Detection. 2.1 Supplier shall monitor its system and its procedures for security breaches, violations and suspicious (questionable) activity. This includes suspicious external activity (including, without limitation, unauthorized probes, scans or break-in attempts) and suspicious internal activity (including, without limitation, unauthorized system administrator access, unauthorized changes to its system or network, system or network misuse or Program Information theft or mishandling).
Detection. 6.4.1 CFS undertakes a range of initiatives that centre on the analysis, prioritisation and progression of fraud related allegations. CFS continues to develop an intelligence-led capability, working together across the public sector and external organisations to share information, identify risk and develop proactive, joined-up approaches to countering fraud. Detection work includes: • Providing a confidential fraud reporting facility through the CFS website; • Providing confidential dedicated telephone ‘fraud-hotline’ reporting facility; • Intelligence Alerts warning of the latest methods being used by fraudsters; • An Intelligence Assessment of threats to NHS Scotland funds and assets • A data-analytics service focussed at programmes, processes and activities at the highest risk of fraud. • Analysis to provide fraud measurement calculations; • Development of specific toolkits that allow cross-comparative and trend analysis of data to identify indicators that may reveal fraud; • Support to Local Intelligence Networks (LINs) to promote the safer management and use of controlled drugs and to share relevant intelligence which helps to identify cases where action may need to be taken in respect of controlled drugs; • Responsibility for patient exemption checking. Fraudulent claims for exemption from NHS charges are investigated and analysed by CFS.
Detection. District 4 will modify existing written district guidance and procedural requirements for implementing the delegation responsibility, which will be published on the District 4 Design website. As indicated previously, a District Design Liaison will be appointed to ensure the consistency and quality of design exception approvals. The District's Design Liaison and experienced functional unit staff, where appropriate, will serve as subject matter experts. The District will consult with HQ DOD Resource Center, early and often, to obtain needed expert guidance and assure statewide consistency, especially on more complex or controversial projects. The quarterly report prepared by the D4 Design Coordinator will serve as a management tool to monitor the consistency and quality of delegated approvals. It will also provide information to indicate corrective action may be necessary and enable management to monitor improvements. Those in the district with delegated approval authority will also be responsible for monitoring quality and process requirements through informal communication with subject matter experts and HQ DOD Resource Center. Approved documents will be reviewed and audited periodically for key indicators and performance measures as indicated in Section 7, "Results," of the SQMP. Regular meetings will be scheduled, i.e., monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly as appropriate, to review district approved and pending mandatory design exceptions. This collaboration will assure consistency and quality throughout the District as well as statewide via the HQ DOD Project Delivery Coordinator. Participants will include District Division Chiefs, the HQ DOD Project Delivery Coordinator, the District Design Liaison and the D4 Design Coordinator. The HQ DOD Office of Performance Management will also conduct periodic reviews, measure compliance with the SQMP and assess performance measures.
Detection. Upon identification of a Serious Threat, the Requesting Party shall, as appropriate, have responsibility for:
a. Alerting all of the other Parties’ identified AIS Representatives immediately, regardless of whether a request for Mutual Aid has already been formally submitted;
b. Notifying, as appropriate, federal governments, First Nations, Métis and Tribes, local governments, Commissions and other relevant organizations or agencies in the Basin of the Serious Threat;
c. Determining the process and sources of information that shall be used in deciding on an Action or potential request for Mutual Aid; and,
d. Communicating its decision on the processes and sources of information to be used on an Action to the Serious Threat, with associated rationale, to all other identified AIS Representatives of the Parties.
Detection. The act or system of discovering and locating a fire. Direct Protection Area (DPA): That area which, by law or pursuant to the terms of this agreement, is provided wildland fire protection by the State or by the Federal Agencies. DPAs may include a mixture of state and federal responsibility areas. Direct Protection Area Maps: Official maps which identify areas of direct wildland fire protection for each agency. Equivalent: Equivalent fire protection is that which may be reasonably compared, using mutually agreed to measures such as staffing, organization, performance, and available resources.
Detection. The presence of these agents can be detected through a variety of monitoring devices available to most hazardous materials response teams and other public safety agencies.
Detection. Do we have an MCI? If yes, immediately declare to dispatch.
Detection. Where feasible, the Municipality will maintain a continuous monitoring system by which Trigger Events set forth in this Conditional Management Plan can be detected in a timely manner. The Conditional areas described in Section 4 of this CMP will be closed to the harvesting of molluscan shellfish in response to the detection of any event or disruption in the normal STP or collection system operations that results in a discharge to the marine environment that has the potential to pose a contamination risk to shellfish beyond the existing Sanitary Closure 17.3 boundary (a “Trigger Event”), as defined in further detail in Section 5.1.3. Rare events such as catastrophic failures or collection system ruptures that result in sewage discharges to the marine environment and are not specifically listed under the Trigger Event definition in this CMP, remain subject to reporting under subsection 38(4) of the Fisheries Act as well as the CSSP Emergency Closure Protocol Appendix VIII. Event or disruption detection systems in place include the following:
Detection. 1. Financial entities shall have in place mechanisms to promptly detect anomalous activities, in accordance with Article 15, including ICT network performance issues and ICT-related incidents, and to identify potential material single points of failure. All detection mechanisms referred to in the first subparagraph shall be regularly tested in accordance with Article 22.
2. The detection mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 shall enable multiple layers of control, define alert thresholds and criteria to trigger and initiate ICT-related incident response processes, including automatic alert mechanisms for relevant staff in charge of ICT-related incident response.
3. Financial entities shall devote sufficient resources and capabilities, to monitor user activity, occurrence of ICT anomalies and ICT-related incidents, in particular cyber- attacks.
4. Financial entities referred to in points (34) and (36) of Article 2 (1) of Regulation 600/2014 shall, in addition, have in place systems that can effectively check trade reports for completeness, identify omissions and obvious errors and request re- transmission of any such erroneous reports.
Detection. We designed our infrastructure to log extensive information about the system behavior, traffic received, system authentication, and other application requests. Internal and external systems (Security Operation Center) aggregate log data and alert (24/7/365) appropriate employees of malicious, unintended, or anomalous activities. Our personnel, including security, IT, Cloud Operations and support personnel, are responsive to known incidents.
