Land Rover Sample Clauses

Land Rover. The 2003 Land Rover, vehicle identification no. SALMB11413A106077 for assumption ox xxx xxxxxxxxx amount financed against the vehicle which Buyer will pay off within 30 days after the Closing, plus a cash payment of $14,050.00.

Land Rover. In 1994, Otokar, a Turkish company, began production of the Scorpion light reconnaissance vehicle. The Scorpion is comprised 70 per cent of Land Rover parts which are assembled in Turkey and to which machine guns and night vision surveillance cameras are added. The Land Rover parts are exported from the UK but are listed as civilian transfers and so do not require an export licence. ‘Ottokar in the past have exported such armoured personnel vehicles to Pakistan and also to Algeria’.20 GKN GKN Defence Ltd set up a licensed production agreement with a company in the Philippines to produce Simba Armoured Personnel Carriers. A total of 150 vehicles were ordered, the vast majority to be assembled at the plant of the Filipino company. The company started with the assembly of kits, progressed to importing some parts and manufacturing others, and finished up producing the whole vehicle. (Also see Xxx Xxxxx quote on opposite page.) Rolls-Royce ‘Xxxxx Xxxxx of Anti-Apartheid gave evidence to the UN Security Council in 1977 how sanctions were bypassed when British-designed equipment was made under licence in a third country and sold on to South Africa. “The most flagrant example in this area involves Rolls-Royce engines,” he claimed’.21 South Africa is a prime example. A study in 2000 compared government export criteria with the countries actually exported to. It found that 57 of the 83 countries to which South Africa sold arms between 1996 & 1999 did not comply with the necessary criteria.17 But at least South Africa had criteria. Many countries do not. A Pakistani General reported that they had ‘no ban on selling arms to specific countries. “I don’t think we have a problem on that score. Maybe Israel we wouldn’t like to sell weapons to”’.18 The US has one of the strongest export control regimes in the world, with legislation making the ‘diversion of technologies to unauthorized uses and prohibited third parties’ illegal. Unfortunately, ‘inadequate enforcement’ means that there are frequent abuses19. Some of these are shown in the box to the left. While it is unfortunate that the US enforcement is not stronger, there is at least the possibility of legal action. It would be naive to imagine that a lack of controls, as is the situation in the UK, would do anything but facilitate a much greater level of ‘diversion’. Why is it being ignored by the UK government? How are we to interpret new legislation to control arms exports which has an omission that allows it to be sy...