Contexts. A total of 77 contexts were extracted from the collected data. The major part of the contexts contained up to 2 targets: 68,8% of all contexts contained 1 target, and 20,8% contained 2 targets. Consider Figure 8:
Contexts. Session Context: depending on whether this is a BSS or IBSS configuration, the session context stores the information about the Authentication and Association states. More importantly for this mechanism, it has the information of where the Master Keys have been obtained or not from ULA. Refresh Context: includes all of the state information required to manage the AKA exchange required to: Derive the encryption keys Timers to ensure the exchange is progressing Threshold values used to synchronize when the new derived key takes effect Active Encryption Context: includes all the information required to encrypt/decrypt packets for the corresponding session STA State Machine Initialization (for each session) Session-context nil Refresh-state nil Active-Encryption-state nil Encryption Keys nil MLME-SetMasterKeys event // Set the master keys by ULA if Session-context for this session = nil skip // error; event fails else //the Session-context is populated check to see if Refresh state is active plumb the master keys and cache them for this session if Refresh-state = nil no encryption key has been derived, start the exchange to get one set the packet threshold to 0 so no encrypted traffic goes by as key is new use the newly plumbed master keys to authenticate and derive encryption keys create a new Refresh-state state transmit message 1 start message 1 timeout else // there’s already an encryption key active so we must synchronize the switch determine when (based on packet count or iv value) a switch is safe use the newly plumbed master keys to authenticate and derive encryption keys create a new Refresh-state state transmit message 1 start message 1 timeout fi fi Deauthenticate event // Disable the master keys when you deauthenticate if Active-Encryption-state = nil AND revoked key is associated with Active-Encryption-state skip // nothing to do, no encryption is active else // crypto is active; stop subsequent packets from being encrypted/decrypted with the keys Active-Encryption-state = nil fi if Refresh-state = nil skip // nothing to do, no exchange is in process else if Refresh-state nil AND key is associated with Refresh-Encrytion-Key // Revoking in a middle of exchange, abort this process anyway fi Session-context nil Session-state nil Refresh-state nil Active-Encryption-state nil Encryption key for this session nil Disassociate event (for AP or STA) if Active-Encryption-state nil disassociate Active-Encryption-state from...
Contexts. The assessment aims to provide a measure of reading performance that reflects students’ typical reading experiences. Contexts should be: • drawn from a range of curriculum areas • relevant to students • age appropriate.
Contexts. The NAPLAN Language Conventions test assesses aspects of Standard Australian English in its written form. Contexts should be: • drawn from a range of curriculum areas • relevant to students • age appropriate. As far as possible, they should be appealing to students.
Contexts. Contextual information includes problem scenarios, explanations, instructions and background text. Contexts should be: accessible meaningful to the mathematics being assessed realistic and appropriate for the year level assessed the minimum necessary to set up the problem.
Contexts. Most programming languages, including type theory, distinguish between the assertion “x is an object of type A” and the assertion “x is an object of type A and t is its value”. For example, the statement extern int x in the C programming language declares a variable x of type int, whereas the statement int x = 1 defines the value of a variable x of type int to be 1.
Contexts. The proof of U makes use of the following contexts. ∆p =df [p : Process] ∆c =df ∆p, [c : Class] c ∆rc =df ∆c, [cr : Class, lc : [ Class ], ihc : V ρ σ1 ] =∆o =df ∆cr , [hc : c = cr, o : Operation ] ∈∆o =df ∆cr , [hc : c ∈ lc, o : Operation ] =∆ro =df =∆o, [or : Operation, lo : [ Operation ], iho : W ρ σ2 [cr/c] σ1 ] c o =∆s =df ∆or , [ho : o = or, s : Statement ] =∆rs =df =∆s, [sr : Statement, ls : [ Statement ], ihs : X ρ σ2 [cr/c] σ2 [or/o] σ1 ] =∆ =df =∆sr , [hs : sr = s] =∆r =df =∆, [i : Invoke, he : p R1 (R2 (R5 c o s i)) ] ∈∆ =df =∆sr , [hs : s ∈ ls] ∈∆r =df ∈∆, [i : Invoke, he : p Process R Process Class (R Class Operation (R 5 Operation
