Court of Appeals. 27 x x x The fundamental doctrine of unjust enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or consideration. The elements of this doctrine are: enrichment on the part of the defendant; impoverishment on the part of the plaintiff; and lack of cause. The main objective is to prevent one to enrich himself at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioners used the property for several years for their own benefit having operated a restaurant thereon. Therefore, it would be the height of injustice to deprive respondent of compensation due him on the use of his property by petitioners. The fact that the parties agreed to a different mode of payment – in this case, a building – does not in any way exempt petitioners from paying compensation due to respondent for the use of the latter’s property because the building was destroyed. While we sustain the award of back rentals in favor of respondent, we do not agree with the amount imposed by the courts a quo. Petitioners should only be liable for rent during the period within which they were in possession of the leased property. Respondent himself testified that petitioner Xxxxxxx stayed in the building on the leased premises just before it was burned down.28 There was no evidence submitted to prove that petitioners were in possession of the leased property after the fire. Therefore, petitioners should be made to pay rent until that time only. To order petitioners to pay for back rentals equivalent to the cost of the building 27 500 Phil. 419, 433 (2005). 28 TSN, September 15, 1995, p. 22. is in the same way, unjust enrichment this time on the part of respondent considering that the rent due for the period petitioners occupied the leased premises is way below the cost of the building. This Court further finds the awards for moral, “temperate/compensatory” and exemplary damages lacking in factual and legal bases. As correctly argued by petitioners, these damages were not pleaded in respondent’s complaint nor proven during trial. A perusal of the complaint, as amended, reveals that respondent was praying for “P100,000.00 as damages for the violation.”29 He did not specifically pray that it was for moral, temperate or exemplary damages. It is well-settled that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading an...
Court of Appeals. An employee or the Union shall present the grievance in writing to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or his/her designee, with a copy to the employee’s immediate supervisor in the court or court-related agency to which the employee is assigned, not later than 45 calendar days after the date on which the act or omission giving rise to the grievance occurred or when the employee could reasonably have been expected to become aware of, or to have knowledge, that he/she had a grievance. The Clerk of the Court or his/her designee may require the grievant to meet with the grievant's immediate supervisor in an effort to settle the grievance informally. The Clerk of the Court or his/her designee shall take any other steps necessary to insure that a proper disposition of the grievance is made and shall reply in writing and specify the reasons for the determination to the employee or Union within 20 working days following the date of submission. In the event a grievance is not answered within the prescribed time limit, the grievance will be considered to have been passed to the second step of the grievance procedure if the Union presents the appeal as provided in Section 15.2(b)(1) or (b)(2).
Court of Appeals. 36 the Court acknowledged that, in the past, it considered an appeal to be a proper remedy when it is perceived that the order varies, or may not be in consonance with, the essence of the judgment. In such case, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some remedy available to the aggrieved party.37 Likewise, the Court, in the interest of equity or when justice demands, may interchangeably treat an appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, and vice versa.38 In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse. It is undisputed that the CA Decision dated September 29, 2006 is already final and executory. As a rule, once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty.39 The writ of execution, however, must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.40 The dispute in this case revolves around the order of execution issued by the RTC, which commanded the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff to issue an alias writ of execution ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the total amount of P504,000.00. In so ordering, it was the belief of the RTC that the monetary award included the 12% per annum interest originally provided in its decision. This is, however, in direct variance with the dispositive portion of the CA Decision, which merely provided for the award of a commission in the amount of P180,000.00 without any provision on the imposition of an interest, thus:
Court of Appeals. 46 The records disclose that the September 29, 2006 Decision of the CA modifying that of the RTC became final and executory when this Court affirmed the same in
Court of Appeals. 108 Rescission abrogates the contract from its inception and requires a mutual restitution of benefits received.
Court of Appeals we held that the findings of facts of the CA, which are generally deemed conclusive, may admit review by the Court in any of the following instances, among others:
Court of Appeals. 12 this Court reiterated the rule that in the absence of a stipulation, a party cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind a contract. A judicial or notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission (or resolution) can take place. Thus – Clearly, a judicial or notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission can take place, whether or not automatic rescission has been stipulated. It is to be noted that the law uses the phrase “even though” emphasizing that when no stipulation is found on automatic rescission, the judicial or notarial requirement still applies. x x x x But in our view, even if Article 1191 were applicable, petitioner would still not be entitled to automatic rescission. In Escueta x. Xxxxx, we ruled that under Article 1124 (now Article 1191) of the Civil Code, the right to resolve reciprocal obligations, is deemed implied in case one of the obligors shall fail to comply with what is incumbent upon him. But that right must be invoked judicially. The same article also provides: “The Court shall decree the resolution demanded, unless there should be grounds which justify the allowance of a term for the performance of the obligation.” This requirement has been retained in the third paragraph of Article 1191, which states that “the court shall decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing of a period.” Consequently, even if the right to rescind is made available to the injured party, the obligation is not ipso facto erased by the failure of the other party to comply with what is incumbent upon him. The party entitled to rescind should apply to the court for a decree of rescission. The right cannot be exercised solely on a party’s own judgment that the other committed a breach of the obligation. The operative act which 11 F.F. Xxxx & Co., Inc. v. HR Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 187521, March 14, 2012, 668 SCRA 302, 327.
Court of Appeals. 25 It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.26 (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bench, the proper recourse of NLC was to have filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 22, 2010 Order of the RTC denying its application for injunctive relief. Only after the denial of such motion can it be deemed to have exhausted all available remedies and be justified in elevating the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The petitioner is reminded that procedural rules are instituted to facilitate the adjudication of cases and, as such, the courts and the litigants are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally important that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed rules of procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.27 Only for the most persuasive of reasons can such rules be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.28 No grave abuse of discretion At any rate, even if the Court allows the premature recourse to certiorari without the petitioner having filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, the petition would still fail. Nothing is more settled than the principle that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. “Grave abuse of discretion,” as contemplated by the Rules of Court, is “the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power” that is so patent and gross that it “amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty 25 512 Phil. 210 (2005).
Court of Appeals. Within fifteen days after execution of this Agreement, the parties shall file a joint motion, and comply with any additional requirements, to suspend all proceedings on each of the following- described appeals now pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, until the District Court completes its fairness hearing and other proceedings on the Joint Motion for Judicial Approval. Within five days after the District Court's entry of its judicial approval for this Settlement Agreement, the parties shall file a joint stipulation for the dismissal, with prejudice, of all four appeals.
Court of Appeals. An agent of the seller is not a party to the contract of sale between his principal and the buyer; Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon that contract must, generally, either be parties to said contract.