performance of such procurement contracts by eligible 8(a) Program Participants. The DHS may re-delegate this authority to all warranted DHS Contracting Officers (CO);
SBA. One or more affiliates of Agent have received a license from the U.S. Small Business Administration (“SBA”) to extend loans as a small business investment company (“SBIC”) pursuant to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958, as amended, and the associated regulations (collectively, the “SBIC Act”). Portions of the Loan to Borrower may be made by a Lender that is a SBIC. Addendum 2 to this Agreement outlines various responsibilities of Agent, each Lender and Borrower associated with a loan made by a SBIC, and such Addendum 2 is hereby incorporated in this Agreement.
SBA. Pursuant to a Loan Agreement, dated April 12, 1994, by and between the Debtors and the United States Small Business Administration (the "SBA"), the SBA loaned South Pointe $1,000,000. Such loan is secured by a second lien on a portion of the collateral for the Ocean Bank Mortgage. The SBA asserted a $970,000 claim against the Debtors. The reorganized Debtors assumed the SBA loan, and S&W Miami and the Borrower guaranteed such loan. SENIOR SUBORDINATED NOTE PURCHASE AGREEMENT SCHEDULE 3.13 trade names, fictitious names, d/b/a's of Company and Subsidiaries:
SBA. The Lenders shall have received all closing certificates, corporate documents, evidence of authorization, forms and information required by the SBA, including SBA Forms 480, 1031 and 652, and other agreements, instruments and documents in respect of any aspect or consequence of the Transactions as the Lenders may reasonably request, all of which shall be in form and substance reasonably satisfactory to the Lenders.
SBA. 1. delegates to the U.S. Department of Agriculture for re-delegation to all warranted U.S. Department of Agriculture contracting officers, its authority under section 8(a)(1 )(A) of the Act to enter into 8(a) prime contracts, and its authority under section 8(a)(1)(B) of the Act to arrange for the performance of such procurement contracts by eligible 8(a) Participants. In accordance with 13 C.F.R. §124.501(a), SBA delegates its Sea) contract execution function. SBA remains the prime contractor on all 8(a) contracts and the 8(a) Participant remains the SBA's subcontractor;
SBA. Then, protocol Πta,ts Πta,ts achieves the following security guarantees. – When run over a synchronous network: ts-validity and ts-consistency. – When run over an asynchronous network: ta-weak validity. a synchronous network. SBC
SBA in round 3 + s for each honest party Pi, so that Pi outputs v from Πta,ts Πta,ts . This proves asynchronous network. SBC
SBA. Assume that that at most ta parties are corrupted in an execution of Πta,ts Πta,ts over an [weak validity] Assume the sender P∗ is honest and has input v∗. Up to (and including) round 3, an honest party Pj sets bj := v 𝖳 only if they receive a message (v, σ) such that ∈ Vfy(v, σ, pk∗) = 1. Since corrupted parties cannot forge an honest sender’s signature, bj SBC SBC SBC { 𝖳} 𝖳 ∈ { 𝖳}a j SBC SBA v∗, in round 3 for each honest party Pj. Observe that, if bj = in round 3, party Pj does not send a message whenever they are supposed to share their input in Πta,ts ; this does not break ta-weak validity of Πta,ts , since messages can be arbitrarily delayed by the adversary. Therefore, t -weak validity of Πta,ts guarantees that b v∗, in round 3 + s for each honest party Pj. In conclusion, each honest party Pj outputs either v∗ or 𝖳 from Πta,ts Πta,ts . This proves ta-weak validity, and concludes the proof of the lemma. ⊓⊔ H Proof of Lemma 6 We sketch the proof. Assume at most ts parties are corrupted and the network is synchronous. HMPC Then, ts-security of Πts,ta guarantees that each party receives the same correct output from − the computation of fGRBL in Step 1 (which takes into account the input of all honest parties). Therefore, each honest party encrypts their (authenticated) shares of each gate of circg and sends the resulting ciphertexts to all parties. synchrony of the network guarantees that each honest party receives at least n ts > ts valid (i.e. such that the information checking protocol succeeds) and consistent shares for each gate within one extra round. Since dishonest parties cannot forge authentication vectors, even a xxxxxxx adversary cannot compromise the reconstruction of the function table entries. Together with the masked inputs and the relative keys for each input wire, as well as the masks for the accessible output wires, the (only) reconstructed function table entry for each gate allows each honest party Pj to evaluate the garbled version of circg locally and recover the output. In particular, each honest party terminates. Now, Assume at most ta parties are corrupted and the network is asynchronous. Then, HMPC ta-security of protocol Πts,ta (circfGRBL ; circg; bj) guarantees that each honest party receives − − ≥ − ≥