Court of Appeals. 27 x x x The fundamental doctrine of unjust enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or consideration. The elements of this doctrine are: enrichment on the part of the defendant; impoverishment on the part of the plaintiff; and lack of cause. The main objective is to prevent one to enrich himself at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at another’s expense. In the instant case, there is no dispute that petitioners used the property for several years for their own benefit having operated a restaurant thereon. Therefore, it would be the height of injustice to deprive respondent of compensation due him on the use of his property by petitioners. The fact that the parties agreed to a different mode of payment – in this case, a building – does not in any way exempt petitioners from paying compensation due to respondent for the use of the latter’s property because the building was destroyed. While we sustain the award of back rentals in favor of respondent, we do not agree with the amount imposed by the courts a quo. Petitioners should only be liable for rent during the period within which they were in possession of the leased property. Respondent himself testified that petitioner Xxxxxxx stayed in the building on the leased premises just before it was burned down.28 There was no evidence submitted to prove that petitioners were in possession of the leased property after the fire. Therefore, petitioners should be made to pay rent until that time only. To order petitioners to pay for back rentals equivalent to the cost of the building 27 500 Phil. 419, 433 (2005). 28 TSN, September 15, 1995, p. 22. is in the same way, unjust enrichment this time on the part of respondent considering that the rent due for the period petitioners occupied the leased premises is way below the cost of the building. This Court further finds the awards for moral, “temperate/compensatory” and exemplary damages lacking in factual and legal bases. As correctly argued by petitioners, these damages were not pleaded in respondent’s complaint nor proven during trial. A perusal of the complaint, as amended, reveals that respondent was praying for “P100,000.00 as damages for the violation.”29 He did not specifically pray that it was for moral, temperate or exemplary damages. It is well-settled that in order that moral damages may be awarded, there must be pleading an...
Court of Appeals. An employee or the Union shall present the grievance in writing to the Clerk of the Court of Appeals or his/her designee, with a copy to the employee’s immediate supervisor in the court or court-related agency to which the employee is assigned, not later than 45 calendar days after the date on which the act or omission giving rise to the grievance occurred or when the employee could reasonably have been expected to become aware of, or to have knowledge, that he/she had a grievance. The Clerk of the Court or his/her designee may require the grievant to meet with the grievant's immediate supervisor in an effort to settle the grievance informally. The Clerk of the Court or his/her designee shall take any other steps necessary to insure that a proper disposition of the grievance is made and shall reply in writing and specify the reasons for the determination to the employee or Union within 20 working days following the date of submission. In the event a grievance is not answered within the prescribed time limit, the grievance will be considered to have been passed to the second step of the grievance procedure if the Union presents the appeal as provided in Section 15.2(b)(1) or (b)(2).
Court of Appeals. An agent of the seller is not a party to the contract of sale between his principal and the buyer; Since a contract may be violated only by the parties thereto as against each other, the real parties-in-interest, either as plaintiff or defendant, in an action upon that contract must, generally, either be parties to said contract.
Court of Appeals. An agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act.— Parenthetically, the Court of Appeals should have been cognizant of the well-settled rule that an agent is also responsible for any negligence in the performance of its function and is liable for damages which the principal may suffer by reason of its negligent act. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred when it opined that BA, being the principal, had no cause of action against PAL, its agent or subcontractor. Also, it is worth mentioning that both BA and PAL are members of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), wherein member airlines are regarded as agents of each other in the issuance of the tickets and other matters pertaining to their relationship. Therefore, in the instant case, the contractual relationship between BA and PAL is one of agency, the former being the principal, since it was the one which issued the confirmed ticket, and the latter the agent. Court ruled that the agent was not specifically authorized to grant a right of way or to agree to sell to a portion thereof. It found that the authority of the agent, under the resolution, did not include the authority to sell a portion of the adjacent lot, or to create or convey real rights thereon. Powers of attorney are generally construed strictly and courts will not infer or presume broad powers from deeds which do not sufficiently include property or subject under which the agent is to deal. The general rule is that the power of attorney must be pursued within legal structures, and the agent can neither go beyond it; nor beside it. The act done must be legally identical with that authorized to be done. This case demonstrates a strict application of the rule that the agent must act within the scope of his authority
Court of Appeals. 12 this Court reiterated the rule that in the absence of a stipulation, a party cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind a contract. A judicial or notarial act is necessary before a valid rescission (or resolution) can take place. Thus –
Court of Appeals. Historical Background:**
Court of Appeals. 36 the Court acknowledged that, in the past, it considered an appeal to be a proper remedy when it is perceived that the order varies, or may not be in consonance with, the essence of the judgment. In such case, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be some remedy available to the aggrieved party.37 Likewise, the Court, in the interest of equity or when justice demands, may interchangeably treat an appeal as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, and vice versa.38 In the present case, the Court finds meritorious grounds to admit the petition and absolve the petitioners from their procedural lapse. It is undisputed that the CA Decision dated September 29, 2006 is already final and executory. As a rule, once a judgment becomes final and executory, all that remains is the execution of the decision which is a matter of right. The prevailing party is entitled to a writ of execution, the issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial duty.39 The writ of execution, however, must conform substantially to every essential particular of the judgment promulgated. It must conform, more particularly, to that ordained or decreed in the dispositive portion of the decision.40 The dispute in this case revolves around the order of execution issued by the RTC, which commanded the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff to issue an alias writ of execution ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the total amount of P504,000.00. In so ordering, it was the belief of the RTC that the monetary award included the 12% per annum interest originally provided in its decision. This is, however, in direct variance with the dispositive portion of the CA Decision, which merely provided for the award of a commission in the amount of P180,000.00 without any provision on the imposition of an interest, thus:
Court of Appeals. 46 The records disclose that the September 29, 2006 Decision of the CA modifying that of the RTC became final and executory when this Court affirmed the same in
Court of Appeals. 25 It must be emphasized that a writ of certiorari is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of right, never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion. Hence, he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. Petitioner may not arrogate to himself the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioner must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so, which petitioner failed to do. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the petition.26 (Emphasis supplied) In the case at bench, the proper recourse of NLC was to have filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 22, 2010 Order of the RTC denying its application for injunctive relief. Only after the denial of such motion can it be deemed to have exhausted all available remedies and be justified in elevating the case to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The petitioner is reminded that procedural rules are instituted to facilitate the adjudication of cases and, as such, the courts and the litigants are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally important that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed rules of procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.27 Only for the most persuasive of reasons can such rules be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.28 At any rate, even if the Court allows the premature recourse to certiorari without the petitioner having filed a motion for reconsideration in the trial court, the petition would still fail. Nothing is more settled than the principle that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. “Grave abuse of discretion,” as contemplated by the Rules of Court, is “the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power” that is so patent and gross that it “amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty 25 512 Phil. 210 (2005).
Court of Appeals we held that the findings of facts of the CA, which are generally deemed conclusive, may admit review by the Court in any of the following instances, among others:
(1) when the factual findings of the [CA] and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
(3) when the inference made by the [CA] from its findings of fact is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(4) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) when the [CA], in making its findings, goes beyond the issues of the case, and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; 30 576 Phil. 502 (2008).
(6) when the judgment of the [CA] is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) when the [CA] fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion;
(8) when the findings of fact are themselves conflicting;
(9) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of the specific evidence on which they are based; and
(10) when the findings of fact of the [CA] are premised on the absence of evidence but such findings are contradicted by the evidence on record. (G.R. No. 109849, February 26, 1997, 268 SCRA 703, 709) Significantly, jurisprudence teaches that mathematical computations as well as the propriety of the arbitral awards are factual determinations. And just as significant is that the factual findings of the CIAC and CA—in each separate appealed decisions—practically dovetail with each other. The perceptible essential difference, at least insofar as the CIAC’s Final Award and the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 86641 are concerned, rests merely on mathematical computations or adjustments of baseline amounts which the CIAC may have inadvertently utilized.31 (Emphases and underscoring supplied) In any case, the Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal on the matter of AIC’s entitlement to damages which the CA affirmed as being well supported by evidence and properly referred to in the record. It is well-settled that findings of fact of quasi- judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by the CA.32 The CIAC possesses that required expertise in the field of construction arbitration and the factual findings of its construc...
